795.00/10–1250
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at
Large (Jessup)
secret
[Washington,] October 12, 1950.
| Participants: |
Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador |
|
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup |
Sir Oliver came to see me this morning and left with me the attached message
from Mr. Bevin.
Sir Oliver said that the only thing which he had omitted from the original
message was a sentence at the end of paragraph 2 which left it to his
discretion whether or not he should make the representation contained in the
last sentence of that paragraph. The sentence in
[Page 931]
question requests that there should be prior
consultation between the United States and British Governments before any
authorization might be given to General MacArthur to take reprisals against
the Chinese Communists outside of Korea in the event of active Chinese
intervention in Korea.
Sir Oliver said that he felt that it was appropriate to make this
representation about prior consultation not only on general grounds, but
also because technically they had a right to do so since General MacArthur
is acting as U.N. Commander and the British have forces participating under
his command. Sir Oliver wished to make it plain, however, that he did not
want to put the matter on the basis of a “right” but rather on the basis of
normal consultation between the two Governments on an important matter of
common interest.
Sir Oliver also commented on paragraph 5 (b), noting
that he had not changed the rather abrupt form of expression, although he
said that he personally might have put the point a little differently. He
concluded with the request that the U.K. Government’s views be communicated
to the President. I told him that I would be glad to do so.
[Annex]
secret
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks
Dated 11th October, 1950
I have read an account of a broadcast by General Kim Il Sung, Premier of
North Korea, in which, according to the translation, he said “The Korean
People are not standing alone in our struggle and are receiving the
absolute support of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People, etc.” I have
also seen a statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Peking on October 10th to the effect that the Chinese could not stand
idly by in the event of the crossing of the 38th parallel on a large
scale.1
2. The North Korean statement seems to show that they have no intention
of responding to General MacArthur’s appeal for surrender. Both
statements are no doubt intended mainly for internal consumption, in
North Korea and in China respectively, but in view of President Truman’s
impending meeting with General MacArthur I consider it of the highest
importance that there should be no doubt whatsoever
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in the mind of the United States
Government about our view of the serious consequences that would flow
from Chinese intervention in Korea. It is not possible to assess the
prospects of such intervention. Whilst we cannot take Chinese statements
at their face value, it is equally impossible to discount them
completely. But should they in fact intervene openly I consider it vital
that General MacArthur should not take reprisals against them outside Korean territory without express sanction
from President Truman. I should of course like to be sure that this
sanction would not be given without prior consultation between the
United States Government and His Majesty’s Government.
3. We hope and trust that the United Nations Forces are on the point of
consolidating their brilliant military victory. No one can foretell how
Korea will develop in the more distance future but if our military
successes are consolidated and if there is no outside intervention by
China or by Russia then the way will be clear for the United Nations to
give Korea an opportunity to develop on democratic lines under a unified
Government and with her economy restored and war damage made good. This
will indeed be a great diplomatic victory for the United Nations,
matching on the political front the striking successes achieved in the
military field. But a false step on our part may force China into the
war, with consequences which cannot be foreseen but which will certainly
be of great gravity. India has done her best to restrain China and I
think that the message from Mr. Acheson which Pandit Nehru transmitted
to the Chinese about the bombing incident was wise and timely.2
4. It is, however, not quite clear whether the existing instructions to
General MacArthur not to take action outside Korea would still stand in
the event of Chinese intervention. We have complete trust in the
President and rely on him to make General MacArthur aware of the great
issues that hang on our conduct in Korea.
5. I am anxious that the views of His Majesty’s Government on these
points should be made clear to the President before he meets General
MacArthur. These are:—
- (a)
- the gravity of the situation that would arise in the event of
Chinese intervention, and
- (b)
- the need for categorical instructions to General MacArthur that
even in the event of such intervention he is not to take action
outside Korea without the express orders of the President.
