Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–2551

George F. Kennan to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

New York, June 5, 1951—7 p. m.

Mr. Matthews: The following is the report which I promised you by phone a few minutes ago.

The reception today was the same as the other time, if anything even more cordial and with a greater freedom of exchange.

After some talk about other things, I again introduced the subject of Korea. I said I had thought at length about our last conversation. I could understand, I said, why the Soviet Government might not care to express itself in this way on the questions I had introduced. But there was, as I hoped he would recognize, good reason on our part for making the inquiry. If we were to approach with a view to arriving at a cease-fire, the regimes whose forces were opposing us in Korea, a number of questions would certainly arise in which the Soviet Government would surely experience an interest and in which it would be useful for us to know their views. Who should be invited to participate in conversations looking to a cease-fire? What should be the status of the discussions? If a control commission were established to supervise the execution of the cease-fire, what countries should furnish it with its members and personnel? In the absence of any knowledge of the views of the Soviet Government on these matters we would have no choice but to work them out as best we could with whoever would talk to us. But in these circumstances we could certainly give no assurance that the arrangements arrived at would be ones agreeable to the Soviet Union. It had seemed advisable, therefore, to me that some effort be made to see whether there were views the Soviet Government wished to express in regard to these matters, and I had taken the liberty of advising our Government accordingly.

I pointed out, as an example of the problem, the dilemma we would be in if the Chinese Communist forces just disappeared again from the Korean scene. Who could give us any assurance, in this case, that they would not reassemble their forces and intervene again in Korea at some future date.

My host then stated that he was in a position to say the following to me:

The Soviet Government wanted peace and wanted a peaceful solution (uregulirovanie) of the Korean question—and at the earliest possible moment. However, since its forces were not participating in the hostilities in Korea, it did not feel that it could take part in any discussion of the question of a cease-fire.

He did not know whether I wanted his personal advice, but if I did, it would be that the United States Government get into touch with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in this matter.

I told him that I found his statement a clear one and would take careful note of it. I could understand, as I had said before, why his Government might wish to take this position. I could not tell him what action my Government would take—whether or not, that is, it would wish to pursue the line he had suggested. But if it did, and if questions arose in the discussions which were of interest to the Soviet Government but on which, in the circumstances, its views could not be directly consulted, then I trusted his Government would take note of the fact that an effort had been made on our side to take account of a possible Soviet interest, and our conversations with others would not be taken as an indication that we were trying to solve the Korean problem for all times with no regard whatsoever to Soviet views and interests.

I said that if, as matters developed, they felt the need of any further discussion of this sort I would be glad to be useful in any way that I could. He replied by reiterating that they did not feel that they could take part in discussions of this subject for the reason that he had indicated. (I gathered that this was simply because his instructions allowed for no other reply.)

In order that the Department may have a full record of what was said, and not that it adds anything to the picture of Soviet reactions, I may add that I said to him, in the course of this discussion, that I thought we would find it hard to rely on anything the Chinese Communists or North Koreans might promise. He could, I conceded, counter this by saying: “Do you find it easy to rely on what we say”? My answer to that would be that I did not believe in the relevance of the word “trust” to the relations between great powers with conflicting ideologies, but I did believe in the value of what one actually knew about, [the] other party. The Soviet Government, so far as I could observe, was run by people who took a serious and responsible attitude toward what they conceived to be their own interests. The Chinese Communists on the contrary, seemed to us to be be excited, irresponsible people, on the consistency of whose reactions there could be no reliance.

He replied by charging that we were the people who had excited them, and by complaining about American statements to the effect that no agreement with the Soviet Union was worth anything. I said that in my opinion it depended on the subject of the agreement and the extent to which it corresponded to the interests of both parties. I was sure, I said, that he realized that there could be various attitudes towards agreements, even in the communist world, and reminded him of the reassuring words of Lenin to a disturbed party comrade who had deplored the Brest-Litovsk treaty and had said that at least he hoped it was not being observed on the Soviet side. Lenin, I recalled, had replied: “What the hell do you think we are? We have already broken it forty times.”

In general, the conversation, like the first one, was replete with efforts on the part of the other gentleman to bring up the global complaint against American policy.

So much for the conversation. Now a word or two about my own analysis of it.

With regard to the reply, the following seems to be evident:

1. It was plain that he had memorized this statement and attached great importance to it. (I got him to repeat it before I left, so that I am quite sure of its tenor.) There is no question in my mind but that it represented precisely what he had been instructed by Moscow to say. I am also certain that an instruction of this nature on such a subject must have had Politburo approval. It should therefore be taken as a major policy statement of the Soviet Government—more significant, rather than less, by virtue of the fact that it was intended for communication in a non-public channel.

2. The words “at the earliest possible moment” (kak mozhno skoree) are, in my opinion, highly significant. They would not have been used without most careful consideration. They may even contain a note of warning: namely that if Korean hostilities do not cease in the near future, Soviet interests—in the view of the Kremlin—will be adversely affected. In any case, this is a hopeful sign, from the standpoint of arriving at an early cease-fire.

3. I take this reply to indicate that Soviet influence has already been brought to bear on the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists to show themselves amenable to proposals for a cease-fire. This should not be taken to mean that their attitude in any such discussions will be characterized by good will, sincerity, or cooperativeness. They will make all the trouble they can, and probably advance extreme and absurd demands initially. I would think it likely, however, in the light of the Soviet reply, that cease-fire arrangements could finally be obtained from them with firmness and persistence on our part and at a cost in nerves and temper no greater than that which was involved in the final settlement of the Berlin blockade.

4. It is significant that on this second occasion no mention was made of the wider problems of international affairs in the Far East, such as Formosa, the Japanese peace treaty, etc. I think this may mean that the Soviet Government would like to see a cease-fire even if it did not involve a solution of these wider problems. We would make a mistake, however, in my opinion, to conclude from this that the Soviet Government would be willing, or indeed able, to put overriding pressure on the Chinese Communist regime to abandon (initially, at any rate) its desire to see these questions coupled with the Korean question. While I would accordingly attach no absolute and final significance to this Soviet omission, I think it nevertheless an encouraging sign and would doubt that the Chinese Communists would be able to maintain their position indefinitely, in the absence of Soviet support.

5. While the Soviet Government has been reluctant to participate directly in discussions looking to a cease-fire, we may expect that its desires and interests will find some reflection in any positions that may be taken by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. The North Koreans would be more likely to appear as the exclusive mouthpieces of the Kremlin; but the necessity to coordinate their statements with those of the Chinese Communists may mean that we cannot take even their statements as the pure distillation of Kremlin views. Nevertheless a high degree of Kremlin influence will be reflected in any discussions that representatives of those two regimes may conduct, and it will be up to us to figure out where one thing begins and the other thing ends.

For whatever it is worth, I would like to add a word about my impression of my host, whom I had not met before. I hold him to be one of the better Soviet types; not just a secret policy agent like some of his colleagues. I believe that he is substantially sincere in his enormous bitterness and plaintiveness against the conduct of our Government—his sincerity having, of course, a respectable admixture of that genius for rationalization which distinguishes the Soviet mind. I told him that he was making a great mistake in viewing the statements and activities of our Government as the end-product of some Wall Street conspiracy, and that insofar as these views of his might ever have had any relevance to reality they were at least twenty or thirty years out of date. This made no impression on him nor did I expect it to: I was just keeping up conversation. He is interested in this country but tortured in his interpretation of it, by his ideology, his genuine disgust with certain manifestations of American life, and the pathological envy and sense of inferiority that overcomes many Soviet personalities when they view our material achievements. The result is a distortion of vision more pathetic than sinister. “You see our country,” I said to him, when leaving, “as in a dream.” “No, this is not the dream,” he replied, with a certain air of desperation, “this is the deepest reality.”

One word more, for whatever it is worth. I hope that we will not hesitate to grasp at once the nettle of action directed toward achieving a cease-fire. We may not succeed; but I have a feeling we are moving much closer to the edge of the precipice than most of us are aware, and that this is one of the times when the dangers of inaction far exceed those of action.

1. A typewritten note attached to the source text indicated that Grace Marshall, Mr. Kennan’s secretary, received a telephone message at her apartment on June 4 at 6 p. m. informing her that the gentleman Mr. Kennan had asked to see (i.e. Mr. Malik) could meet with Mr. Kennan on Tuesday, June 5, at 3 p.m. at the site of the previous meeting (see footnote 4, p. 462).