Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

357.AD/6–2151

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (Green)

confidential

[Washington,] June 21, 1951.

Mr. Johnson (NA) told me yesterday, as a result of a telephone call which I made to him, that the Secretary had discussed with Under [Deputy] Secretary of Defense Lovett the question of the relationship agreement between the United Nations Command and UNKRA.

It had been arranged that Mr. Lovett would take this matter up with the Joint Secretaries of the Defense Department today. In preparation for that meeting the paper attached was supplied by FE to Mr. Lovett. I assume that the paper was cleared with someone in UNE but there is no indication of that. Mr. Johnson apologized for not having kept us informed of developments and sent me the attached copy of the paper at my request.

Mr. Hickerson and I have read the paper and we think it is a good presentation of the subject.

Please return the attachment to me.

Durward V. Sandifer

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

confidential

[undated.]

The Problem:

To determine the relationship between the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and the United Nations Command; specifically, the action to be recommended to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the letter of May 16, 1951, from the Secretary of State on this subject.¹

Chronology:

The United States sponsored and strongly supported the establishment of a United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1950.² In deference to the United States point of view and recognition of the fact that the United States would be the major contributor, an American, Mr. Donald Kingsley, was appointed Agent General of this organization.

In February Mr. Kingsley agreed in principle, in consultation with General MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo, to a complete command relationship between CINCUNC and UNKRA until the termination of hostilities.

In March Mr. Kingsley advised the United States Government after strong objections from the United Nations Secretary General, the United Kingdom, Canadian and Australian Governments, it would not be possible for him to accept this command relationship for all phases of UNKRA activities.

In May Sir Arthur Rucker, Mr. Kingsley’s Deputy, reached an agreement with General Ridgway in Tokyo involving independence in a very limited sphere of activity with tight coordination and complete power of veto by CINCUNC. CINCUNC recommended to the Department of the Army that this arrangement be accepted stating that the division of responsibility was regretted but that this was the best agreement it could get. The Secretary of State’s letter of May 16, 1951, supports this position.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they do not concur in the arrangement recommended by UNKRA, CINCUNC and by the Department of State and have stated, “that from the military point of view, the JCS believes it absolutely essential for CINCUNC to retain undivided command over all economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue.”

Discussion:

Economic assistance activities in Korea now include:

1. Provision of direct civilian relief assistance such as food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies and other consumer items.

2. Provision of other categories of needed supplies which serve common military and civilian purposes.

3. Provision of necessary equipment, raw materials and other supplies for the Korean civilian economy, together with appropriate technical assistance.

4. Assistance to local authorities to insure the proper distribution, issue and utilization of essential civilian supplies.

5. High level technical advice and assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

6. Planning for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea.

All parties concerned entirely agree that the first four of the above mentioned items must continue to be the entire responsibility of CINCUNC during the period of active hostilities. In accordance with the Secretary of State’s letter of May 16, 1951, all UNKRA personnel engaged in such activities will be integrated into the staffs or units of the United Nations command until hostilities cease and CINCUNC concurs in UNKRA assuming these responsibilities.

Under the agreement arrived at between General Ridgway and UNKRA and recommended by the Secretary of State, UNKRA would be responsible for the performance of the last two of the above mentioned activities with complete coordination with the United Nations command and complete freedom by the United Nations command in determining whether any plans or recommendations by UNKRA effect his military mission and if so determined, complete power of veto by the UN command over the implementation of such plans or recommendations.

There is attached a draft letter from the Department of State to the Agent General of UNKRA which is acceptable to the Department of State as a replacement for the similar draft letter enclosed with the Secretary of State’s letter of May 16, 1951.³ This new draft is entirely consistent with the arrangements between UNKRA and General Ridgway but clarifies certain obscurities in the original draft letter.

It is the belief of the Department of State that these arrangements do not conflict with the principle of undivided responsibility of CINCUNC. The understanding gives to CINCUNC sole responsibility for short term economic aid, and an absolute veto over any plans or recommendations of UNKRA in the field of high level technical assistance and long range planning. Thus the substance of control remains with CINCUNC embodied in an understanding which will ensure that:

1. UNKRA can and will promptly undertake the very urgent and vital task of strengthening the non-military aspects of the ROK Government to correspond with the program for strengthening the ROK armed forces.

2. UNKRA will carry out necessary planning on a realistic basis for its post-hostilities operations and will be in position promptly to undertake such operations when able to do so.

3. There is maximum participation in and contributions to the relief and reconstruction task in Korea by other members of the UN.

4. There is an early announcement that UNKRA has undertaken some tasks in Korea which will assist in offsetting the present very adverse Korean reactions to public discussions of UN military objectives, as well as assist in offsetting the adverse effects of the deactivation of ECA which will be completed June 30.⁴

1. Not printed.
2. See the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1297.
3. Neither draft is here printed, but the draft attached to this memorandum was substantially similar to the text of the letter as sent by Mr. Acheson to Mr. Kingsley on July 11, p. 656.
4. Telegram 1686, June 21, from New York reported that Mr. Kingsley was greatly concerned over the long delay in approval of the UNC–UNKRA agreement and by rumors that the Unified Command in Washington had rejected it. The telegram went on to say that Kingsley was apparently fully prepared to withdraw UNKRA personnel from Korea if the stalemate continued. The U.N. Secretariat in turn was deeply concerned over what this move would mean for the entire role of the United Nations in Korea and the attitude of the governments participating in UNKRA and the emergency relief program. (357.AD/6–2151)