Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

310.361/6–2751: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact

Moscow, June 27, 1951—5 p. m.

2181. Dept pass USUN.¹ Refmytel 2175, June 26 and niact 2180, June 27. I saw Gromyko today at 2:30 p. m. and, after opening remarks in consonance Deptel 831 June 25, para 1, put to him orally the questions contained therein.

1. He stated that the expression used by Malik “the Soviet peoples believe” was self-explanatory and thus parried a direct answer. However, when I drew his attention to status Malik as official representative Sov Govt at seat UN, and that broadcast was from UN itself, Gromyko acknowledged that Malik was of course an official of Sov Govt, and then went on gratuitously to say he himself was willing to answer any questions on the substance of Malik’s remarks. In answer to next question he said that Soviet Govt’s views had been put forward long ago and that it had reacted favorably to British initiative in 1950 but since that time there had been no positive response from US and UK.

2. Gromyko indicated he considered cease-fire as part of what he terms “interim military armistice.” By this he said he meant that the parties fighting in Korea would meet and conclude a military armistice which would include cease-fire, and which would be limited strictly to military questions and would not involve any political or territorial matters. As to assurance against resumption of hostilities Gromyko said that this would be subject of discussion between Commands in formulating terms of military armistice.

3. Gromyko stated that conclusion of military armistice would in fact be “entering on path of peaceful settlement,” which was what Malik had in mind, and that on basis of armistice peaceful settlement could be taken up. As to latter, however, in response to query whether Sov Govt had any specific steps in mind he said it had “no proposals.” It is up to parties in Korea to decide, and that also special arrangements would have to be made for political and territorial settlements.

4. He said Sov Govt does not know what is the view of Chinese Govt on Malik’s statement and said that US may ask Chinese. When asked for suggestions how its view might be ascertained he said he felt sure that if US Govt wanted ascertain views Chinese Govt it would be able to find way to do so and that he had no suggestions.

5. In answer to question 5, he said that this was clearly set forth in Malik’s statement. When queried on precise meaning of “belligerent parties” he said that what this means is that meeting should be held between military reps of Unified Command (he specified the “Unified Command” as American troops and those of other countries participating in the war in Korea) plus South Korean Command, and of the North Korean People’s Republic Command plus representative of Chinese volunteer units.

I returned to question of relation Sov Govt to Malik’s statement and Gromyko after attempting dodge issue again merely stated he had answered questions of substance and he was official rep of USSR.

Sent Dept 2181; rptd info USUN niact 369.

Kirk

1. A note on the source text indicated that the message was not passed to USUN. Presumably, this was because the text had already been received in New York directly from Moscow.