Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] May 22, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys, and Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong;
	Colombia	—Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma. First Secretary
	France	—Ambassador Bonnet, and Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Ambassador van Roijen
	New Zealand	—Ambassador Berendsen, and Mr. Lakinsr, Counselor
	Philippines	—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
	Turkey	—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
	Union of South Africa	—Ambassador Jooste
	United States	—FE. Mr. Rusk
		UNA, Mr. Hickerson
		EUR, Mr. Allen
		UNP, Mr. Stein
		FE, Mr. Hackler
		Lt. Col. Gilchrist (Army)
		Lt. [Gen.] Bolte (Army)

Lieutenant Bolte reported that enemy activity had decreased recently all along the front. No reports had been received of enemy air or armor in the battle area. Although the enemy was withdrawing in the west and decreasing pressure in the east, Far Eastern Command still considered that the enemy was capable of mounting a massive offensive.

For the period May 17–20, the four principal days of the present offensive, Lieutenant Bolte listed the following enemy casualties:

36,000	—killed in action
31,800	—wounded in action
824	—prisoners of war

Colonel Gilchrist outlined the recent action on the ROK section of the front and reported that the 3rd and 9th ROK Divisions had been seriously hit and forced to withdraw. They had lost all of their equipment and large numbers of their personnel. The 1st and Capital ROK Divisions had withdrawn on the east side of the 3rd and 9th in order to straighten the UN line at its eastern end.

To relieve the pressure on the US 10th Corps and ROK Army Corps sectors, General Ridgway had launched an attack on the western end of the line which started on May 20. The momentum of his drive north from Seoul had not slackened, Colonel Gilchrist said, and the enemy was not resisting strongly. Heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy by UN artillery and air. General Ridgway has reported that UN losses in the past few days have been fantastically light.

In response to a question by Ambassador Jooste, Lieutenant Bolte stated that the Far Eastern Command believed that the enemy offensive had been planned in three phases. The first one was the offensive which started on April 21. The second was probably the one which started on May 16; whether or not the enemy considered that the second phase had ended was not known. Mr. Rusk commented that reports have been received of prisoners of war statements that their units had not come close to reaching the goals which had been set for them. Lieutenant Bolte said that approximately ⅓ of the enemy troops available are actually in the line at the moment and that adequate reserves were therefore available for continuing the second phase or preparing for the third phase. Colonel Gilchrist agreed with Mr. Rusk that certain ROK divisions, for instance, the 1st and Capital Divisions, had shown excellent fighting quality and acquitted themselves well and that the recent failure of the 3rd and 7th ROK Divisions to hold their own ground should not lead us to generalize about the quality of ROK troops.

Mr. Rusk reported that the United States has received no indication that any new “peace feelers” have been extended by the enemy. He drew attention to the fact that Pravda published the full text of the resolution for cease-fire in Korea offered by Senator Edwin Johnson, which called for a cease-fire based on the 38th parallel, to be effected on June 25, the anniversary of the North Korean invasion.¹ Pravda had commented that the resolution indicated that the “imperialists” realized their failure and were seeking peace.

Mr. Rusk said that consideration must be given to whether or not an opportunity will shortly present itself for the initiation of new attempts at reaching a settlement. He asked all representatives present to report any indications which they might receive that the Communists had changed their objective and were receptive to a new overture. He said that if the current offensive is set back with heavy losses there might be an opportunity for a new UN peace effort. However, the United States had received no indication as yet of any change in the declared Communist objective to drive UN forces out of Korea. Some evidence of change in this objective would be needed, he said, before a further UN peace effort could be undertaken.

Ambassador Bonnet expressed his assumption that any negotiations would be limited to the future of Korea. Mr. Rusk said the United States’ position remained on the one hand that the UN cannot link other questions to Korea so as to award [reward] aggression, but on the other hand, that all problems are subject to methods of peaceful settlement, e.g., the seating of Chinese Communists is regularly subject to discussion in UN organs. In response to Mr. McNichol’s question as to whether a report by the President of the United States to the Secretary-General of the UN was still being considered as a possible approach, Mr. Rusk agreed that this was one possibility to be considered when the present offensive ended, but that the details of any approach would be discussed by representatives present, if and when the opportunity arose.

Referring to his speech of May 18,² Mr. Rusk said that its purpose was to convey a message of friendship to the Chinese people along the lines of Senator McMahon’s resolution expressing American friendship for the Russian people.³ This was the sole purpose of the speech, he said, and it was not intended to contain any new policy and, above all, not intended to indicate any change in the United States’ attitude toward a peaceful settlement in Korea, which we continue to consider most desirable.

1. For the text of the resolution, see S. Res. 140, 82d Cong.. 1st sess., May 17, 1951. The resolution also called for withdrawal of all non-Koreans from Korea by December 31, and a full exchange of prisoners by that date.
2. The text of Mr. Rusk’s speech before the China Institute at New York on the subject of Chinese-American friendship is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 28, 1951, p. 846.
3. A portion of this resolution was quoted by Mr. Rusk in his May 18 speech; for the text of the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution as adopted on June 26, 1951, see S. Con. Res. 11, 82d Cong. 1st sess., in 65 Stat. B69 or the Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1951, p. 381. For further documentation on the McMahon–Ribicoff resolution, see the compilation on U.S.-Soviet relations in volume iv.