357.AK/5–3151
Memorandum by John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Discussion Between Amb. Padilla Nervo and Tom Hamilton Re Peaceful Settlement in Korea
At his request Padilla Nervo called on me this morning as follows:
On the day last week of Hamilton’s first New York Times article on rumors of as Soviet “peace feeler”1 Hamilton called on Padilla and had a general discussion of the prospects of a peaceful settlement in Korea. Padilla discussed pretty frankly with Hamilton his current thinking about a General Assembly move, giving to Hamilton in effect the gist of the suggestions that Padilla and Grafstrom gave to Hyde and me last Friday at lunch (USUN’s 1585, May 25). Padilla’s interview with Hamilton was apparently before he had discussed his suggestions with Grafstrom or Entezam. At the end of the interview Hamilton asked if he could publish Padilla’s views. Padilla refused to permit this.
Hamilton kept after Padilla and on last Tuesday (May 29) called Padilla and, referring to his story in that morning’s New York Times concerning Malik’s “denial” of peace feelers, asked Padilla whether the latter did not feel that in the light of Malik’s “denial” it would now be appropriate to publish the material Padilla had given Hamilton last week. Hamilton seemed to have the impression that Malik’s denial somehow changed the picture. Padilla again refused to assent to publication, saying that he did not see how Malik’s statement altered the situation and indicating further to Hamilton that since their interview he had passed his ideas on to his GOC colleagues and to the U.S. Delegation. Hamilton, however, got Padilla to agree to look at a story Hamilton had written on his interview with Padilla.
[Page 477]Padilla received Hamilton’s story yesterday evening, May 30, when Hamilton again telephoned him. Meanwhile in the course of the day yesterday someone from the New York Times office telephoned Padilla about Hamilton’s story, indicating that Hamilton had apparently already filed it. Hamilton again tried to get Padilla to release the story and again Padilla refused. It was left that Hamilton would call Padilla again today.
Padilla was very much concerned by the foregoing situation and said in view of Hamilton’s apparent determination to run his story in one way or another he thought he had better let us know right away. He wondered whether there was anything we could do to stop publication of the story. He gave me a copy of the story to read. It gave pretty well the gist of the proposal which Padilla and Grafstrom discussed with us last Friday with some variations which Padilla said were Hamilton’s and not his.
I made no comment on the substance of Hamilton’s story. I told Padilla that while we always wanted to be helpful I just did not know of any steps we could take to prevent publication of the story. If there were any steps available to us I doubted very much whether it would be advisable to take them. To do so, I felt sure, would simply blow the story up and create more rather than less embarrassment for all concerned.
I told Padilla I could readily understand the embarrassment he would undergo if the story were published. I also indicated that I felt publication of this kind of story was a hindrance rather than a help to the process of peaceful settlement.
Padilla said that he felt Hamilton was very sincere in feeling that publication of the story at this time would be helpful. In the light, for example, of a recent Lippmann story which made quite an impression on delegations here, Hamilton felt that it would be a good thing to reemphasize at this time the conditions Gross and Crittenberger gave last December to the Cease-Fire Group and to clarify the status of the five principles. I commented that I had not the slightest doubt of Hamilton’s sincerity but it was simply unthinkable that a newspaperman could have the necessary information and background to formulate a judgment as to whether a particular procedure was a good thing or, if it were a good thing, to determine whether and at what time and in what form such a procedure should be followed.
Padilla said he had always found that Hamilton had respected background conversations. He did not seem altogether hopeful that he would be able to prevent Hamilton from publishing the story; he hoped at least that he could persuade Hamilton to leave his name out of it. (Padilla’s name was very prominently used throughout Hamilton’s piece.) Padilla said he would be very particularly embarrassed if [Page 478] it were revealed that he felt since the United States were no longer wedded to the five principles in so far as they related to Formosa and Chinese Representation that the United Nations should recognize this as a new situation.
I sympathized with Padilla and said I thought the best thing for him to do was to be entirely frank with Hamilton, telling him that he had relied on his discretion in the past and hoped he could in the future.
Since I had the impression that Padilla was, in small part at least, persuaded that Hamilton’s idea of publicity for the latest GOC suggestions was a good thing, I thought it best to give Padilla a forecast of the Department’s attitude towards those suggestions as expressed in the Department’s 953, May 29. (Gross and I have in mind communicating the Department’s views officially to Grafstrom and Padilla together.) Padilla said that he felt there were two useful purposes to be served by early Assembly action, if not exactly then somewhat along the lines of their approach last Friday. First, he said if it should become necessary in the future to take further action against the Chinese Communists (he referred in this connection to Admiral Sherman’s comments concerning a naval blockade)2 it would be well to have on record beforehand a clear statement of United Nations aims which have been repudiated by the Chinese Communists. Second, Padilla felt that we should not minimize the risk (a) that other Members of the UN would agitate the question of peaceful settlement on the basis of the five principles, or (b) that the Chinese Communists themselves may sue for peace (e.g. by responding to Entezam’s communication) on the basis of the five principles.
Regarding the first of these points Padilla seemed quite convinced that we would be unable to get the Assembly to agree to further action that might be necessary in the absence of another UN try for a peaceful settlement. With regard to the second point Padilla felt that it might be very embarrassing to us and to a good many other UN Members if the Chinese Communists sued for peace on the basis of the five principles.
In anticipating the Department’s probable reaction to the Padilla-Grafstrom suggestions I stressed that realistically we could probably not expect much to come of UN public action if there had not been adequate diplomatic preparation through the Good Offices Committee or other diplomatic channels. This point seemed to register with Padilla but it was quite clear to me that he feels some prompt action in the peaceful settlement field is necessary.