795.00/6–2551: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
2166. Hedged though it may be as being expression of will of Soviet people rather than attitude of Soviet Govt itself and as being only first step in solution of problem, concept in Malik’s radio address that cease fire should be arranged between belligerents in Korea and troops withdrawn from 38th Parallel represents significant new turn in Soviet approach to Korea in that it abandons as immediate conditions for talks about peaceful settlement in Korea, agreement for complete withdrawal foreign troops from Korea and discussion of admission CPR to UN and disposition of Formosa. This may reflect concern over deepening difficulties in FE for both USSR and CPR and hence may be indication their willingness settle on something less than previously announced objectives. This not necessarily so, of course, and Sovs have much to gain through this maneuver by enhancing alleged position as peacemaker and if offer does result in talks of any kind, having suitable forum for pounding home free propaganda themes. However, attitude of Sov people as expressed by Malik does appear to coincide with views of UN as expressed cease fire resolution as far as first step is concerned. Hence Embassy believes it would be desirable investigate any element of sincerity that may be contained. Malik’s address does not constitute a proposal and makes no reference to machinery for getting together on basis of “belief of Soviet peoples”. Believe we shld, in any answering statement, point out that we are interested to hear Sov views but have recd no indication from Commie belligerents that they desire to take such first step toward attaining peace in Korea.
Regardless of whether or not there is element of sincerity in views expressed by Malik Emb feels that strong counter blast shld be made to propaganda argumentation preceding his remarks on a cease fire and armistice in Korea. As usual they are sophistry throughout and can be very convincingly refuted. Self righteous Sov role of peacemaker wld appear less impressive before world if we note that Korean war started with Commie aggression and that hostilities cld have ended many months ago if Peiping Reds had not intervened and if Sovs had supported UNGA cease fire res. Main emphasis shld be placed on the ridiculous nature of the Sov position which continually castigates the govts of US, UK and Fr as reactionary and as not representing their peoples (thereby by clear implication not really capable of being responsible parties to any settlement) and then scoring them for not yielding to the demands of the Soviet Union as a national state. Much play shld be given to the fact that the USSR must be obliged to take into account fact that these govts do represent will of their peoples [Page 552] and that no real settlement possible until such recognition forthcoming. Issues such as Korea settlement fully placed before peoples of those countries and policies concerned are their response. On other hand, in spite of Malik’s statements there is no evidence from inside or outside USSR that Soviet peoples are being accorded opportunity freely express themselves on settlement of Korean question or in fact any other specific international problem. Strong propaganda counter blast as suggested above wld, in Embassy opinion, in no way have detrimental effect on any possible serious discussions of matter. Even if Soviets desire with this approach to embark on path toward settlement, it is quite clear that they intend exploit every opportunity through propaganda to attain maximum support for their position on part of world public and we shld likewise not ignore any chance to do the same and above all not to let their specious arguments stand.
If Sovs hope that Malik’s proposal will produce cease fire and armistice, it is possible that Commies, in face of inability to drive UN forces into sea with present Commie commitments in Korea, have in mind one of two courses: (a) to call off war in Korea as bad job which can be renewed under more favorable circumstances. Commies wld retain control North Korea and wld hope thru subversion in ROK to make some progress. They wld also hope that with cessation Korean hostilities unity of UN states which have supported collective action in Korea wld degenerate. Also, expense of keeping large UN forces in ROK wld be expected prove unattractive as time goes on; (b) to hope to use fairly short ceasefire period for improvement Commie mil sitn in North Korea to extent necessary to make further military effort.
Dept pass London, Paris, Tokyo. Sent Dept 2166, rptd info London 396, Paris 679, Tokyo 39.