795.00/11–1750
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks Dated 17th November, 1950
My immedately preceding telegram.
Chinese Intervention in Korea.
Chinese intentions are unpredictable but it is essential that every effort should be made to ensure that they understand the pacific nature of our intentions towards Chinese territory. I was very pleased to read the wise and statesman-like announcement by the President yesterday which does much to make the position clear.1
2. I am proposing to make a statement in the House of Commons designed to secure publicity in China. In it I would try to convince the Chinese that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea are those publicly stated, that we have no ulterior designs and no intentions to violate Chinese territorial integrity, that the implications of Chinese action in Korea are extremely grave, and that while it is [Page 1174] our earnest desire to prevent any extension of the conflict, the decision and the responsibility will lie with them.
3. But the situation is so serious that I think we ought to go further than making governmental declarations and attempt to bring our intentions home to the Chinese through any other available channels. I think it is also important from the point of view of public opinion in our countries that we can be shown to have tried all possible means to make our position clear.
4. It may be possible to make direct contacts with the Chinese Delegation when they arrive in New York and in preparation for this I am strengthening the Delegation by sending Mr. Lamb2 to New York. But it looks as if the delegation may not arrive in New York for some time and meanwhile the situation may deteriorate. I therefore propose to take the following immediate steps.
5. Though Mr. Hutchison in Peking unfortunately has no right of access to the Chinese Government on matters of general policy, I propose to instruct him to try to see Chou En Lai (even at the risk of inviting a snub) or at any rate the highest available responsible official, to convey a statement on the general lines of paragraph 2 above. I do not propose to convey to the Chinese Government an indication of our proposals and ideas for a demilitarised area. If however the Chinese should give any opening to Mr. Hutchison in the course of conversation about future possibilities in the frontier area, I would ask him to enquire from them (as being an enquiry from him personally) whether they had ever given any thought to the idea of a demilitarised area in North Korea and if so whether they would like him to convey any suggestions regarding this to me.
6. I also propose to inform Pandit Nehru of the approach which Mr. Hutchison will be making to the Chinese Government and shall ask him to consider sending instructions to the Indian Ambassador in Peking to make a parallel approach.
7. Finally I propose to instruct His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow to inform the Soviet Government, in view of their declared interest in the maintenance of peace, of the views of His Majesty’s Government on the gravity of the situation in the Far East. Sir D. Kelly would not raise the question of a demilitarised zone.
8. I do not much like Mr. Pearson’s suggestion that the Secretary-General of the United Nations might get in touch with the Peking Government since this might detract from the efficacy of the approaches suggested above.
9. I should be glad if you would so inform Mr. Acheson. I am sure that the United States Government will agree with what I am doing [Page 1175] as they share our views as to our common objectives (namely those outlined above). In view of our recognition of the Chinese Government we may however be better placed than they to take the initiative.
Washington, [undated.]