795B.5/3–3151
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Acting Secretary Lovett’s letter of March 31 with further reference to the question of obtaining additional ground force contingents from other United Nations members for service in Korea has received careful attention in the Department of State.
This Department has for some time been concerned with regard to the need for obtaining substantial additional contributions of ground forces not only in the light of the military situation in Korea but also with a view to strengthening the cooperative nature of the United Nations action there. The Department has approached all other United Nations members which appear to be in position to make substantial contributions or to increase existing contributions. It has been our understanding that the Department of Defense is desirous of obtaining substantial rather than merely token contributions. As you are aware, serious practical difficulties bear upon the ability of some other Governments to give substantial help. Some United Nations members can contribute or increase contributions of ground forces for action in Korea only at the expense of depleting forces already assigned to or earmarked for regional defense purposes or for the maintenance of internal security. The extent to which the United States is prepared to make up deficiencies on the part of possible contributors in ability to train, equip, transport or supply forces constitutes an important factor in other cases.
In your letter of January 30 you informed me of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Great Britain and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries on the European continent should not [Page 381] be pressed to furnish additional forces. It is noted that you believe that it would now be desirable for the United Kingdom to increase its ground forces up to division strength if this result can be obtained without interference with NATO schedules. As the problem of NATO schedules involves important military decisions, the Department would appreciate the views of the Department of Defense on this problem. Subject to such views, the Department desires to point out, however, that it does not see from what source these additional forces could be drawn except from the United Kingdom itself. If the situation in Malaya can be brought under effective control some troops now engaged there might at some future date become available.
It is my understanding that the Department of Defense continues to be of the opinion that we should not approach the NATO countries on the European continent for additional forces.
The Australian Government was asked on February 19 to provide an additional battalion of ground force troops for action in Korea. The Australian Government has replied that it is unable to make a decision on this question at this time in view of the dissolution of Parliament and the decision to hold a general election on April 28. The Department intends to take up the question again with the Australian Government after the election and to urge that two additional battalions rather than one be supplied. On February 20, the New Zealand Government was asked to double the number of the New Zealand ground forces in Korea. The New Zealand Government replied on March 30 that steps would be taken to increase the number of New Zealand ground forces in Korea; but that as such an increase would involve considerations affecting other Commonwealth Governments the question was being discussed with them. The New Zealand Government is being informed of this Government’s hope that the consultation with other Commonwealth Governments would not delay for long the implementation of the New Zealand decision to supply additional forces. The Department will press this matter actively.
It should be pointed out that both Australia and New Zealand face the problem of reconciling the sending of additional troops to Korea with their commitments to build up their armed forces so as to be in position to furnish troops for service in the Near East which is a matter of priority under British plans.
The Canadian Government on February 19 was requested to increase its contribution to United Nations ground forces in Korea. The Department has now been informed that the major portion of the Special Force—about 6,300 men—has been scheduled to leave Fort Lewis, Washington for Korea about April 20. Of the approximately [Page 382] 3,000 men remaining at Fort Lewis after this date, it is understood that the Canadian Government plans to have roughly 1,500 serve as replacements for the Special Force in Korea and 1,500 serve as a nucleus for the brigade to be created to meet NATO requirements. Given the NATO and Canada’s so-called “Active Force” requirements for additional strength, the Canadian Government’s position against conscription and the present rate of recruitment for ground forces, there would appear to be little prospect that the Canadian Government would for some time increase materially forces available for service in Korea unless it were decided to request diversion to Korea of troops yet to be raised and which are earmarked for other purposes.
Turkey has in the field in Korea a brigade of about 5,000 men, and is currently replacing its losses, which as you know have been heavy. At the present time, we are making arrangements to assist in financing an expansion of the Turkish military establishment, in order to augment the size of the country’s forces and to strengthen their fighting capabilities. In addition to these factors, certain highly important political considerations, such as the Turkish insistent demand for a full-fledged United States security commitment, suggest that it would be inadvisable at this time to solicit additional Turkish troops for Korea. The situation in Greece is somewhat similar: Assignment of more Greek troops to Korea would be embarrassing to the Greek Government in view of the tense situation in the Balkans and the absence of any security arrangement for Greece. Our financial support of the country’s military and economic structure is substantial and continuing, and any request in behalf of the Unified Command would be certain to meet with a counter-request for additional United States financial aid which would be most difficult for us to provide. Iran, in a precarious position on the Soviet perimeter, cannot divert any armed strength from its own needs. Ethiopia is furnishing some 1,100 troops. Israel and the Arab States are unlikely sources, in view of the modest military establishments maintained and the existing tension in the area. Pakistan would not favor withdrawal of any of its forces from the country until the Kashmir issue is settled and relations with India enter a more cordial phase. India’s policy is such that an approach on this subject would not be welcomed.
The Department has not pressed the Philippines to increase its present contribution. If additional Philippine ground troops were to be sent to Korea in the near future they would have to be withdrawn from forces now fully occupied with internal security problems. It is not believed that such a reduction in existing internal security forces [Page 383] would be wise at this time. The Department is likewise doubtful whether a request should now be made to the Thai Government for an increase in its present contribution. We are, however, asking the opinion of our Ambassador in Bangkok whether, considering the existing political situation there, a request for additional forces should be made in the absence of a further offer from the Thai Government.
Advantage was taken recently of the presence of the Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics to bring the pressing need for additional ground forces in Korea directly to the attention of those Latin American states most likely to be able to contribute. On April 5 the Minister of State of Brazil was asked for an infantry division for Korea. The Minister of State said that he would inform President Vargas of this request; that he knew that President Vargas was in principle in favor of close military cooperation with the United States; and that pending a decision on the question preliminary talks should commence between the military representatives of Brazil and the United States. The President on April 9 handed to the Brazilian Minister of State a personal letter to President Vargas stressing the urgent need for action on this question.
On April 6 the Peruvian Foreign Minister was asked whether Peru might not be in a position to contribute a regimental combat team (4,000 to 5,000 troops). The Peruvian Foreign Minister replied that while his Government was in agreement that the Peruvian Government should contribute to the Unified Command in Korea, public opinion in Peru had to be prepared to accept the need for sending Peruvian troops outside the country. It was agreed that the military aspects of this matter should be discussed between Peruvian and American military representatives. It is the Department’s understanding that pending a decision on the question by the Brazilian and Peruvian Governments, military representatives of those Governments have been discussing equipment deficiencies with Department of Defense officials.
The Chilean and Uruguayan Foreign Ministers agreed to discuss the question urgently with their respective governments. In the case of Bolivia, it was agreed that there should be further discussions between military representatives of the two countries. The reply of the Mexican Foreign Minister was negative.
The foregoing constitutes the more important recent developments relating to this matter. The Department would be glad to receive any suggestions which the Department of Defense may have to offer with regard to further steps which might usefully be taken at this time.
Sincerely yours,