Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

357.AK/6–551: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

New York, June 5, 1951—7:13 p. m.

1608. Eyes only for Hickerson and Rusk. Re GOC efforts. Ross and I called on Grafstrom and Padilla this afternoon and at their request I reviewed our attitude towards suggestion for GA peace approach as follows:

1. We had received no reply from Chicoms on approaches GOC had made.

2. The cards of the UN and the UC had, however, repeatedly been laid face up on the table.

3. We felt that if any approach at this time would serve a useful purpose it would be a discreet (confidential) approach rather than a public one as envisaged by their suggestion.

4. In considering any arrangements for a cease-fire the security of UN forces must be primary consideration. This in turn involved (a) arrangements guaranteeing that the aggression had ceased, and (b) arrangements guaranteeing against any resumption of hostilities.

5. In any action taken there must not be any implication of “repeal” of the implicit authority contained in the Oct 7 res permitting UN forces to go beyond the 38th Parallel as might be necessary from military viewpoint.

On last point Padilla inquired whether we had in mind implicit authority to go beyond 38th Parallel if necessary would continue even after a cessation of hostilities. I replied that in our view there should be no limitation on military action unless arrangements (guarantees) which we considered indispensable were provided against resumption of hostilities. This would involve, I added, necessity of being able to observe objectively that there was not in fact any action which might lead to resumption of hostilities.

Grafstrom said that he thought GOC members fully understood our views, which he added he felt might be boiled down to a simple objective of guarantees against resumption of hostilities. This in turn, he said, would of course involve right of reconnaissance and right even to strike in order to prevent resumption of hostilities.

Appearing to agree, as he had last Friday, with our view that a private approach would be preferable to a public one if any approach at all were worthwhile, Grafstrom then went on the question whether there was anything further GOC could do that it has not already done. Only thing that occurred to him was an attempt to contact the Russians. Also appearing to agree with our view, Padilla said that another possibility would be an effort to contact the NK’s. He realized, he said, difficulty of getting in touch with them. He recalled, however, a conversation with Katz-Suchy¹ in which latter had inquired why GOC had not followed up NK approach. Padilla had replied that (a) GOC did not know attitude of Chicom Govt toward NK approach, and (b) did not know how NK authorities could be approached. Katz-Suchy had replied that prominence had been given to NK approach in Chinese media and that so far as approach to NK’s was concerned NK’s had an Amb in Peiping who could easily be approached. Padilla then observed to us that an approach to NK Amb in Peiping might be made through one of the govts having relations with Peiping.

Elaborating this possibility Padilla said that an oral approach to NK’s through channel indicated inquiring whether NK authorities would be willing to establish contact would involve no disadvantage if rebuffed by NK’s. They would have no document which would be useful to them for propaganda purposes and they would have no GOC commitment which they could misuse. Padilla summarized that he had in mind a possible approach that would (1) not commit UN in any way; (2) would not give any basis for a propaganda barrage; and (3) would not commit GOC in any way.

Referring to apparent desire of GOC to make some report to GA, I expressed view that a negative and discouraging impression would be created if they merely reported their failure to date. Whether or not they filed a report was, of course, their decision to make. I suggested, however, that they might wish to consider deferring any report at this time until possibly after another approach. Grafstrom said that their idea of reporting to the GA was wholly tied to their suggestion for possible GA action; if GA action were not going to be sought they would not make a report.

Grafstrom went on to summarize his view as to possible approaches as follows:

1. He did not see that there was anything further to be done vis-à-vis the Chicoms. He said the Feb 14 communication from Entezam still stands and technically cannot be changed. It is available to the Chicoms for response at any time they wish to make a response.

2. The remaining possibilities would be approaches to the NK’s and the Russians. The only aim of such approaches would be to establish contact “without giving anything away”, the purpose of contact being to have “preliminary discussions”.

Padilla thought that in addition to possible approaches to Russians and NK’s a new query might be made to Peiping. In this connection he wondered whether the newly designated Swedish Amb to Peiping might not appropriately make such an inquiry.

On purely hypothetical assumption that there might be need for further consultations with them I inquired concerning mechanics contact with GOC in view of fact Grafstrom plans to leave for Sweden on Friday and Padilla had talked of necessity visiting Mexico. Grafstrom still hopes very much to leave by ship on Friday. At the moment he plans to return at end of August but would be available to return to New York by air on moment’s notice. Padilla hopes to go to Mexico at end of June, among other things in order to avoid necessity of having to go to Geneva for ECOSOC and Art 73 mtgs this summer. He also could fly back on moment’s notice. They both assured us that they would work out mechanics of their arrangements in such a way as to be able to deal with any matters which might arise.

In course of discussion both Padilla and Grafstrom indicated while they had not discussed specific proposals with other dels they have strong impression that general psychology among UN members is that they want to get something done, that with UN military position now good there is general feeling this is opportune moment to “do something”. Grafstrom said many people currently emphasized 38th Parallel.

Gross

1. Juliusz Katz-Suchy, Permanent Representative of Poland at the United Nations.