Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–1550: Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Ottawa, November 15, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received November 15—8:08 p. m.]

153. Reference Deptel 95, November 12 [13],¹ Embtel 150, November 14. After receiving statement and aide-mémoire on our position hot pursuit Heeney discussed subject by telephone with Pearson at Windsor. As a result Canadian position stiffened considerably as compared Heeney’s reaction yesterday. Ambassador called this mornning to hear statement changed Canadian reaction.

Following is text External Affairs draft paper in this regard.

• “(1) We agree with the US Government that everything possible should be done to localize the conflict in Korea. We also agree that the abuse of Manchurian territory by the enemy could impose an intolerable burden upon the UN forces operating lawfully and properly on UN missions in Korea.
• “(2) The immediate question is whether the burden has not become, or is likely shortly to become, so intolerable as to make it necessary for UN aircraft to pursue attacking enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time into Manchurian air space. The answer to this question involves, of course, the careful balancing of purely military considerations against the political consideration that combat operations in Manchurian air space will increase the risk of the extension of hostilities.
• “(3) In order to lessen the risk that the step which the US Govment has proposed would lead to an extension of hostilities and in order to give the Chinese Communists an opportunity to discontinue the present abuse of Manchurian air space by hostile aircraft, we consider it important that, before the UN Commander-in-Chief is instructed to permit pursuit, the Chinese Communist Government should be given a specific public warning, preferably by a representative of the Unified Command in the Security Council, that, if hostile aircraft continue to use Manchurian air space, United Nations aircraft will naturally have to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of pursuing attacking enemy aircraft.
• “(4) Such a warning might also help us to determine the real intentions of the Chinese Communists. If they take measures to stop the use of their air space by hostile aircraft, this will to some extent indicate a desire to limit the conflict on their Korean border.
• “(5) It would therefore seem to us to be wise to delay a decision whether or not UN aircraft should be authorized to pursue hostile aircraft into Manchurian air space until reasonable time has been given for the Chinese Communist Government to show whether or not they intend to heed this warning.
• “(6) In spite of the case which could be made under international law that the UN Commander-in-Chief has the right to authorize UN aircraft to pursue attacking aircraft into Manchurian airspace, the Canadian Government considers it most important that no military operations take place outside Korean borders without specific authority from the UN.”

Heeney also said that according NY Times November 7 Gross has stated UN forces would not take action outside Korea without specific authorization UN² and he wondered how this reconciled with present position.

Aide-mémoire to come based on above quoted paper.³

Woodward

1. Same as telegram 2487, November 13, 7 p. m., to London, p. 1144.

2. Telegram 301, November 16, from New York, made the following observation on this point:

   “For information Department (re TS No. 153 from Ottawa, November 15), New York Times November 7 attribution to Gross was erroneous report of comment made at press conference. Only reference to subject is following, taken from stenographic minutes of meeting with press, held November 6, 1950 at Lake Success:

   ‘Question. Can you tell us, Sir, whether General MacArthur’s instructions would call for bombing of those frontier crossing points if he considered that was vital to the protection of his forces?

   Answer. Well, the instructions of General MacArthur, as has been reported to the Council, are very explicit and do prohibit bombing of territory outside Korea. Crossing of the frontier or a military action of any kind outside of the boundaries of Korea are prohibited and of course he, himself, has issued those instructions, very strict instructions, to members of his command.’”(795.00/11–1650)

3. Telegram 156, November 16, from Ottawa contained the following message in regard to the Canadian aide-mémoire:

   “Aide-mémoire mentioned end of Embtel 153, November 15 now received. It follows exact wording of draft paper quoted in 153 except insertion one additional paragraph and word changes as follows: in first paragraph read ‘the Canadian Government’ for ‘we’. In third paragraph read ‘Canadian Government’ for ‘we’ and read ‘notice in appropriate terms’ for ‘a specific public warning’. In fourth paragraph read ‘notice’ for ‘warning’. New fifth paragraph inserted reading ‘It might also be useful if a representative of the United Nations could establish direct contact with representatives of the Chinese Communist Government with view to discussing border problems arising out of the present situation in North Korea.’

   “Fifth paragraph renumbered six and in it read ‘the Canadian Government’ for ‘us’, also ‘warning notice’ for ‘warning’. Sixth paragraph renumber 7.”(795.00/11–1650)