693.0024/6–2551: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
1087. Re Deptel 970, June 21.1 Impressions POW team re conditions North Korea China, capabilities CCF, based purely fon interrogations recent prisoners as follows:
CCF morale entering last offensive good. Surrenders due hopelessness mil position. POW’s report no food 2 or 3 days before capture, consequent breakdown discipline order. Psychological war operations encourage surrenders under these conditions. Morale based primarily on confidence victory thru numbers, record. Fourth FA victories December, January, promise rotation after 2 front-line battles.
Majority CCF troops China North Korea ex-CNA men. Many express pro-KMT, anti-CCP sentiments in POW camp, but battle records testimony others indicate this attempt secure preferential treatment. Believe ex-CNA troops in gen reliable, well-trained fighters for CCF.
Most CCF units Korea equipped Soviet weapons transport. Soviet troops training units seen Manchuria, no Soviets reported with CCF units in Korea, CCF propaganda effectively portrays war as Chinese not Soviet, Soviet aid as that of an ally. No feeling CCP becoming Soviet puppet.
Conditions North Korea greatly deteriorated. Food shortage, with [Page 550] extreme hardship some starvation among civilians near east-central front-line areas. CCF stopped requisitioning local food supplies about end April. Farm production down. Less than one-fifth fields cultivated near front-line areas, although to rear probably most land planted. Labor shortage, absolute lack fertilizer expected reduce yields. North Korean army now consists of manpower remnants; its effectiveness greatly reduced below July 1950, now useful principally in guerrilla-like operations, and probably will decline with casualties. North Korean regime operating at low effectiveness. Major effort to maintain farm output. Tenacity and ingenuity shown in effort restore rail lines major roads, but these efforts largely frustrated by continued bombing.
Hardship resulting deterioration North Korean army civilian morale. Food shortage blamed on CCF. Rising animosity noted reciprocated between CCF troops and North Korean troops civilians.
Strain on CCF transport serious. Deterioration quality rations major source troop discontent during May. Mobility of troops limited by necessity rely fixed supply depots.
POW’s agree best CCF armies destroyed. Peng Teh-huai2 said personally directing last offensive to insure victory. Large number replacements evidenced, including new recruits of few months service and experienced troops from units in China. POW’s believe CCF can and will continue fight, but quality of troops will drop. Mobilization program China regarded as source of ample new recruits, evidence CCF ability willingness sustain tremendous losses. POW’s agree manpower short in northeast North China to point affecting farm output, believe future replacements from newly organized militia forces South China.
No serious unrest opposition to CCP reported within China.
Guerrillas successfully suppressed Szechwan, local militia now maintaining order. Reduced guerrilla forces may exist Kweichow, Yunnan. Guerrillas aligned with lawless predatory elements, generally discredited. Morale villages generally reported low due draft tax levies, but no evidence either active passive opposition.
Believe CCF has capacity continue pour disciplined armies into Korea, but due logistical difficulties cannot mount dangerous offensive barring significant increases Soviet commitments. Believe stalemate wld increase North Korean resentment towards CCF, increase CCF difficulties.
Sent Dept 1087, rptd info Tokyo 199.