Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795B.551/5–851

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)¹

secret

Pusan, May 5, 1951.

Remarks of the American Ambassador to President Rhee, May 5, 1951.

Mr. President, when I visited you April 25th with General Coulter,² I mentioned that for two and one-half years I had been looking for indications of greater confidence of Koreans in one another and between the Government and the people and of improvement in the ability of Koreans to live and work together, and that I could not satisfy myself there had been substantial progress.

Last night, I read an article by George F. Kennan in which several points appear very pertinent to the situation here. He observed that: “The forms of Government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is a great deal of good in the (Korean) national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come . . ., let us not hover nervously over the people … applying litmus paper daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of “democratic.” Give them time; let them be (Koreans); let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which people advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good.”

I am against foreign interference in Korean affairs. On the other hand, all Koreans must appreciate that with 17 free nations having sons fighting and dying here, world-wide interest in Korea is inevitable. Internationally, Korea is living in a “gold fish bowl.” Koreans appear hyper-sensitive to living under such conditions. I see no reason why Koreans should be squeamish. You have done remarkably well since August 1948. Still, all interested in the welfare and progress of Korea feel that more could have been done in certain respects. For instance:

1. It is fundamental that in the long run no country is militarily defensible unless it is in good health socially, economically and politically. In these three fields, good health can only come from the efforts of the Koreans themselves. Outsiders can only help Koreans attain that to which they aspire. Socially, there is special concern over the tendency of treating substantial elements of the Korean society as subversives by official and semi-official agencies instead of making use of all—admittedly scarce—Korean talent and ability. Economically, there has been continuing alarm over the threat of inflation which undermines the very fibres of Korea’s national structure. An integrated program to solve the inflation that will re-establish confidence in the won and above all confidence in the Government of Korea cries for the wholehearted cooperation of all. Inflation is a “rat-hole” that vitiates all the good that should come from outside economic assistance. The threat of inflation cannot be completely overcome so long as public servants are not paid salaries adequate to allow them to be honest. Politically, the delicate and healthy balancing of authority essential in any representative government between the Executive and the Legislature and the Judiciary has not progressed satisfactorily and is a real impediment to good government.³

2. In the military field, the best brains available to the United States of America have constantly sought means and methods of more effectively using the manpower available here. On the whole, I think the Korean armed forces have done remarkably well. The critical times call for ever better coordinated effort. Two factors govern effective use of manpower—1) availability of arms and equipment, and 2) capacity to use. Today the factor not fully exploited is the capacity to use.

You may recall that on April 25th, General Coulter and I outlined to you and the Prime Minister the impediments to the expansion of the Korean military forces. In spite of that explanation, the clamor for arms continues, both directly and indirectly, prior to taking steps toward improving discipline, efficiency and leadership in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps.

3. In several fields there is not the frank, open exchange between Korean and US–UN authorities. In times of crisis, mutual confidence is essential; lack of it may be fatal. Admittedly, this is most delicate and difficult to attain between foreigners. What I am concerned about is the tendency to either not present and discuss programs, or if a program is unilaterally adopted and for some reason found not practicable, to attempt to circumvent or force acceptance. Striking examples of this tendency are:

a. The announcement in January of the formation of a national reserve of 10 divisions for a defense force of 320,000 without any prior consultation with UN authorities. Queries by me and Mr. Drumright⁴ brought only evasive replies by Korean officials directly concerned.

b. Korean officials have avoided telling members of my staff what has been done in land reforms and related problems.

c. Lack of confidence is further reflected in giving weight to so-called intelligence reports brought in by para-military and private groups such as the Youth Group, “Tiger” Kim,⁵ “Montana” Chang and No Duk Sul in preference to data available through official Korean or UN channels.

1. Transmitted to the Department as enclosure 5 to despatch 161, May 8, from Pusan, not printed (795B.551/5–851).
2. Lt Gen. John B. Coulter, Deputy Commander, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. Memoranda of the April 25 meeting by General Coulter and Ambassador Muccio were sent to the Department as enclosures 1 and 2 to despatch 161.
3. President Rhee had recently asked for and received the resignations of the Ministers of National Defense, Home Affairs, and Justice, as a result of their roles in reporting on the so-called Kuhchang massacre which had taken place in February in southeastern Korea and involved the execution of a considerable number of civilians, after trial by court martial by ROK military authorities, for their alleged role in aiding Communist guerrillas. The Korean Government had come in for severe criticism both foreign and domestic for the killings and the subsequent handling of the investigation. (See U.N. document A/1881, pp. 22–24, and despatch 147, May 2, from Pusan in file 795B. 13/5–251)
4. Everett F. Drumright, Counselor of the American Embassy in Korea.
5. Col. Kim Chong-won (“Tiger” Kim), Vice Commander of Military Police in the Civil Affairs Department of the South Kyongsang District Martial Law Command, had recently beaten with his fists two Korean newsmen for publishing remarks critical of Korean military and police personnel in his jurisdiction (despatch 163, May 12, from Pusan in file 795B.00/5–1251).