693.95/11–1350
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
top secret
[Washington,] November 13, 1950.
Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
| Participants: |
Mr. Erik Boheman—Swedish
Ambassador |
|
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of
State |
I asked the Swedish Ambassador, Mr. Boheman, to call at my office today.
I asked him if the Swedish Ambassador (Mr. Hammerstrom) is now in Peiping. He
replied that he was. I asked if he seemed to have anything like normal
relations with the Chinese Communist authorities; Mr. Boheman replied that
his relations were normal, “within limits”. I told the Ambassador that we
had been wondering whether there might not be some advantage in asking Mr.
Hammerstrom to sound out the Chinese Communists in order to determine just
what their present intentions are and to discover whether there is in fact
any basis for a peaceful settlement of any of their legitimate anxieties. I
then outlined for him the principal ideas in the attached memorandum.
Mr. Boheman said that he would be glad to inquire of his government, but that
he felt that Stockholm would be sympathetic to the idea.
[Page 1142]
I told Mr. Boheman that we had tried a discreet direct contact without result
and that the Swedish Government might wish to explore the situation
initially on its own account before leaving any indication that they were in
touch with us. Otherwise, the effort might run into a simple rebuff. Mr.
Boheman agreed to pass this suggestion along. I then gave him a copy of the
attached memorandum.1
[Annex]
It is of the utmost importance that every effort be made to ascertain the
actual intentions of the Peiping authorities with respect to their
present intervention in Korea.
The most serious possibility is that the present move is part and parcel
of an overall Communist offensive, coordinated from Moscow, in which the
Korean affair is only an incident of much larger plans, The facts that
the Chinese Communists are moving more or less openly in Korea, are
giving considerable assistance to Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China, have
selected this particular time to move into Tibet at the risk of
straining their relations with India, and are making menacing propaganda
moves toward Nepal, suggest that the Korean matter is not merely a local
action. The additional fact that Chinese forces (although of Korean
ethnic origin) have been moving into Korea over the past year suggests a
longer-range purpose than can be related to immediate incidents in
Korea.
If, on the other hand, there is any possibility that Peiping is acting in
the Korean matter out of any real fear that UN forces have any designs
against China or out of fear, that China’s legitimate interests in
frontier matters (including hydro-electric power) may not be adequately
safeguarded by the UN, it is important to ascertain that fact and to
arrange the necessary negotiations and machinery to deal with such
matters peaceably.
So far as the United States is concerned, we have no hostile intentions
toward the China mainland, we are acting in Korea wholly within the
framework of United Nations policy, have no interest in any military
position or bases in Korea for U.S. forces, and see no reason why
China’s legitimate interests are not wholly reconcilable with the United
Nations policy in Korea.
On the other hand, the United States will not accept a pattern of
Communist aggression in Asia and must insist that the Peiping
authorities act peaceably to avoid a result which will only bring
disaster to China and comfort only to the Soviet Union.
