795.00/6–551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Korean Fighting
| Participants: | Mr. Henri Bonnet—French Ambassador |
| Mr. Pierre Millet—Counselor, French Embassy | |
| Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State |
The French Ambassador came in to present some views of his [Page 505] Government about a further step to bring about an end to the fighting in Korea. The French Government believed that the military situation indicated that the time was ripe for a new move toward a settlement. The French believed that the heads of government of the United States, United Kingdom and France might join in a tri-partite declaration to Moscow, with perhaps the United Kingdom making a similar démarche to Peiping at the same time. Such a tri-partite declaration would be public. Although the three western governments could not speak for the United Nations, they were responsible for the maintenance of peace and it would be appropriate for the three to take this action.
The French proposal envisaged a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone north of the 38th parallel which would be under the administration of the United Nations (UNCURK) and subsequent negotiations limited to the subject of Korea.
I asked the Ambassador if they had any information of any sort that Moscow or Peiping was interested in a settlement. He said that they had none. I asked him then whether he looked upon such a public move as a move to assist in producing a settlement or as a move to bring about collateral political advantages in the western world and in the United Nations. He stated that he thought the French Government looked on such a public declaration as a step which might lead toward an actual settlement.
I told the Ambassador that we were ourselves seriously considering what further move might be desirable but that we were dubious about the efficacy of a public move in moving us closer to a settlement. I said that a public declaration might have important collateral advantages. I told him we were also concerned that a public statement might rebuff the Communists if it contained more than our minimum position, that if it contained solely our barest minimum position it would create public discontent in South Korea and misgivings among sections of the American public and that discontent would be difficult to handle unless we were able to establish peace on the basis of our position.
In leaving, the Ambassador indicated that the French and British were having some talks on the same subject.1
- On June 13, Ambassador Bonnet handed Mr. Rusk a draft tripartite statement (not printed) along the lines indicated in the above memorandum. Mr. Rusk remarked that the United States might have some thoughts on a tripartite as against a broader statement and that for the moment the United States did not quite concur in the French idea of a tripartite declaration. (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Rusk, June 13; 795.00/6–1351)↩