Office of the Historian

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1

top secret
Washington, April 30, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated [Page 388] 27 April 1951,2 in which you requested on or before 1200, 1 May 1951, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 48/3, a draft statement of policy on Asia.3

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined this draft statement of policy and, from the military point of view, recommend:

a.
For purposes of clarification, that paragraph 9–b–(2)4 be amended to read:

“Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.”

b.
To clarify the relationship between the mission assigned the Seventh Fleet and our effort being expended on strengthening forces ashore on Formosa, that paragraphs 11–a and 11–c be amended to read, respectively:5

“11–a. Continue the mission presently assigned the Seventh Fleet until Chinese Nationalist forces are able to defend Formosa.”

“11–c. Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa.”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that paragraph 6–e of the subject paper,6 which purports to set forth the current United States policy objective with respect to Korea, is, in effect, a course of action and is not sufficiently comprehensive to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate therefrom necessary military policies.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. This memorandum was forwarded to the National Security Council for information on May 1 by the Executive Secretary of that body, James S. Lay, Jr.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. NSC 48/3, dated April 26, is not printed. The text of NSC 48/2, dated December 30, 1949, is in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol vii, Part 2, p. 1215. Another revised draft, NSC 48/4, dated May 4, is also not printed. For the complete text of NSC 48/5, approved by President Truman on May 17, 1951, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 33. See also p. 439.↩

  4. The text of paragraph 9–b–2 in NSC 48/3 read as follows:

    “[The United States should] deny to the enemy the opportunity of consolidating his position in Korea or otherwise exploiting his aggression.”

    ↩

  5. Paragraphs 11-a and 11-c in NSC 48/3 read as follows:

    “11. With respect to Formosa the United States should:

    “a. Continue the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet.”

    “c. Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined.”

    ↩

  6. Paragraph 6-e of NSC 48/3 read as follows:

    “In view of the threat to United States security interests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should be the policy of the United States to seek a settlement acceptable to the United States of the Korean problem which would, as a minimum, terminate hostilities, end the aggression, and provide against its resumption. Until such a settlement is achieved, military action should continue in order to penalize the aggressor and deny him the exploitation of his aggression.”

    ↩