795.00/11–1350: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations
498. Eyes only for Austin. Purpose of this telegram is to set forth certain views regarding strategy and tactics of handling Korea case in UN as case proceeds. This in no sense qualifies splendid manner in which you have handled Korean case. All of us here are in complete and cordial support.
Unfortunately we do not have at this time reliable and accurate picture of ultimate Chi objectives beyond those set forth Deptel 478.1 Further, the immediate military situation in Korea is unclear pending further action by UN forces to clarify the situation on their own front. Under these circumstances we must play our hand in UN with some care in order to achieve to extent possible objectives which we seek to obtain from UN consideration. These objectives are:
First. To localize Korean conflict to bring about withdrawal of Chi forces and prevent a world war or general engagement between Chi and UN forces with all consequences that might follow. This requires careful handling both politically and militarily. On political side it means that if Chi position is subject to satisfaction and negotiation (for example, fears concerning their frontiers or equitable allocation hydro-electric power) our handling of case should leave room for such negotiations. It may be, of course, that Peiping Moscow aggressive conspiracy has its roots so deeply in worldwide strategy that negotiation of local Korean issues is not possible.
Second. To obtain maximum support from international community for such action as may be required under various contingencies if character and extent Chi intervention change for worse. To mobilize this international support, it is essential that it be fully understood that our objectives are UN objectives, that we have no hidden purposes of our own, and that we are ready to take advantage of any opportunity to obtain UN settlement or to prevent general war with Chi Commies.
A Third objective is of course to bring about final settlement Korean question along lines Oct 7 resolution.
General MacArthur has pointed out that the initial mission of UN forces in Korea has been largely accomplished, i.e., to repel the aggression of NK forces against the ROK. Chi aggressive intervention appears as a new factor. From a propaganda point of view it would be comparatively simple to brand Chi Commies with aggression through the SC—GA procedure and thereby be free to take action against Commie Chi. Our overall national interest does not permit us [Page 1144] to move readily down this path. We must be careful that our political posture not run substantially ahead of the situation on the ground in such a way as to commit us to heavy involvements in Asia which we should try to avoid. Just as we pretended that Moscow was not committing aggression in NK so it may be necessary for us not to overplay the new factor of Chi intervention in NK until our combined political-military interests require that action.
Whether we should push six-power resolution through to a vote at maximum speed or let Council proceedings move forward more slowly depends to some extent upon the development of planned military operations in Korea. Also affecting tempo of SC consideration is question whether overwhelming majority SC will be dissipated by differences on bringing six-power resolution to vote before Chi Commies reach New York. If latter are obviously stalling, this question probably does not arise.
Similarly, we should not now make firm public commitments that Korean case will be brought immediately to GA following anticipated Soviet veto. Although present prospect is that we shall want GA consideration, we should not at this stage consider that as inevitable consequence of Soviet veto in SC. If Chi Commies position is “negotiable”, we may find some move on their part or by other governments to find some negotiating procedure which is more flexible and which moderates prestige and face considerations more than full GA debate. For example, some conciliation procedure analogous to efforts of six “neutrals” in Berlin case in 1948.2
Above considerations arise from facts that risk of general war has been substantially increased in recent weeks and that our political and military decisions must be related to fundamental and overriding considerations of a worldwide sort and not merely to the precise issues of this specific case. Maximum firmness and energetic action are required but the main effort must be directed toward the principal challenge and not to diversive secondary threats.
- Same as telegram 2344, November 6, 2 a. m., to London, p. 1050.↩
- For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, pp. 867 ff.↩