795.00/5–351: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State
5731. Deptel 4969, Apr 30. In conversation with EmbOff this morning Scott informally outlined his reactions to personal message to Morrison which he feels have good chance being accepted by Cabinet. Fol are his views:
Agrees with first four paras.
Fifth para. There is still some doubt in Brit minds as to what extent our proposals are based on their own merits and to what extent on pressure of Amer opinion.
Seventh para. There is apparent conflict of intelligence data and evaluations, as Brit intelligence estimates still do not envisage major air attack as probable and believe it cld not be carried out without substantial direct Soviet participation. Fuller exchange of data and consultation [Page 413] on intelligence level might have salutary effect on Brit attitude.
Re point in ninth para that US Govt as Unified Command must determine whether attack requires immed counter-attack, Scott feels it wld be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get HMG to give any other govt authority in effect to declare world war on its behalf. Brit are also concerned over report that President has already authorized Chiefs of Staff to order counter-attack on theory that it is possible civilian officials govt might not be immed available to make decision in event emergency. HMG willing to make political decision in principle subject to confirmation immed upon receipt factual info when and if major air attack occurs. Scott emphasized such confirmation cld be obtained within an hour or so at any time of day or night. He also emphasized that Brit position on this subject has nothing to do with full confidence he insists they have in judgment Joint Chiefs, but is based on firm principle that decision of such gravity can only be made by civilian heads of govt on basis full info on immediate situation.
There is still considerable reluctance to authorize AMC take immed action but Scott feels Cabinet may agree, particularly if they cld receive some assurance that presently contemplated measures are not merely opening wedge for complete embargo which Brit feel still inadvisable. Jebb being informed instructions on this point will be forthcoming within next two or three days. There is still some difference re exact list of items to be embargoed and in this connection Scott remarked on statement in para 16 that “what we are actually proposing” is “an embargo on raw materials”.1 He points out that actual proposal is for embargo on items which wld add to war-making potential including certain raw materials.
Re proposed moratorium on debate over admission Chi Commies to UN, Scott is in hearty agrmt but somewhat pessimistic as to possibility of finding a formula for moratorium which wld not involve change of policy. He sees some possibilities in an arrangement for mutual abstention similar to parliamentary pairing but states many efforts have been made find way out of legal box imposed by Brit recognition CPG, all of which have been vetoed by FonOff legal experts.
On postponement of declaration of aims Scott agrees completely with last para but states decision will involve internal political difficulties for govt.
At lunch Wednesday2 Morrison told me he appreciated personal message from Secy very much and that he thought it excellent statement [Page 414] of our position and quite convincing. However he wanted to study it carefully from their point of view. I have appointment with him tomorrow afternoon to discuss message as well as Iranian situation and will report further after this conversation.