Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

320/10–950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret

Seoul, October 9, 1950.
[Received October 10—3 a. m.]

241. For Rusk. Colonel Katzin proceeding UN headquarters October 8 for consultation re implementation UNGA resolution. I have suggested that he visit you soonest.

We have discussed implementation several times here. I am sending you my preliminary thinking on several points raised. This thinking predicated on desirability of bringing the UN into the Korea picture to the fullest possible extent:

(1) Foremost all delegates to 7 Nations Commission must be of the highest caliber.

(2) High Commissioner for relief and economic rehabilitation serving as executive under commission should be outstanding hard-hitting businessman who has had experience in dealing with Orientals. Advantage of an American versus non-American in this position hard to evaluate.

Right man probably more important than nationality. However I am inclined toward non-American to give further impetus to the UN character of endeavor. In this regard Katzin is inclined towards American and also feels ECA should be continued (he possibly has an eye to influence thereof on Congress and US appropriations).

United States and UN command are now functioning in area of activity affected by UN resolution:

(a) During period of hostilities UN command will continue to undertake certain activities under disease and unrest formula and to further military operations, which will have long range economic benefit; such as, essential repairs of railroads, motor roads, port installations, and airfields.

(b) Some activities are joint army–ECA undertakings; for instance, admirable joint effort made in restoring power and water to Seoul within one week.

(c) Relief and sanitation has been assigned by UN command to Public Health and Welfare. There should be gradual transition to full-fledged UN endeavor.

d) In view inevitable difficulties and delays in recruitment personnel and establishment functioning UN economic organizations in Korea. I feel that ECA should continue its program for this fiscal year and have its activities in Korea phased gradually into international setup. Continuation ECA operations during transition period could be a part of United States contribution to joint effort. This procedure would make available to international agencies individual talents and accumulated experience and capabilities of ECA mission and insure that there is no interruption of essential economic programs at this critical juncture.

(e) KMAG is now attached administratively to 8th Army. Post hostilities military advisory group should also be on international basis.

(3) I should also like to make the following remarks regarding general aims:

(a) Rehabilitation should not be merely “pouring in” materials and goods to replace war damages. Any program must keep in mind Korean capacity to absorb without indigestion, particularly the capacity of ROK to furnish non-inflationary local currency financing for projects. Income from sale of consumer goods and raw materials furnished by international agency would be principal source of such funds.

(b) Greater emphasis than in the past-should be directed toward government administration on taxation, fiscal policy, and other intangible factors affecting economic stability and requiring as much attention and material aid.

(c) Special effort should be made in the field of education. We should bear in mind that the unpiloted unification of Korea including the liberation of North Korea from Communist domination places upon us a moral commitment of the first magnitude to remold the thinking of the Korean people along democratic lines. Communist indoctrination of North Koreans under the guise of public education has been extensive. Any less effort on our part would fail to restore the Korean people to sanity and would lay US/UN open to Soviet allegation that capitalist Democracies ignore educational aspirations of the masses. Embassy notes with pleasure Department’s plans for greatly expanded USIE program in Korea, but believes that even this very large operation will not meet Korea’s needs in school buildings and new text books. Since Department has again stated that Fulbright funds can be used only in accordance original terms of the act,¹ I recommend that UN be advised of the magnitude of the educational problem in Korea and requested to take positive measures of assistance.

(d) The general scope of aid should be kept within realistic levels. The use of ECOSOC and UN specialized agencies might bring into this field such idealists, dreamers, and perfectionists that the operation would not result in practicable programs.

(e) Greatest progress may be expected by transferring functions and responsibilities to Korea soonest, making them aware of their responsibilities and at the same time keeping tactful UN supervision over them.

Muccio

1. P.L. 79–584, August 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 754. Presumably, the reference should be to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, known as the Smith-Mundt Act, P.L. 80–402, January 27, 1948; 62 Stat. 6.