795.00/11–1750
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the National
Security Council Senior Staff
top secret
Washington, November 17,
1950.
Subject: U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea
| References: |
a. NSC
81/21
|
|
b. Record of Meeting of the Senior NSC Staff, November 16, 1950, paragraph
2.2
|
The enclosed draft interim report on the subject, submitted by the Senior
Defense member3 in accordance with the agreement at the Senior Staff
meeting on November 16, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the
Senior Staff at its meeting on Monday, November 20, at 2:30 p. m.
[Annex]
Draft for
NSC
Staff Consideration Only (Senior Staff)
interim report by the national security council on
united states courses of action with respect to korea
- 1.
- The National Security Council has continued its review of the
situation created by the intervention of Chinese Communist
forces in Korea. This report is supplemental to the interim
report of the Council dated November 14, 1950.*
- 2.
- The military operations of the United Nations in Korea are
being carried out in accordance with current directives. The
resistance by the North Korean forces, fortified by substantial
numbers of Chinese Communists, continues. Men and materiel
continue to flow across
[Page 1177]
the Manchurian boundary to the support of
the North Korean troops. Communist aircraft, notably the Russian
built Mig–15, continue to engage our forces and to return to
sanctuary across the Yalu River.
- 3.
- While hoping that the United Nations forces will achieve a
rapid success in spite of this, the Council recognizes the
possibility that the military situation may result in a request
by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces for
authority to reduce Chinese Communist support by air attack
against targets in Manchuria.
- 4.
- The Council believes that two major policies should dominate
our actions in Korea, one affirmative and one negative.
- The affirmative policy is to continue our vigorous support of
the United Nations and the consequent development of that
organization as the medium through which it is hoped that
aggression will be prevented and war eliminated as a human
institution.
- The second policy is to avoid having the Soviets succeed in
involving us in a war with Communist China.
- 5.
- The Council believes that the creation of a situation whereby
United Nations aircraft would attack targets in Manchuria would
increase very substantially the likelihood that we would become
involved in war with Communist China and therefore believes it
important that all possible action be taken to eliminate the
necessity for such attacks by United Nations forces.
- 6.
- At the moment the military action of the United Nations forces
is going reasonably well and there is reason to hope that even
without such attacks in Manchuria the United Nations forces may
succeed in driving the Communist forces out of Korea.
- 7.
- On the other hand this happy result may not be forthcoming and
it may be that the best that the United Nations forces can do,
without undertaking air attacks against Manchuria, is to hold
the line. Should this situation arise, the Council believes that
such a line should be held as long as possible.
- 8.
- If, however, the Chinese Communists, through their assistance
to the North Korean forces, succeed in causing the United
Nations forces to retire, the Council believes that the most
serious consideration should be given to a political course of
action by the United States, within the United Nations, which
would openly and effectively hold Russia responsible for the
action in Korea.
- 9.
- To hold Russia responsible for this action would be a very
grave step. The Council believes, however, that unless the
prestige of the United Nations, built up at so much cost in the
Korean war, is to be lost, and the cause of peace
correspondingly harmed, the United Nations forces cannot accept
a military defeat in Korea without making it clear to the world
that such defeat is caused by the Soviet Union.
