357.AK/5–2551: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1585. Eyes only Hickerson and Rusk. Re GOC proposal on Korean hostilities. Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo at their request met with Boss and Hyde to discuss a project; they were speaking with consent of Entezam. Padilla Nervo presented the idea at length and had previously gone over it carefully with Grafstrom.
The substance of their proposal, which they had not developed to the point of drafting or in detail, is that the time has come when the GOC should make a full report to the GA and as part of that report suggest and sponsor an Assembly res. The res would in its preamble state three clearly agreed UN aims in Korea; (a) The creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korea; (b) the desire of the UN that hostilities should be brought to an end and (c) the determination of the UN that aggression must be met in the area of the ROK and that it has been met there.
[Page 458]The res in its operative part would then provide that upon assurance, or some indication, on the part of the PRC and NK forces that they will not advance south of the 38th parallel, the UN forces will not themselves operate north of that parallel, subject, however, to the PRC and NK forces recognizing the need for the safeguards for UN forces contained in the Gross-Crittenberger proposals put forward in cease-fire talks during December.
As part of a full report to the GA the res would end this phase of GOC activities. This sponsorship would be preferable to allowing India or other Asian states to come forward with a proposal and it would probably be better than having the sixteen participating states put in such a res, although Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo do not rule this out. They stressed the importance of timing, indicating that the Korean operation in the UN is at the crossroads, that politically at least the 38th parallel is an important symbol and that this move might lead to a de facto cease-fire without using that term, which should be carefully avoided, and with regard for security of UN forces. This would not settle the Korean case. They envisaged over-all negotiations to come later. The Pres of the GA would be the channel for presenting the proposal GA res to the PRC. Padilla Nervo stressed that the UN and the US have nothing to lose by this operation which if it failed would have great propaganda advantages and would lay a basis for further actions necessary to prevent aggression. Padilla Nervo and Grafstrom elaborated the proposal after stating a series of propositions substantially as follows:
- 1.
- The GOC has been unsuccessful after weeks of work. It baited the hook and has had no bites. Now is the time for new bait and new fisherman. GOC was hampered by being considered as illegal. By this report and proposal it would move out of the center of the picture but without being regarded as a failure. However, they regarded the proposal as more important than sponsorship and in spite of their views on action by the sixteen participating powers they would be willing to see them undertake sponsorship as a possible alternative.
- 2.
- The current PRC offensive seems to have ended and responsible diplomats in the UN are troubled at what they consider the lack of a clear statement of aims beyond the military objective of repelling aggression and killing as many aggressors as possible.
- 3.
- The military testimony before the joint Senate comite suggests the UC’s view that the UN is not able to defeat the aggressor forces throughout Korea, nor are the aggressors able to throw out the UN forces. Therefore some sort of settlement along the 38th parallel has been mentioned. The proposed res in the light of these facts would not now seem a strategic inhibition on UN plans but consistent with military thinking which seems not inclined to risk extending UN lines of communication.
- 4.
- The October GA res is not completely satisfactory as statement of political aims because of permissive clause allowing military operations north of the 38th parallel. For same reason this statement seems dated.
- 5.
- The five principles stated in Jan res, while widely supported and valid at the time, would present difficulties for US in light of subsequent developments. Some people doubt whether Gross-Crittenberger cease-fire conditions are still completely up to date.
- 6.
- USSR has too much initiative in current situation because they themselves might or otherwise cause a crisis to be precipitated beyond Korea, for example in Iran. Furthermore, if there were a serious air attack on US naval units off Formosa, and Padilla Nervo recalled recent hits on two naval vessels off Korea, US public opinion might quickly force the very broadening of the conflict which the administration opposed by insisting on bombing of Manchurian air bases.
- Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo felt one could only speculate on current Soviet-PRC relations. PRC must be somewhat concerned at Soviet standing aside during this offensive. On the other hand, USSR would probably not want to settle along the lines of the proposed res because it does not involve returning to the status quo as of June 25. It would leave UN forces and bases in Korea. Hence a self-executing arrangement at which proposed res is aimed would be expected to appeal to PRC as first step toward settlement.
- 7.
- They stressed the growing feeling that events are moving swiftly and that aims need to be stated now. Grafstrom commented that he expects to sail for Sweden on June 8. Padilla Nervo feels that even friendly UN reps are not clear on how the US and UN stand and that the UN position could be effectively consolidated by this type of res which would make it no longer necessary to study a series of previous ones to arrive at present policy.
Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo stressed that they did not want to push this against the judgment of the US and other responsible members. They urged the importance of timing and the advantages of using the GOC in order to avoid a less responsible effort by the Asian group, to allow the GOC to withdraw, to create a situation making negotiation possible and to liquidate these hostilities before graver troubles are upon us.
We listened carefully and attempted to clarify various points by questioning. Ross commented that he did not feel competent to express an opinion on possible military implications or broad political impact of these ideas but assured them we would report, and most careful consideration would be given to their proposal. He recalled that the US has never taken a negative attitude toward possible peaceful settlement and has consistently tried to maintain even balance between what we feel necessary to repel aggression and effort for peaceful settlement. [Page 460] He noted their acceptance of the need to guarantee the security of UN forces and prevent enemy build up. He wondered whether they attached too much symbolic value to 38th parallel as such. He suggested the real problem is that certain conditions for a cease-fire are essential; if and when complied with by PRC a cease-fire might be arranged but in the framework of the then existing military situation.
He inquired whether cessation of hostilities is possible without provision for the withdrawal of PRC forces from NK since otherwise their presence would prejudice achievement of UN political objective of independent, unified, democratic Korea. Grafstrom felt question of withdrawal of forces would be first item and objective of negotiations looking toward peaceful settlement after cessation of hostilities and that such negotiations would be long and drawn out. Padilla Nervo recalled military testimony that we cannot throw PRC forces out of NK without broadening conflict which no one wishes to do.
Ross wondered whether proposed res might precipitate a broad debate on Far Eastern problems in First Comite with proposals and amendments leading to confusion rather than clarity, especially if Asian group took an active hand. Padilla Nervo felt that careful diplomatic preparation and a substantial majority would reduce the risk of this.