795.00/4–1651
The Secretary of State to the Korean Chargé (Sae Sun Kim)
Sir: The receipt is acknowledged of your note of April 16, 1951,1 in which you present certain questions relating to the policy of this Government concerning the future conduct of hostilities against aggression in Korea. In reply, I take pleasure in setting forth, for your consideration, the views of the United States Government upon the points which you have raised.
It might be well, for a moment, to review briefly the background which has led to the outstanding cooperation between the various forces operating in Korea under the Unified Command. The members of the United Nations have sent their forces to Korea pursuant to the recommendations of the Security Council of June 25 and June 27, 1950, to repel the aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. In its resolution of July 7, 1950, the Security Council recommended that those members of the United Nations providing military forces and other assistance make these forces and this assistance available to a Unified Command under the United States. It follows from this action of the Security Council that the Unified Command so established should exercise the responsibilities of that Command on behalf of all members of the United Nations who are participating in the operations in Korea or who have supported such operations. The actions of the Unified Command, furthermore, must in all respects correspond to the will of the United Nations as expressed in its several resolutions on Korea; within this framework all policies and decisions of the Command in Korea must be cast and executed.
In a splendid gesture of solidarity with the United Nations, it will be recalled that President Rhee, on July 14, 1950, turned over for the period of hostilities the operational command of the gallant forces of the Republic of Korea to the Commanding General of the forces of the United Nations. From that date forward, these Korean forces have fought shoulder to shoulder with the troops of the other allied nations in the common aim of defending freedom and justice, of repelling the aggressor and restoring peace and security. It is against this background, therefore, that the questions put forward in your letter must be viewed.
The answer to your first question2 must inevitably depend not only upon the policies of the United Nations but also upon the military [Page 390] capabilities of both the United Nations forces in the field and also those of the enemy. It is the policy of this Government to support, with all available means, the military objectives of the United Nations in Korea as set forth in the Security Council resolutions. Military capabilities are not without their limits and are influenced by conditions and circumstances often beyond the control of any military commander to predetermine. The hypothetical character of any present military decision to take and hold a given geographical line in Korea, therefore, makes it impossible for me to make any specific answer to your question at this time.
The second question raised in your note3 like the first one involves hypothetical considerations and decisions which lie beyond the ability of this Government alone to determine. It should be clear, however, that only in unity is there strength and that, given a common objective and a common determination to cooperate in carrying it through to a successful conclusion, the problem which you raise would never arise.
While the answer to your third question4 would, of course, in the last analysis rest with the United Nations, the United States has never advocated and does not contemplate advocating the use of Japanese armed forces in Korea. It might be noted that there are no Japanese armed forces in existence.
I venture to express the hope that the foregoing discussion will be of use to you, and I am confident that by singleness of purpose and an ever closer cooperation between our two nations, a victory can be won which will bring to the people of Korea the full realization of their just aspirations for unity, peace and freedom.
Accept [etc.]
- Not printed.↩
- The first question in the Korean note of April 16 asked whether it would be the policy of the United States to induce the U.N. forces to cease hostilities before reaching the Yalu River, the traditional boundary between Korea and China.↩
- The second question asked whether, in the event the Republic of Korea forces should push ahead to the Manchurian border, it would be the policy of the United States to induce the U.N. forces to withdraw thereupon from Korea.↩
- The third question asked if there was any possibility that the United States might permit the United Nations to invite Japanese armed forces to land in Korea should more U.N. manpower be needed.↩