357.AK/6–151: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1599. Eyes only for Hickerson and Rusk—Re Korea. Ross and I met with Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom at lunch today and communicated to them substance of Deptel 953, May 29. I elaborated two points as follows: First, whether their proposed move would contribute to solidarity and unity of UN or the contrary, drawing conclusion that proposed move would be divisive rather than unifying; second, whether proposed move would be persuasive to Chi Coms, drawing conclusion that public approach of this character, given history of their attitude towards UN moves, would force them to antagonistic attitude.
Grafstrom agreed that approach would probably be divisive. He felt that argument on persuasive effect was hypothetical, but he was inclined to agree that proposed move would not be persuasive but contrary. Noting what we had said about possible greater efficacy approach through diplomatic channels, including GOC or otherwise, he questioned whether statement of aims necessary to provide a basis for diplomatic effort. He had in mind statement that would cover three points as follows: (1) Cease-fire on basis Dec conditions; (2) restoration of status quo ante on 38th parallel; (3) peaceful settlement re Korea (avoiding any commitment whatsoever concerning Formosa, Chi representation, etc.).
We warned against attaching too much symbolic importance to 38th parallel as such, particularly from point of view of avoiding UN action which might hamper mil tactics. Grafstrom and Padilla both again emphasized they attached great importance to political value 38th parallel as symbol.
Padilla discoursed at great length covering ground already gone over by him. Commenting on two points I raised, he said re first point that naturally we would not go into Assembly with move such as they had in mind without diplomatic preparation adequate to assure that move would contribute to unity rather than contrary.
Re second point Padilla said Chi Coms might fail to respond or reject any moves along suggested line. Even if they did so, however, two points would be clarified in their minds: (1) Dec cease-fire conditions stand as valid; (2) Oct Res would be clarified in sense UN forces would not go beyond 38th parallel if cease-fire could be arranged. (In this connection Padilla commented US generals in current hearings have emphasized we cannot throw Chi Coms out of NK.)
In addition to these points Padilla stressed following two points [Page 496] which he had covered earlier: (1) Russians have very substantial advantage in that they have initiative in present situation. No one knows what is in their minds but they seem clearly to have choice to make between two alternatives: (a) Bring about peaceful settlement in Korea, thereby relaxing tension and in turn slowing down free world rearmament effort; or (b) attempt to embroil US and free world more and more not only in Korea but in China and elsewhere, thereby immobilizing substantial part of western strength. (2) If they choose latter course by taking initiative in air attacks on US naval forces off Formosa (or by stirring up trouble further afield, e.g. Iran) demand for further action against aggressors will be overwhelming. Admiral Sherman had testified, Padilla went on, that further action such as naval blockade should have support of UN. Padilla doubted whether we would get UN support for further action in absence of prior new attempt at peaceful settlement which had demonstrably failed.
In general Padilla felt we were dealing in UN with vacuum situation requiring positive steps on our part.
We carefully noted comments made by Grafstrom and Padilla, and since Grafstrom still plans to leave for Sweden next Friday1 for remainder of summer we agreed to meet with them again Monday afternoon.2