Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/10–1050

Draft Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)¹

secret

[Washington, October 10, 1950.]

Subject: Department Policy Towards War Crimes in Korea.

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a basis for consideration of the attitude which the Department should adopt towards the assignment to persons in the North Korean Communist regime of war crimes responsibility for criminal aggression, and on this basis to determine what instructions should be sent to the United States Delegation to the United Nations.

The North Korean regime was established in September of 1948 under Soviet auspices and assumed the responsibilities of government following the alleged withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from North Korea in December 1948. It inherited whatever authority it has exercised in North Korea directly from the Soviet Union and it has not in any sense been free from effective Soviet control. Not only did the Soviet Union assign numerous military “advisers” to the North Korean armed forces, but the evidence is strong that a large number of similar “advisers” were assigned to Korean counterparts within the administration. Indications are, furthermore, that these Soviet “advisers” have had the effective powers of command over their North Korean protegés, and it should be noted that General Shtikov, formerly military commander of the Soviet occupation forces, is currently the Ambassador of the USSR at Pyongyang. There is no doubt that North Korea was established and has been maintained as a typical Soviet puppet state.

While for political reasons the direct political, military and economic relationship of the USSR to the North Korean regime has been minimized by the Department in public, this relationship has nevertheless been a close one; it is inconceivable that the North Korean Communists could have initiated the attack upon South Korea which took place on June 25, 1950 without the approval of Kremlin. While it is not clear to what extent the Soviet Union may have exerted its influence in pushing the North Koreans into their military adventure, it is clear that the invasion could not have been carried out without Soviet acquiescence and active support in the military field. It is now notorious how extensive this support has been.

One of the most difficult basic problems to face the United Nations in unifying Korea is that of overcoming the hatreds and suspicions engendered by the present conflict. Unless these hatreds and suspicions can be kept at a minimum and prevented from pervading the future relations between the North and South Korean populations, the political integration of Korea will be rendered immeasurably more difficult.

A further matter for consideration is the fact that from the date of its occupation by Soviet forces in 1945, the people of North Korea have been effectively shut off from contact with the non-Communist world and, most significantly, from the southern part of Korea where a free, democratic government has been established. Undoubtedly, the aggressive and virulent propaganda of the Communists in North Korea against the ROK has had its effect upon the North Koreans themselves who, not being aware of the true motives and democratic ideas underlying the establishment of the ROK, have fallen victims to Soviet propaganda concerning the alleged aggressive intentions and vices of the ROK and of the Western Powers which have backed it. This does not condone the cynical and cold-blooded action of the North Korean regime in launching an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea. It does perhaps in some measure tend to relieve the North Korean leaders of what otherwise would have been their complete responsibility for what occurred.

It is the opinion of NA in the light of the foregoing considerations that a distinction should be drawn between the so-called war crime of aggression on the one hand and war crimes involving violations of the law and customs of war and atrocities against the civilian population on the other. These latter crimes are covered in a directive now being prepared for General MacArthur, which will instruct him to apprehend and hold for trial persons guilty of such crimes. As distinct from these crimes, however, the war crime of instigating and unleashing an unprovoked military aggression against the Republic of Korea involves significant political factors. Consequently, and since the crime was continued in defiance of the United Nations, it should be the United Nations itself which takes cognizance of the question of whether war crimes guilt should be assessed against the leaders of the North Korean regime.

In general, and although a precedent was set when the United States took an active part in support of the principle of trying persons responsible for the crimes of aggressive warfare (i.e., the International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg and for the Far East), considerable difference of opinion has subsequently arisen within the United States Government as to whether this policy was advisable or successful, and as to whether or not it may have had an unfortunate effect on our subsequent policy in Germany and Japan.

It is the view of NA that, in the light of the above circumstances, our Delegation should be instructed that the United States Government considers that the assignment of guilt against the North Korean leaders for war crimes of aggression is not desirable for the following reasons:

(1) The North Korean regime is not and has never been since its inception free from overriding Soviet control or influence. Therefore, primary responsibility for the aggression should be placed at the door of the Kremlin, against which at this stage, of course, no action can be taken. In this sense the North Korean regime may be considered as having acted only as an agent for Soviet policy.

(2) The Soviet Union prevented the North Korean regime and people from learning the true picture of the situation existing in the Republic of Korea. Consequently the North Korean leaders were not exposed to the moderating influences of the truth, but were subjected only to insidious and violent propaganda from Communist sources. An appeal to reason therefore probably would not have affected this course of action, once it had been determined for them.

(3) Any war crimes trials of a type such as that conducted before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg can serve only to intensify the hatred already unfortunately engendered between the populations of north and south Korea by intensive Communist propaganda and by the current hostilities, thus rendering the achievement of an effective and peaceful political unification of the peninsula much more difficult.

(4) As a practical matter, it is extremely doubtful that the North Korean Communist leaders primarily responsible for issuing the orders for the attack of June 25, 1950 will fall into our hands, since presumably they would be the first ones to flee the country and seek sanctuary in other Communist areas.

(5) Some of the effectiveness of punishing North Korean leaders for the crime of aggression, were they to fall into our hands, would be dissipated by the fact of Soviet influence over and connivance in the plan of aggression and its execution.

It is, therefore, suggested that our Delegation to the General Assembly be instructed to discourage the assignment, by the United Nations, of war crimes guilt in respect of aggression, to any North Korean leaders at this time. It is to be hoped that the question of such guilt in relation to the Korean conflict can be avoided or minimized in the United Nations.

1. This memorandum was routed through the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson).