Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] May 3, 1951.

Subject: UK Proposal for 14-Power Declaration on Korea

Participants:	Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
	Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
	Mr. Livingston Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
	Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Director, NA

Mr. Tomlinson called at our request today to discuss the above subject. He was first given a copy of the Secretary’s message of April 30, 1951, to Mr. Morrison which he read before the discussion proceeded. With respect to the latter part of that message he observed that he knew of no sentiment whatever for issuing such a statement while the Communist offensive was in progress, but that the UK felt it would be well to proceed with the discussion of the type statement which might be made at an opportune time in the future. He also asked what new indication there might be of the possibility of massive Communist air attack. Mr. Merchant stated that, in addition to the information which had already been given to them Intelligence reported that in spite of the continual attack to which they were subjected the enemy were expending a great deal of effort in attempting to place airfields in North Korea in an operable condition and that there had recently been a great increase in the anti-aircraft protection of those fields.

With respect to the UK’s suggestion for a 14-Power statement and the UK draft,¹ Mr. Hickerson observed as follows:

1. The United States has been and continues to be completely opposed to any proposal that a conference be convened before the fighting has stopped. The US had communicated to the Cease-Fire Committee its thoughts with regard to the essential elements of any ceasefire and if the other side desired to bring about a cease-fire this could readily be done through established UN organs without the necessity for a conference. While the principles for a cease-fire set forth in the January 3 report of the Cease-Fire Committee contained what we felt were the essential elements in any such arrangement, we recognize that circumstances might require some changes therein.

2. The composition of the conference suggested by the UK was entirely unacceptable to the US, the membership being “loaded” from the US point of view and not representative of a cross section of UN attitudes toward the Chinese regime.

3. There is also the problem of a self-constituted group, such as that suggested, handling what is essentially a UN problem. In this regard the UK draft statement gives no recognition whatever, except for the doubtful proposal that the conference appoint the President of the General Assembly to a cease-fire group to the UN aspects of the whole Korean problem and military action there. Additionally, the UK proposal disregards the position and legitimate interests of the ROK. The draft declaration makes no reference to UNCURK or UNKRA in the roles assigned to them by the UN.

4. There would be great difficulty in obtaining agreement among what is now the sixteen nations group² to any statement and the setting up of a group of this kind would encourage other groups, such as the Arab-Asian bloc, to go off on their own on similar proposals without reference to the UN.

Mr. Hickerson stated that we had been giving continuous consideration to the question of a statement or report of some kind since our original proposal was made, but that it had been beset by difficulties which Mr. Tomlinson was aware and it had not been possible to obtain its issuance prior to the renewal of the Chinese Communist offensive. He stated that we were now thinking in terms of a report by the President to the UN which would start off with a short account of the operations in Korea, and end with a statement along the following lines: the UN Charter requires every effort be made to prevent the spread of hostilities and to prevent the prolongation of the loss of life resulting from the aggression in Korea; the statement would go on to say that the US as the Unified Command was prepared to enter into appropriate arrangements which must include an end to the fighting, provisions to insure that fighting does not break out again, steps to bring about UN objectives of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and the phased withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from the peninsula. The report would close with a statement to the effect that such arrangements would fulfill the UN policies with regard to Korea, greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and reassure the peoples of the world that peace can and will be maintained. Mr. Hickerson emphasized that this statement was still in draft form, was under continuous revision, and had not yet been approved by the Secretary.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the only other reaction that they had thus far received to the UK proposal was a suggestion by Canada that the statement should include “Pearson’s Principles”.³ He stated that he would immediately transmit to London our observation and inform us when a reply is received.

1. See the communications from the British Embassy dated April 10 and 17, pp. 328 and 351.
2. The countries contributing troops to the U.N. effort in Korea were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, and the United States.
3. See footnote 3, p. 128.