795.00/4–1751
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Message on Korea From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the British Embassy in Washington
In suggesting a fresh approach to a negotiated settlement I had in mind not only the importance of rallying world opinion but also of seeing whether the Chinese would be more ready to respond to an initiative not coming directly from the United Nations with whom they are apparently unwilling to co-operate, at any rate at this stage. From both points of view this is the right time to try.
It has always been my intention to keep the Good Offices Committee fully in the picture and if, as suggested the Committee feels that its functions are being usurped, then it will be necessary to explain to them that this is not so but that I had on the contrary hoped that they would welcome an initiative on a basis somewhat different from that of their efforts precisely because the prospects of a response from the Chinese were perhaps a shade better under the procedure I proposed. I hope that the Asian/Arab Group would also acquiesce in my proposals. Although this Group is not directly participating, a declaration of aims by the countries with forces in Korea may offer a better prospect of Chinese response than an initiative by some other Group such as the Asian/Arab Group who can neither speak for the United Nations as a whole nor are primarily responsible for the conduct of operations in Korea.
I would like you to put these considerations to Mr. Acheson and say that I still regard a restatement of aims as urgent and that I see advantages in having it made in the way I suggested, i.e. an identic statement by Governments with forces in Korea, backed up by a message from the President on behalf of the Unified Command. If we delay too long there is the double risk that we may miss the present opportunity and that some less hopeful initiative may be taken by another Group, e.g. the Asian/Arab Group, or that extensive military operations may recur.
[Page 352]Timing and manner of the approach to Peking call for very careful consideration. My present idea is that we should concentrate on securing a declaration of aims and that we should thereafter decide how best to use it for the purposes of an approach to the Chinese. We must avoid giving the impression of weakness and at the same time we must if possible avoid the risk of a direct rebuff from the Chinese. I think therefore that we might regard this operation as in two stages, first a declaration of aims and secondly an approach to the Chinese.