793.001/10–750: Telegram
The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 8—4 a. m.]
750. NCNA quotes October 5 Peking Kwangming daily as saying Korean war has “entered new stage”. Daily elucidates “this will be drawn-out war of attrition”. Implication this statement like those of Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, previously commented on by Consulate General, is that North Koreans will not receive open large-scale military support from Chinese Communists but will go on guerrilla resistance.
Consulate General and other American agencies Hong Kong have been unable obtain any reliable new information from Communist sources since dispatch of Congentel 684, September 291 which would shed light on Communist intentions re Korea. Majority British and Chinese opinion Hong Kong is that Chinese Communists will not intervene militarily there. Of representative group informed Chinese contacted by Consulate General officers during past several weeks, large majority expressed opinion neither Chinese people nor government desire become embroiled in foreign war, particularly war fought on behalf USSR and Chinese Communists would successfully resist presumed Soviet pressure on them to intervene militarily in Korea. Although British officials naturally concerned over possibility such intervention, prevailing view expressed in official circles is that it [Page 913] will not take place. However PolAd states Hong Kong Government has no actual information on Chinese Communist intentions.
Re Department’s intel October 4, 5 p. m.,2 it seems most unlikely USSR could afford to risk political dangers involved in pushing its most important satellite into devastating war unless fully prepared to back it with Red Army, particularly in view of Sino-Soviet treaty. China, including important sections of CCP, would be certain to regard such action as betrayal.3
ReDepcirtel October 5, 11 a. m. Opinion of Consulate General and other American agencies is that if Panikkar actually was told by Chou that Chinese would send troops over frontier if US forces crossed 38th parallel, Chinese Communists must intend carry out threat. However, since there are many indications to contrary, it seems more likely that threat was conveyed to Panikkar indirectly so that it would not have to be backed up if bluff called. If Chinese Communists are prepared to intervene militarily in Korea, would it not be much more effective deterrent to UN advance for them to issue public warning that they would act if US forces crossed 38th parallel? We cannot perceive any advantage to their permitting issues to remain in doubt until US forces have crossed and then intervening. Furthermore, such action would be entirely contrary to previous Chinese Communist practice of careful psychological preparation of people in advance of military action accompanied by advance announcement of goal such as crossing Yangtze or preparing to take Taiwan and Tibet.4 Communist propaganda on Korea has been decreasing rather than increasing in volume and public statements of Communist leaders have not appeared to be of type designed prepare Chinese people for involvement in major war. On contrary their repeated references to long-term war of resistance by Korea indicate the opposite.
Repeated Taipei 80.
- Not printed. It offered the balanced estimate, based, however, on statements made by Chinese Communist leaders before the Inchon landings that Communist China would probably not openly send troops to aid North Korea. (793.001/9–2950)↩
- Not printed. It transmitted the substance of the British estimates on Soviet and Chinese intentions in Korea, printed under date of September 28, pp. 812 and 813.↩
- Telegram 749, October 7, from Hong Kong, not printed, reported an absence of the usual adulation of the U.S.S.R. during the celebration of National Day in the People’s Republic of China on October 1, reflecting an apparent response to a general feeling of resentment against previous public adulation of the Soviet Union. This, however, was not construed to represent a change in the relationship between Peking and Moscow. (746G.00 (W)/10–750)↩
- For documentation on Tibet, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.↩