Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

793.54/11–1650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

top secret

[Washington,] November 16, 1950.

Participants:	Mr. Millet, French Embassy
	Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State, NA.

Mr. Millet called with reference to our telegram No. 258[2]¹ to Paris regarding the possibility of “hot pursuit” of attacking enemy planes across the enemy frontier. He stated that he had no instructions but desired to obtain information as to whether our approach to the French Government was a request for “consultation” or merely “informing” it as indicated by Ambassador Bruce at Paris. I told him that we fully recognized the great interest of particularly those governments which were participating in the military action in Korea in decisions such as this and we had, therefore, immediately informed them of the possibility that a decision might have to be taken giving them an opportunity to express their views if they desired to do so. I said that in reaching our final decision, full weight would be given to any views which they may have expressed. Mr. Millet stated that he had no instructions to transmit any official views to us, but that from the telegrams which had been exchanged between the Foreign Office and Chauvel at New York, it was evident that both Chauvel and the Foreign Office were very concerned over the matter, and particularly over our apparent intent to make the decision without consultation with the UN. He stated that he expected Mr. Chauvel probably would have instructions on the matter by tomorrow.

I informally and personally discussed with Mr. Millet the various possibilities and probable results of various types of formal or informal consultations or action within the UN which might be undertaken to meet the apparent French views. He was unable to suggest any procedure which even he felt would be practicable from the standpoint of meeting the problem. I avoided making any commitment as to our course of action if the views of the French and other governments were unfavorable which was the evident primary purpose of his call.

In reply to his query concerning the newspaper reports of Mr. Rusk’s reference in his speech yesterday to a “buffer zone”,² I said that we would be interested in obtaining the details and developing the thoughts any government might have on this subject, but felt that it would be only equitable and just that such a zone be established on both sides of the Sino-Korean frontier.³

1. Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

2. See the editorial note, p. 1158. In his speech, Mr. Rusk made the following statement:

   “There has been some talk about a buffer zone. That perhaps they [—the Chinese Communists—] are trying to create in North Korea a buffer zone between themselves and United Nations forces. That is a matter which has come up for some discussion publicly around Lake Success and is a matter about which, undoubtedly, there will be more discussion in the future.”

3. On the following day, Mr. Johnson recorded two memoranda of telephone conversations with Mr. Millet, wherein the latter stated on instructions of his government that the views expressed by him on November 16 in regard to “hot pursuit” were the official views of the Government of France and also that the Government of France strongly supported the suggestion of Mr. Bevin for a Security Council resolution to establish a demilitarized area in North Korea. (795.00/11–1750; 330/11–1750)