795.00/11–1650
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Like everyone else, I have been racking my brains as to possible additional steps, however small, which we might take to reduce the risk of hostilities spreading from Korea. I submit the following, allthough they may have been already considered and rejected:
- 1.
- Clamping down on statements out of Tokyo Headquarters and lesser
commands.
It seems to me that there have been a series of irresponsible and provocative statements attributed to high American officers. Undoubtedly they have served to arouse further the suspicions of the Chinese as to our intentions. I suggest that the Secretary discuss this with General Marshall with a view to the JCS sending out a stiff warning for General MacArthur to transmit to all his subordinate officers.
- 2.
- Similar precautions with the Rhee Government.
I suggest a telegram to Muccio asking him to impress upon Rhee and his cabinet the vital importance at this point of avoiding any provocative or belligerent statements on the part of ROK officials.
- 3.
- Discuss delicacy of present situation with heads of wire services,
papers or syndicates having representatives in Korea or Tokyo.
It seems to me that as a further protection against irresponsibility on the part of American or Korean officers and officials, the responsible American newspapers would be willing to exercise a voluntary censorship on publication of interviews or statements which might further increase the tension.
- 4.
- Presidential action at home.
If it has not already been done, it seems to me that the President should ask his cabinet and members of the Congress of both parties, through the Congressional leaders, to exercise extreme restraint in any public statements on Korea or Chinese intervention at this time.
- All of the above relate to efforts to avoid any further strain due to unnecessary or irresponsible talk. The following three suggestions relate to efforts to make sure by direct contact that Peiping is left in no doubt as to our non-aggressive intentions provided they withdraw from their intervention:
- 5.
- A personal message from President Truman to Mao Tse-tung.
I think we should consider asking the British or Indians in Peiping to transmit personally to Mao Tse-tung a letter from the President which would reiterate our purposes. It should be firm but not minatory in pointing out the consequences of continued intervention on their part. I think it should, moreover, be kept secret at the outset and only published later if some advantage from such action appeared clear.
- 6.
- Sending an agent to directly contact Chinese Communist leaders in
Hong Kong.
This should be someone who speaks the language, possesses means or contacts whereby he could be put in contact with Peiping agents, clearly an official and not a private go-between and yet not of a rank which would result in publicity. Specifically, I suggest Sabin Chase,1 who I believe meets all of these qualifications and in whose judgment and discretion I have complete confidence. I think we should consider putting him on a plane in the next few days with a full briefing but no additional tools other than a signed letter from the Secretary stating that he has his full confidence; that he be provided with means of secure communication directly to the Secretary. The purpose would be to reiterate assurances already publicly given and to attempt to ascertain the Communists’ true intentions.
- 7.
- Direct approach to Stalin.
I think we should consider instructing Kirk that he request an interview with Stalin for the purpose of re-stating assurances already publicly given the Chinese and asking him to endorse and transmit these assurances to Mao Tse-tung. I know this is a difficult problem of approach in order to avoid any appearance of weakness.
Any of the last three steps, before being undertaken, should be fully discussed in advance with the British and our other principal allies.
- Chief of the China Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State.↩