795.00/5–3051: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1593. Re Korea and other matters. Following is report of conversation between Bebler (Yugo) and Cory during ride back from Flushing yesterday:
Titoism in Communist China:
Cory told Bebler he had noticed recently what appear to be divergencies between respective propagandas of Chi Com and USSR. He said that ChiComs apparently made no comment on recent Johnson res on Korean cease-fire although it was heavily emphasized in Sov press. He also mentioned that ChiCom propaganda lately has placed little stress on Sino-Soviet friendship and has been playing down Korean war in domestic press and propaganda. Cory also pointed out that ChiComs, contrary to usual practice, delayed almost a week in commenting on May 18 GA res re economic sanctions, adding that when ChiComs did, this comment placed little stress on expectations that Sov economic aid would alleviate effect of sanctions. When asked what significance, if any, he attached to this, Bebler replied with seeming elation that any development of this kind has significance in Communist countries. He said that under present circumstances he would attach to these developments very considerable importance because they tend to reveal grave and growing tensions which he is sure must now exist between ChiComs and USSR and recalled his previous views on subject (see USUN tel 1374, Apr. 6) as well as Yugo analysis of divergencies between ChiCom and Sov May Day slogans.
[Page 474]Peace settlement in Korea:
Bebler contended he feels time has come when USSR is ready for bilateral US–USSR talks leading toward Korean settlement along 38th parallel. He commented he has felt this to be true ever since Stalin’s self-interview of Feb 16, and said he thinks bureaucratic bumbling of Sov Govt is perhaps responsible for Sovs having so far failed to express themselves more clearly on subject. He said he was struck by moderation of Malik’s statements May 17 and 18 in GA first comite and plenary session1 and said that he thought Malik could not possibly have taken less temperate attitude, whereas he obviously could have done much more to make propaganda and sabotage proceedings if his government had so instructed. Bebler tied this in with Malik’s May 28 denial of US–USSR peace talks, pointing out Malik specifically did not say USSR is wrong party for US to contact for settlement Korean war and that Malik’s denial was unusually quiet and non-polemical.2
Cory asked Bebler why he thought USSR would be interested in Korean settlement. Bebler replied this was simply because Far East situation has become too serious for Sovs, who do not want global war, and that Chi Communist military defeats have placed USSR in position where total victory in Korea can be achieved only by open Sov intervention, a stake for which USSR is afraid to play. Bebler added that he thinks Sovs fear another UN invasion of North Korea principally because of loss of prestige which that would involve for USSR all through Asia. Bebler admitted as another reason that Sovs of course also fear approximation of US power near their borders but claimed that this is secondary consideration because from strategic point of view USSR has capacity to force US units off Korean Peninsula at any time global war may come.
Influence of certain Sov officials:
Cory asked Bebler how important a figure Malik really is in Sov hierarchy, pointing out that Malik is Deputy FonMin. Bebler replied that he thinks Malik is not very prominent in Sov officialdom, that Malik certainly lacks influence Gromyko had, but that even Gromyko is not very big person. In support this statement, Bebler recalled that several years ago when Molotov was in New York, Molotov asked Bebler what Bebler thought of Gromyko’s capacity as Sov rep. According to Bebler, he replied that he thought Gromyko a very intelligent and hardworking young man, to which Molotov responded [Page 475] that although Gromyko is young and relatively inexperienced, nevertheless Sov Govt held in high esteem his intelligence, diligence and loyalty and that his UN assignment was to groom him for higher posts. Bebler commented that if Gromyko were high personage certainly Molotov would hardly have asked opinion of small Yugo diplomat.
When Cory expressed astonishment at this story, Bebler said that is not unique, that several years ago while in Belgrade, Molotov inquired of group of Yugo officials what they thought of Sov Ambassador who was in Belgrade at that time and whose name began with G.3 According to Bebler, Yugo officials nodded their heads in deprecating manner, to which Molotov responded by saying rather apologetically that this individual was only one available at that time for Belgrade assignment and that although he was “stupid he was also honest” and Molotov therefore hoped Yugo officials would be patient with him.
Bebler also said he is convinced even Vyshinsky is not top-level Sov official and on various occasions he has noticed how Vyshinsky has abruptly altered his line in UNGA as result of what must have been sharp instructions from Moscow.
Malik presidency SC:
Bebler said he does not expect Malik to try any tricks during his SC presidency next month. He thought it unlikely Malik will energetically raise question of Chi representation4 because Yugos still believe USSR really does not want ChiComs to attain UN membership. Bebler thought it unlikely Malik will rule against validity of Chi Nationalist credentials and force question to vote. Bebler said Malik could have done that last August at time when SC membership was more favorable to ChiCom representation than it is now and that Yugos thought it most significant at time that Malik failed to do so.
Cory told Bebler that if Malik does raise question next month US hopes Yugo will at least abstain on general question of ChiCom membership and, if necessary, support US view that substantive decision on ChiCom membership should not be made by SC as long as aggression continues in Korea. Bebler was non-committal as to position Yugo will take if Chi representation question is raised again.
Yugo vote on Kashmir:
When questioned about his vote yesterday on SC letter to GOI and GOP,5 Bebler said he voted affirmatively despite previous Yugo [Page 476] record of abstention on Kashmir case because he thought letter to be reasonable act on part SC and not because he now believes in correctness of general SC policy towards Kashmir. He said he was unhappy that Malik insisted upon a vote yesterday but that as long as vote was taken, he felt obliged to vote affirmatively. (Bebler thus did not seek to get any especial credit from US for his vote.)6
- Reference is to the discussion attendant on passage of the resolution imposing economic sanctions against the People’s Republic of China; see U.N. documents A/C.1/SR.444 and A/PV.330.↩
- See the New York Times, May 29, 1951.↩
- The editors have been unable to identify the individual alluded to here.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 209 ff.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.↩
- The Department of State responded to this message in telegram 956, May 31, to New York, which read: “Dept finds urtel 1593, May 30 interesting and commends Cory for excellent reporting.” (795.00/5–3151)↩