Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–1751

Memorandum Containing the Sections Dealing With Korea From NSC 48/5, Dated May 17, 1951¹

May 17, 1951

top secret

Current Objectives:

a. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

b. Consistent with a above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

c. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

1. Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.

2. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:

(a) Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.

(b) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.

(c) Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.

3. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.

4. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.

5. If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing. UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

6. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.

7. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

Policy Guide Lines for United States Action

a. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

b. Consistent with a above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

Principal Courses of Action

Settlement of the Korean Problem

1. The United States has consistently sought as an ultimate political objective the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. Since the North Korean invasion, the military objective of the United States in the United Nations has been to repel the aggression and to establish international peace and security in the area. The intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea has so changed the situation that it appears militarily impossible now to bring about a situation under which a unified, non-communist Korea could be achieved by political means. Therefore, while in no way renouncing the ultimate political objective which we hold for Korea, the present task should be to bring about a settlement of the Korean problem which at the minimum will deny to communist control that part of Korea south of the 38th Parallel and will provide for the phased withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces as militarily practical.

2. Because it appears likely that both the United Nations and the communist forces will be able to maintain military positions in parts of Korea, the Korean situation could develop in one of the following ways:

a. Chinese Communist agreement to cessation of hostilities and a political settlement of the Korean problem.

b. A political and military stalemate during which the Chinese Communists neither offer nor accept any suggestions for settlement.

c. A northward movement of the United Nations forces.

d. A massive communist drive, possibly supported by Soviet or satellite “volunteer” air and naval activities.

3. In view of the above possibilities the following considerations are pertinent: (a) the United Nations should not accept a settlement which leaves any part of South Korea in the hands of the aggressor; (b) United Nations forces may be able to expel the aggressor from South Korea; (c) United Nations forces can continue to inflict heavy losses on the Chinese; (d) a settlement will permit the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea for use elsewhere and will put an end to Chinese losses in Korea; (e) a majority of the United Nations presently opposes another major crossing of the 38th parallel; and (f) it is important to maintain the maximum amount of unity within the United Nations regarding Korea. Unless the USSR provides greatly increased military support to the Communist forces in Korea for a massive drive south, it is conceivable that a cessation of hostilities and a political modus vivendi can be achieved. Such a modus Vivendi would permit the withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea.

4. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

a. Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.

b. In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:

(1) Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.

(2) Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.

(3) Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.

c. Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.

d. Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.

e. If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.

f. If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.

g. Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

5. The United States should give special attention at all stages of the settlement of the Korean problem to the development of a strong ROK military establishment for continuation of the struggle against communist forces (in case of a stalemate), and for the organization of a strong barrier to defend the ROK against future aggression. Particular emphasis should be placed on training capable Korean officers. Essential parts of the program to develop military stability are the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Korea in the area south of the demarcation line, and such economic and technical assistance, consistent with the absorptive capacity of the Korean economy, as will develop stability by the time United Nations forces are withdrawn from the peninsula. It is probable that the ROK will require the provision of air and naval assistance after withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. forces.

1. For the complete text of NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951 on United States Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 33. The sections here printed correspond to Paragraphs 6 e and f, 9 a through g, 10 e and f, and 20 through 24 of NSC 48/5.