Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–2351

Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)¹

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[New York,] May 23, 1951.

Subject: Next Steps in Korea.

I. The mood of the country is angry. The testimony by Secretary Marshall and General Bradley² has calmed the storm for a while, and responsible commentary in the press and on the radio is pointing out the fallacies in General MacArthur’s recommendations. Nevertheless, the demand continues for a statement of how peace is to be achieved.

II. Already, under the pressure generated by General MacArthur, the Administration has “toughened” its policy: the United Nations strategic embargo, the increased aid to Formosa, the diplomatic pressure on our friends, and Secretary Marshall’s flat statement that we would never agree to let Formosa fall into Chinese Communist hands or let the Chinese Communists fall into the United Nations seat. If there is no settlement in Korea, the public pressures to get peace or hit harder will increase. The Administration may then be forced to move further; we might even wind up by doing most of what General MacArthur recommends, with all the disastrous results foreseen by those who now oppose his recommendations.

III. Even now, the results of the great debate is a diplomatic stalemate. Secretary Marshall’s testimony on Formosa and the United Nations seat leaves us without a bargaining position. The Chinese Communists might have accepted the January cease-fire proposal when they came to decide that they could not drive us out of Korea, with the hope of getting Formosa and the United Nations seat in return for a Korean settlement on United Nations terms. We have now said that we may be forced into discussion but will never surrender. The Communists are confident that so long as we take this position a majority of the United Nations will uphold it. There is consequently no political or diplomatic advantage to them in a cease-fire.

IV. An early Korean settlement is therefore both imperative, if we are to avoid the possibility of a larger Asian involvement with unforeseeable consequences, and more difficult than ever to achieve.

V. In looking for a possible way out, it may be useful to list the probable objectives of the chief participants, and their present degree of expectancy about attaining these objectives.

A. Soviet Union:

(1) To keep United States power away from its borders (both the actual Soviet border and the border with its vital Manchurian interests). This has been achieved.

(2) To keep the United States and China engaged indefinitely, thus diverting United States resources and attention away from the principal target in Western Europe. (If we should take General MacArthur’s advice, the only consequence more damaging to our national interests than Soviet entry—and resulting general war—would be Soviet non-entry, resulting in an indefinite United States involvement in Asia with Western Europe remaining naked.) The present Soviet expectancies about achieving this objective must be high. On the other hand, they must also be worried by the prospect that an indefinite continuation of the Korean war, with American tempers getting shorter, could lead to a general war for which they might not now be ready. The emphasis in the Senate hearings on the Sino-Soviet Pact would make even more glaring the perfidiousness of the Soviet Union if we should extend the war to China and they then refused to come openly to China’s assistance. As part of a new “peace offensive”, the Russians might be prepared to abandon this objective for the moment, hoping that a Korean settlement would lead to a slackening of the Western defense effort.

B. China:

(1) To keep United States power away from its borders. This has been done, and probably cannot be undone by us short of victory in a general war.

(2) To get all of Korea. They may realize now that this is most unlikely; and they may be feeling the stresses and strains of a continued effort, not only on their army but on their domestic economic and political situation.

(3) To use their continued pressure in Korea as a bargaining counter for Formosa and the United Nations seat. They must now realize from Secretary Marshall’s statement that they are most unlikely to attain this objective at present.

(4) If they are working with the Russians on a time-table calling for early general war and world conquest, they may be attempting also to engage United States power indefinitely in Asia so the Russians can take Europe. If this is one of their objectives, the prospects of attaining it are good under present circumstances and the aggression will continue indefinitely.

C. United States:

(1) To repulse aggression. This will be within reach soon if we can get a cease-fire at the 38th parallel.

(2) To end the fighting in Korea as quickly as possible. This is attainable on the same basis as above.

(3) To get our forces out of Korea and return to our priority task of strengthening the Western alliance. This is possible, at least to some extent, if we can get a cease-fire.

(4) To achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The United Nations has never undertaken to achieve this objective by military means; it remains the political objective, to be achieved through the United Nations processes of peaceful settlement.

VI. The situation therefore may offer the possibility of a settlement on the same basis as the previous post-war conflicts with the Soviet Union: the restoration of the status quo. This is the only type of settlement which will be possible so long as we continue to wage limited wars and engage in conflicts with the Soviet Union which do not go beyond the boundaries of the specific areas of conflict. As long as they continue to test our nerve and strength at specific points, and we continue to stand up to those tests, the most we can achieve is a restoration of the status quo at the specific points. They will not give us more than they have to: and, without our using (or threatening to use) our strategic air power to strike directly at their centers of power, they do not have to give up anything more in these local situations than the effort to push us out. This is basically what happened in Greece and Berlin. What this means in Korea is that we will have reestablished the independence and integrity of the Republic of Korea and they will have maintained North Korea as a Communist satellite. The military objective of the United Nations—repulsing aggression—would be achieved. This might not be a totally unacceptable solution to the Communists, since it does not involve total defeat for them: they would still have North Korea, and could announce that they had “repulsed the South Korean aggression”. Of course, if Peiping is deliberately trying to engage us indefinitely without a decisive outcome, and if Moscow does not fear the consequences of allowing the war to continue, there is no prospect of a settlement at present. There is only one way to find out whether this is true: devise an action the United Nations can take, and await the aggressor’s reaction.

VII. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley have both indicated in the hearings that something along these lines might be useful. Secretary Marshall said the United Nations could appropriately take the initiative for a cease-fire, asking the aggressors if they had had enough and were willing “to halt this sacrifice of lives and find a basis for adjustment”. General Bradley said that “we could have an intermediate military objective without abandoning the long-range political objective” that “we would consider it a victory with something less than” the immediate establishment of a free and united Korea; and that “the military mission given to General Ridgway does not include the clearing of all Korea. It includes the inflicting of maximum casualties on the Chinese with minimum losses to ourselves and with due regard to the safety of our troops in order to get into a position whereby we may negotiate some kind of peace.” He added that there was a possibility “of this war simply petering out around the 38th parallel even without negotiating a peace”.

VIII. USUN is not in a position to make any hard and fast recommendations. However, the staff has discussed this situation and has suggested the following four ideas. They are not mutually exclusive. We cannot evaluate their worth, but we would like to contribute them as possibilities which the Department might explore in its thinking on this question.

A. We could stimulate the Good Offices Committee to re-state, either publicly or privately to Peiping, the eight points of the original ceasefire suggestions made public on 2 January (A/C.1/643). Presumably these still stand as the basis on which a satisfactory United Nations settlement could be built. This restatement now might lead Peiping to conclude that this is the best settlement it can get for the present.

B. The United States might make a private approach to the Russians. Malik’s remark to Cory (US/GEN/419) that the Korean affair might be settled by the United States and Soviet Foreign Ministers may have been simply conversation.³ On the other hand, there is at least a possibility that it may have been intended seriously. Such an approach would seem to suit the Russian taste for private negotiations: which they apparently regard as a more suitable method for dealing with serious matters. If such an approach led to any positive results, the agreement would of course be registered by the United Nations.

C. We could propose to the Additional Measures Committee a program of psychological measures designed to clarify and restate United Nations objectives in Korea. Such a reformulation could be used both as psychological warfare and as an indication of our approach to peaceful settlement. (See Annex for a fuller treatment of this point.)

D. Beginning in the Additional Measures Committee or the Political Committee itself, we could issue a United Nations manifesto in the form of a General Assembly resolution, perhaps along the lines of the proposed special report of the President as chief executive of the Unified Command. Such a declaration might go further than a reiteration of our willingness to enter into arrangements for a ceasefire. An arranged cease-fire, involving a conference and an inferential confession that they have had enough, may involve too much loss of face for the Chinese Communists to accept. We might be able to get a de facto cease-fire if we were simply to cease firing the next time we got back to the parallel, the United Nations declaring that the military objective of repulsing the aggression had been achieved and that the fighting would only be renewed if the aggressor renewed his attack. If Moscow and Peiping have had enough, they will not renew the attack. The Communists might then enter into arrangements for a permanent cease-fire. If so, the United Nations will have achieved not only a cessation of hostilities but will have received certain guarantees against the renewal of aggression. If they do not enter into more permanent arrangements, the United Nations forces could assume a defensive posture and maintain air reconnaissance of North Korea, so that ground forces could re-group against any attack that might be mounted. Meanwhile, the drain on our forces would be stopped and the destruction would be ended. Even if a permanent cease-fire were not arranged, the attack might not be renewed and the “volunteers” might slip away, as in Greece. Then the United Nations forces could be gradually withdrawn as ROK forces were trained and armed.^* If, on the other hand, the attack were renewed, we would have gained the following political advantages:

(1) The United Nations would be clearly on the record for a settlement at once honorable and realistic. This would be good psychological warfare. It would also establish the basis for some future settlement, if the Chinese Communists should ever decide that they had had enough.

(2) We would strengthen our political position internationally, and especially our Western alliance, by showing that our determination to achieve a reasonable peace had not slackened despite continued rebuffs.

(3) We would help restore domestic tranquillity by showing that we were not without a plan for achieving peace in Korea.

(4) We would have inserted a potential wedge between Peiping and Moscow, which might be driven home in the future if Chinese casualties continued indefinitely, with Stalin offering no help to them except guns and cries of encouragement.

IX. These ideas, even if acceptable and tried out, may come to naught. If a cease-fire should be achieved, though, there may be a conference of the interested nations. There will certainly be problems a-plenty. Whatever the outcome, it will be important for the United States to be ready to take political leadership in the Far East.

[Annex]

Next Steps in the Additional Measures Committee

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There are three possibilities for future work in the Additional Measures Committee, apart from servicing the embargo resolution, (1) military, (2) diplomatic, (3) psychological. This paper deals with psychological measures. In its confidential paper the Bureau of the Additional Measures Committee listed possible measures for consideration by the Committee and formulated one in the following language:

“Should further steps be taken to bring to the knowledge of the people of the world, especially the people of China and Korea, the nature of the United Nations action in Korea, and the aims and objectives of the United Nations there?”

There are great advantages in initiating promptly in the Additional Measures Committee a program of additional psychological measures. Such a program would supplement measures already being taken by the Unified Command.

It could be used (a) as a strategic and perhaps tactical tool developing what is already being done in active support of United Nations forces in Korea and (b) to tell the story of what the United Nations is trying to do beyond the iron curtain as well as to educate the free world, hold it together and at the same time have an effect on our own public opinion here.

The substance of such a program is something that would have to be worked out with the collaboration of our public information people as well as our military people. It is significant that Paul Hoffman in his pamphlet on the Marshall Plan (Peace Can Be Won) considers that one major department of the Marshall Plan conception is the publicizing of steps taken with Marshall Plan assistance.

An over-all plan would have various substantive elements. In so far as military operations are concerned, the use of pamphlets and radio would be continued and perhaps strengthened. It would be possible to use radio, perhaps from sea based United Nations transmitters, to state over and over again what the United Nations aims are in Korea with some hope that it might reach people on the Chinese mainland.

The sort of things that the United Nations would want to publicize by every medium to everyone fighting against the United Nations in Korea is a series of points or principles, including such things as the following:

1. It was the North Koreans that attacked and the United Nations which met the attack.

2. General war is avoidable; it is a decision that is up to the Russians and Chinese Communists.

3. Our military aims are to repel aggression in the area; our political aims are a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

4. The United Nations is as much a place to negotiate as it is a collective security organization and the door is open to negotiation.

5. The concept of the worth of the individual as we understand it in the free world.

6. An affirmative statement to meet the point that this is a war of the white race against the Asians.

7. A series of slogans such as the communists use over and over again to state these points in simple catch phrases.

8. Some of the Marshall Plan techniques could well be employed, such as stamping goods exported with some legend indicating they are not for ultimate destination or use by aggressors against the United Nations. Also, United Nations information offices could be used.

A program of psychological measures would have considerable immediate advantages. Among them are the following:

1. It could be used to pick up the Indian idea that there should be a statement of war aims by the General Assembly. Some of the points mentioned above could be formulated by the Additional Measures Committee and then taken into an Assembly resolution. Such a statement of war aims by the General Assembly might be preferable to a statement of war aims by the President or the Unified Command.

2. It would create a balance between the collective security activities and the peaceful settlement responsibilities in the United Nations and show that we are actively engaged in both fields.

3. It would give the sort of support to United Nations troops fighting for the United Nations that we would at once give them if they were fighting a general war solely on behalf of the United States. (We are using these techniques now, and both Generals MacArthur and Ridgway have reported large numbers of pamphlets dropped and the use of surrender passes. We might broaden and develop what is being done.)

4. We could use United Nations as well as Voice of America facilities to meet the Soviet and Chinese Communist big lies, some of which Mr. Dulles has exposed in his recent speech.

5. This will lay a good foundation for meeting the propaganda of the World Peace Congress and show that the peoples of the free world are behind the United Nations action in Korea.

6. It would provide a means for telling our story more effectively to the Asians and meeting the point of those of our friends who feel that we have not given sufficient attention to that.

Of course, there are dangers and disadvantages that we would have to watch from the beginning. For example, we should not permit the United Nations to interfere with the tactical use of pamphlets and surrender passes as our military authorities consider them appropriate. Also, the United Nations would not want to start a course of action where pressures would build up to drop pamphlets or otherwise use American facilities for flights over the Chinese mainland.

1. The memorandum was also addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk).
2. See Hearings, pp. 321–724, and pp. 729–1182. General Bradley followed Secretary Marshall in testifying before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.
3. See the memorandum of conversation dated May 3, p. 401.
4. This provision distinguishes the present idea from Senator Johnson’s resolution, now getting such a play from the Communist press, which states flatly and without guarantees being received that all non-Korean forces should depart by the end of the year (after a cease-fire at the 38th on 25 June). [Footnote in the source text.]