Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹

top secret
urgent

Tokyo, April 27, 1951.

1. I am fully cognizant of the national interest in avoiding an extension of hostilities in this theater, providing this can be done without jeopardizing the safety of my own forces, and without appeasement or sacrifice in principle.

2. With respect to this national interest, and subject to these limitations, I believe I am fully aware of my responsibilities.

3. With this in mind, I have concluded that the military situation in this theater now requires that there should be delegated to me without delay authority to attack enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula at the earliest moment. I am prepared to do so following a major enemy air attack against our forces in Korean Area.

4. The reasons supporting this conclusion are the increasing scope and rate of build-up of enemy capabilities of air attack, the increasing probability of such an attack in support of his present major ground offensive, and the fact that the effectiveness of our counter attack by air will vary directly with the rapidity of its delivery. The almost certain delay in launching the attack, incident to the necessity of first securing JGS approval, would almost certainly decrease the effectiveness of our retaliation and increase our own immediate and ultimate losses.

5. I consider enemy air attack so far delivered as sporadic, limited and primarily defensive in nature. I would define a major air attack as a concerted effort by large numbers of enemy combat aircraft against our ground forces, rear bases, or fleet, and not merely counter-air action such as recent enemy MIG operations conducted from Manchuria and in the rear of enemy front lines, even though large numbers of such aircraft were to be similarly employed.

6. I have further concluded that I should at once be authorized to conduct air reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula, as an essential preliminary to the effective attack on such bases, if this should be ordered, under the conditions as already stated. I have designated the Shantung Peninsula rather than the Weihaiwei area, as information here indicates an enemy air build-up in the former but not in the latter.

7. I therefore recommend that JCS instruct me soonest substantially as follows: “you are hereby authorized to use United States Forces assigned to the Far East Command to conduct air reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. In the event of a major enemy air attack from outside of Korea against United Nations Forces in the Korean area, you are hereby further authorized at your discretion without further reference to the JCS or higher authority, to attack those bases. The authority here granted will not be delegated, except to your successor in command, should you become a casualty.”

8. Com Gen FEAF² and COMNAVFE³ have been fully consulted and concur.

Ridgway

1. Copies of this and the immediately succeeding message have been provided by the Department of Defense; the texts are complete, but certain message indicators of a special character on the originals have been deleted.
2. Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer.
3. Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy.