102.201/5–2951
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: State–JCS Meeting
| Participants: | General Bradley | Admiral Lalor |
| General Haislip | Colonel Baer | |
| General Twining | Colonel Cams | |
| Admiral Sherman | Mr. Matthews | |
| General Taylor1 | Mr. Nitze | |
| General White2 | Mr. Rusk | |
| Admiral Duncan3 | Mr. Harriman |
[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia, documentation on which is contained in volume IV.]
Mr. Matthews then raised the question of Korea and asked whether recent developments in Korea had caused the Chiefs to amend their previous views, particularly with respect to the armistice terms suggested in their paper of March 27. Mr. Rusk said that he had assumed that the military situation would continue to be a war of maneuvers in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. If there were a possibility of destroying the Chinese forces, this would affect our assumption. There has been no reaction to the feelers which we and the U.N. have put out with respect to a settlement, but public statements on the Communist side, including Pravda and other Russian propaganda emphasis on the Johnson Resolution, indicate that discussions of a settlement may be a possibility. If such discussions take place, are the Chiefs still of the same mind as they were before?
General Bradley indicated that the Joint Chiefs have not changed their minds. They still would like to get a settlement along the lines previously discussed. General Haislip said that there were no signs of a Chinese collapse. They are getting out of the way of our weapons. Only on the east central front have they been hurt; on the west, they are sitting tight. General Bradley said we don’t have a condition under which there are wholesale surrenders. They are now back to their depots. He said he believed the opposition would be stiff from here on and that the present position was as good as we were going: to get for some time. Mr. Nitze asked whether there was any possibility of a large-scale amphibious envelopment operation. General Bradley said [Page 471] this was out of the question, although small landings as threats or harassments were being and would continue to be carried out.
General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs needed guidance because they are trying to consolidate and bring up to date the directives defining CINCFE’s mission. Is his mission to be the Yalu or the 38th parallel or something in between? The Joint Chiefs were considering language which would direct CINCFE to seek JCS approval before undertaking any general advance beyond the line running east and west through the Hwachon reservoir. Mr. Rusk asked what would happen if the enemy were to disengage at that line. General Bradley said there might be some advantage if such a disengagement offered the chance of developing into a de facto settlement. He said there were certain military handicaps in losing contact, but that these handicaps might be over-ridden by other considerations.
Admiral Sherman said that in his view a line further north, perhaps as far north as Chinnampo, Pyongyang, Wonsan might be better. This was a very strong line. One could then dictate terms in exchange for drawing back to the 38th parallel. Otherwise one would have nothing to give up in exchange for what we were demanding. General Bradley said that the moment one went north of the present position one would start processes in the Kremlin arising from their uncertainty as to how far north one proposed to go. There followed a discussion of a line running from Wonsan southwest to the Imjin River, and the point was brought out that the further north one went the more serious would become one’s own logistic problems. There was no port which would help in these problems south of Wonsan. General Bradley said he would like to have guidance from the State Department as to whether the line should be the one through the Hwachon reservoir or the next line north. Mr. Rusk said that the further north one went the more difficult might become the problem of settlement, particularly with respect to the South Koreans. General Bradley emphasized the political difficulties if one were to give away in a settlement territory already occupied. The additional risks would seem to outweigh the small advantages, particularly if one took into account the probable reactions of Syngman Rhee. Admiral Sherman said that there were plenty of indications that the Chinese had taken punishment. If the opportunity comes for us to move north and we don’t because of self-imposed limitations, we ought to know what the reactions of our allies would be. Mr. Matthews said that we would have no problem with our allies if we didn’t move further north. Problems would be raised if we attempted to ascertain the views of all of them. General Bradley said that if there is no nibble from the other side, then perhaps the wraps ought to be taken off. Mr. Rusk said that if there are no indications of [Page 472] a willingness from the other side to talk, we should take another good look at the triangle Hwachon, Chorwon and Kumhwa, where the main Chinese build-up prior to the recent offensives took place. He felt that we should not be nervous about authorizing a further freedom of maneuvers in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Admiral Sherman suggested that perhaps the line 38°30′ would provide the necessary room for maneuvers.
Mr. Matthews asked Mr. Harriman’s views. Mr. Harriman said that his views were colored by his feeling that negotiations were impossible. He wouldn’t hesitate too long in expanding General Ridgway’s authority if there was something to be gained thereby. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the suggested directive to General Ridgway merely directed him to touch base with the JCS before he went north in force. General Haislip said that no line north of the present one was any better than any other. General Bradley pointed out that the rivers did not add much to the strength of any line—in the fall they dry up and in the winter they freeze. Admiral Sherman said that the risks would definitely increase if one went north of Pyongyang. Mr. Harriman asked whether there was any intelligence about what the Chinese were doing in their rear area. General Haislip said that there was great confusion in the east central part of their front but that our 1st and 9th corps were up against solid resistance in regimental and greater strength and were running into enemy probing attacks. He said that our 10th corps was running into resistance in battalion strength. Mr. Matthews said that on one point he felt very strongly: any move by U.N. forces north of the Wonson general area would greatly increase the risks of Soviet intervention and broadening the conflict. Mr. Harriman said he fully agreed.
[Here follow portions dealing with Yugoslavia and also with the question of a blockade of mainland China; for text, see page 1990.]