S/S Files: NSC 48 Series
Memorandum by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State, to Walter N. Walmsley 1
Subject: NSC 48/3:2 CIA Intelligence Memorandum
In response to your memorandum of May 7 enclosing a CIA memorandum of May 23 on the subject of NSC 48/3, and JCS memorandum of April 5, “Military Action in Korea,” I can give you the following comments:
1. The statement in the first paragraph of the CIA memorandum that “it is an unwarranted assumption that Soviet immediate objectives are concentrated in either Europe or in Asia, to the exclusion of the other” is in complete accord with our own estimates and with joint estimates of the several government intelligence agencies. It is also in accord with the views of Embassy Moscow and with a joint … Intelligence study made last summer … .
2. The remainder of the CIA memorandum (paragraphs 2 and 3) raises question as to whether the USSR would consider it wholly to its advantage to have UN forces remain in Korea even if immediate Soviet objectives centered on Europe, or, conversely, would consider it wholly to its advantage immediately to drive UN forces from Korea if its objective centered on the Far East. We entirely agree that under either of the assumed Soviet objectives it is by no means an open and shut case as to what Soviet policy would be with regard to ending the Korean war.
If Soviet policy were concentrated on Europe, the USSR might estimate—as the CIA memorandum notes—that the Korean situation might get out of hand and force either Soviet intervention or a loss of Korea and a severe blow to China, thus importantly affecting the Soviet global position, i.e., its prospects in Europe. The USSR might in addition be concerned, even if its interests centered in Europe, over the stimulus that prolonged Korean fighting would give to US mobilization efforts, efforts that of course affect the relative power position of the two countries in Europe as well as Asia.
Similarly, if Soviet objectives centered in Asia, the Kremlin might conceivably desire continued US involvement in Korea rather than a quick ending of the conflict. Aside from the cementing effect this continued involvement could have on Sino-Soviet relations—the point [Page 424] stressed by the CIA memorandum—the Kremlin might consider it advantageous in that (a) it would insure continued diversion of US forces from the defense of Japan and from the support of anti-Communist efforts in southeast Asia, and (b) it would serve as a constant propaganda issue in Soviet appeals to Asiatic peoples, and, if called for by Soviet strategy, a convenient excuse for further Soviet or Chinese aggression.
3. Without regard to the issue of area of Soviet concentration, the question of whether the USSR favors the expulsion of UN forces at the earliest possible moment or is willing to see the conflict drag on more or less indefinitely presents a number of intelligence puzzles.
All available evidence indicates that the Kremlin’s objective is establishment of Communist control over all Korea, and that it will not abandon this objective unless subjected to far greater pressures than have so far been brought to bear. Yet the Kremlin possesses capabilities of aiding the Chinese forces in a way that would not materially increase the risks of full Soviet involvement but would substantially improve the Chinese prospects of driving the UN forces from the Peninsula. These capabilities, which include the assignment of heavy Soviet equipment, greater technical assistance, and even unacknowledged employment of select Soviet combat units, have not been brought to bear.
There are, of course, a number of indications that this situation is changing, and a great increase in Soviet support of Chinese combat operations, including unacknowledged participation of Soviet personnel, must be considered a serious possibility. However, Communist propaganda is currently in terms of a long war of attrition, offering no hint of a plan for a sudden final blow against UN forces. There is also no “holding out of a hope” that Chinese inferiority in equipment and planes will be reduced, although some prisoners of war have reported that their officers have made statements to this effect. The propaganda line has been that the “aggressors” will be defeated despite their superiority in planes and equipment.
Moreover, Peiping is increasingly stressing the long-run, in fact permanent, nature of the conflict with the US. From the internal standpoint, the Chinese Communists appear to look upon the conflict as a crucible that will serve to temper the Chinese Communist State, facilitating, as did the Civil War and Intervention for the Bolsheviks in Russia, the purification of the Communist Party and the consolidation of its control over the country. Internationally, they seem to be imbued with the key nature of their role in the Communist mission to bring about the final overthrow of imperialism. Illustrative of both of these attitudes is a statement by Chinese Politburo member Peng Chen in the April 27 issue of the Cominform journal. Peng explained that with the [Page 425] “high tide of anti-imperialism represented by the opposition to American aggression … all reactionary dregs are being quickly eradicated and all democratic reconstructions of the people are being quickly developed.”
Peng then went on to discuss the connection between the present struggle and the final defeat of the US. After characterizing the US as “the last enemy in human history for the laboring people of the world,” Peng asserted that
“The present era is an era of intensity in the struggles of the peoples of the world in opposing imperialism. It is an era of fanatic aggression of imperialism and of revolution of the proletariat and the oppressed races. The carrying out of armed struggles against imperialistic aggressors is not only the main struggle pattern of the Chinese People’s Revolution but also has begun to become the main struggle pattern of the peoples of the oppressed nations of Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, and Malaya. Imperialism and the oppressed peoples cannot stand side-by-side. Imperialism and all reactionaries are armed to the teeth. Any uprising to resist aggression and demand liberation to overthrow the domination of imperialism and the reactionaries by the oppressed peoples or oppressed races will immediately meet the armed suppression of these brigands and become a blood struggle. In such cases, the masses have to use revolutionary armed might to oppose counterrevolutionary armed might.”
A prolonged Korean conflict could, therefore, fit into the overall Soviet strategy of keeping the US power position under constant attack. On the one hand, it would increase pressures on the US (accentuate “contradictions” both within the US and between the US and its allies), and, on the other, strengthen the resolve and increase the dependability of the Chinese as allies of the USSR, as fighters in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle. This does not mean, of course, that Moscow would prefer that the war continue rather than be brought to a successful (from the Communist standpoint) conclusion, providing this last could be achieved without a substantial increase in the commitment of Communist resources. Moscow would probably reason under this circumstance that other “struggles” could be pushed forward (particularly in southeast Asia) in case the Korean were eliminated. In fact, the way has obviously been prepared for this in Communist propaganda. It is perhaps noteworthy in this connection that Peng in the treatise referred to above did not take the position that a solution of the Korean problem, even on Chinese terms, would mark the end of, or even a pause in, the conflict with the US. Rather, the line is that the conflict—in fact “armed struggle”—is to continue until imperialism (the US) is vanquished.
Possible Soviet willingness to let the Korean conflict drag on is not indication that the USSR considers itself a bystander in the conflict. [Page 426] It is our estimate that while Moscow may be somewhat reserved in the utilization of its resources if the only issue at stake is the speed with which Communist victory is to be achieved, it would utilize its resources to the maximum short of a formal resort to war if Communist defeat were threatened. In fact, OIR estimates that if the existence of the Communist regime in China were at issue, the Soviet Union would probably formally intervene with all means at its command.
4. With respect to Soviet capabilities in the Far East, on the basis of National Intelligence Estimates, it appears that against presently available opposition forces the USSR is now in a position to: (a) expel the US from Korea, (b) ensure successful defenses of the Chinese mainland against any force—Nationalist or combined Nationalist-US—that could at present be arrayed against it, (c) attain air superiority over Korea, the Sea of Japan, and probably Japan proper, (d) attack the Japanese main islands with sufficient force to overrun Hokkaido and probably also Honshu, and (e) maintain communications between the Asiatic mainland and the Japanese islands.
With respect to the questions raised in your memorandum about specific capabilities, the information available to us indicates:
- (a)
- Against the forces presently available to the US in the Far East, the USSR could probably mount a successful amphibious attack on Japan.
- (b)
- Soviet forces in the Far East are now, as before World War II, largely independent of support from European Russia. Actually, the buildup of these forces has been under way since the 1930’s. This buildup reached a point where the Russians were ready for a full-scale offensive against the presumably powerful Kwantung Army in 1945. The arrangements made to fight Japan have not been scrapped. The number of divisions has been somewhat reduced, but supply depots, equipment, communications, etc. have steadily improved. These are forces in a logistic position that would enable them to make an assault on Japan or against US forces in Korea without any further buildup or even without any further warning. Stockpiles appear adequate to take care of full-scale operations of several months duration.
- (c)
- For operations of prolonged duration it would be necessary for supplies and equipment to be transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Far Eastern provinces do not have sufficient industrial or food production to maintain support of forces presently stationed in the Far East.
- (d)
- Maintenance of the Soviet forces in being in the Far East on the present semi-war basis has not strained the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is estimated that quite substantial additional military freight could be handled by the Trans-Siberian in case of an emergency. Moscow has given improvement of the Trans-Siberian top priority for many years.
- (e)
- Soviet forces already in the Far East are adequate for a successful attack on US forces in Korea. They exceed the lifting capacity [Page 427] that would be available for an assault on Japan. Appreciable additional forces could be massed, but it is estimated that those already present are sufficient for any campaign that is considered militarily feasible.