Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/10–750

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[New York,] October 7, 1950.

On the basis of my telephone conversation with you at noon today I saw Engen and, making clear to him that these were all personal questions, suggested that if opportunity presented when he saw Kassaniev today he might raise the following points:

1. What is the purpose of the conversations? Is there anything that Kassaniev wanted Engen to do?

2. If there were in some degree an affirmative response Engen might indicate that it would be very difficult or embarrassing for him to do anything if there were not a genuine interest but the conversations merely a maneuver.

3. I suggested Engen might make clear that Kassaniev must realize there was no possibility of suspension of operations only to give extended time to the North Korean forces to build up their strength.

4. If the Russians were really interested in getting us out of Korea the best way would be for the North Koreans to lay down their arms. Otherwise the logic of the situation indicated that we would be likely to get further and further involved.

5. Since obviously the Russians do not believe public statements made by us and the British and the General Assembly Resolution concerning the purpose of occupation forces, what sort of assurances would they need?

Engen had lunch with Kassaniev after the Assembly meeting and gave me a full report as follows late this afternoon at the Vanderbilt. This report, as given below, is close to a verbatim record.

Engen said that Kassaniev initiated the conversation by asking Engen’s opinion as to whether the point in the Soviet resolution regarding cessation of hostilities could be accepted subject to guarantees from the Soviet Government that the North Koreans would not start hostilities again.

Engen asked whether Kassaniev meant an immediate cessation of hostilities, the two sides resting on present positions. Engen used the phrase “under conditions existing today”. Kassaniev replied in the affirmative. Engen said he stated his assumption that this meant before “United Nations” forces crossed the 38th Parallel. Engen said Kassaniev smiled at the reference to UN forces; it was apparent to Engen that Kassaniev had in mind United States forces. There was no mention of South Korean forces.

Engen then asked whether a United Nations “body” (commission) would get access to North Korea immediately. Kassaniev said that was his understanding.

Kassaniev then asked Engen’s opinion. Engen said that the basis (starting point), he thought, would have to be the North Koreans laying down their arms. Engen said this was his opinion and he thought it would be the opinion of the “other side”. Kassaniev made no comment but apparently shook his head.

Engen then asked Kassaniev what the latter thought about the assurances given in the Austin and Younger speeches in the plenary yesterday.¹ Kassaniev replied by referring to Vishinsky’s speech,² saying that as Vishinsky had said in his statement the Russians did not believe in these assurances. He mentioned Vishinsky’s examples from history to the effect that occupations always last longer than it is said they would.

Engen then asked Kassaniev, since the latter did not seem to believe in the assurances given in the Austin and Younger speeches, what kind of assurances the Russians might want.

Kassaniev asked Engen whether he asked this question for his personal information.

Engen replied that he asked the question for his personal information since, of course, he was naturally interested in the lack of belief Kassaniev had expressed in the public assurances given by Austin and Younger.

Kassaniev then asked whether Engen had contacted any other delegations. Engen replied in the negative.

Kassaniev then said if he should ask Vishinsky (put Engen’s question to Vishinsky) it would make a lot of difference to know if the question comes from Engen personally or whether Engen would convey what Vishinsky might answer.

Engen then repeated that he had asked the question for his personal information but said to Kassaniev that if the latter wanted Engen to convey any answer Engen would, of course, be willing to consider it. Engen added that his attitude would depend on whether Kassaniev had an interest in Engen conveying an answer. Engen said that it would also depend on what kind of an answer it was, that is to say, whether Engen personally thought the answer had any value. Engen said that up to now he had considered their conversations on a strictly personal basis. Kassaniev then said that he would tell Vishinsky, that he could give Engen no answer, that he did not know what the Russians would consider acceptable assurances, or whether they would want to have an answer conveyed to “others”.

(It seemed clear from Engen’s report that Kassaniev referred to himself and to the Russians more or less interchangeably in the first person, singular and plural).

Kassaniev then asked Engen whether the latter, if necessary, would be available to see Vishinsky if Vishinsky desired it.

Engen replied to the effect that seeing Vishinsky would certainly put the whole matter on a different level. He said he did not think he would be entitled to do such a thing without being allowed to by the head of his Delegation.

(Commenting on this to me Engen said he did not like very much the idea of seeing Vishinsky. He said he thought it would be a little odd since there was no parity of level.)

Kassaniev then said that he would tell Vishinsky and he suggested to Engen that they meet again next week.

Engen said the foregoing was the substance of their conversation on this subject, the rest of his conversation with Kassaniev at lunch being of a general character.

After getting the foregoing report from Engen I explored with him his own estimate of the conversations he had had with Kassaniev as follows.

With regard to Kassaniev’s own position in the matter Engen felt that Kassaniev probably had position enough to have freedom of conversation with a foreigner. I asked Engen whether he thought Kassaniev was holding these conversations on a permissive or on an instructed basis. Engen thought the basis was permissive rather than instructed. He thought that the purpose of the conversations was essentially exploratory on a permissive basis to see if anything might turn up.

Engen summarized his estimate of the conversations in two points as follows: (1) There is no way of telling, that is, there is no basis for valid judgment, whether the Russians have any desire to get into contact with the “other side”, to try to achieve something (an arrangement). (2) If there has been any value in the conversations it has been that it was possible to become clear regarding a certain line of thought on the part of the Russians, that is, they are maybe trying to avoid by an “arrangement” access to North Korea of United States forces.

Engen amplified the second point as follows. He said he thought the main reasoning of the Russians was that they realize their attempt to unify Korea by force and the North Koreans taking over has failed. They are now, therefore, trying to cut their losses by having an arrangement which would allow the North Korean authorities to continue to exist in North Korea and play an active part in preparation for elections.

Engen said there were two primary things the Russians wanted to avoid: (1) occupation by American forces, and (2) elimination (liquidation) of the North Korean authorities.

In general Engen said he did not really think the conversations indicated a common basis for general negotiations.

I said to Engen that it seemed to me that two principal, related but separate, points emerged from his conversations, namely, the desire by the Russians to cut their losses, having suffered defeat, and possible fear on their part of a threat to their territory (Vladivostok).

Engen said that he thought the threat to Russian territory was the starting point in their reasoning. This, said Engen, was a military consideration. From the political viewpoint he thought the predominant consideration in the Russian mind must be that this was the first time since the war that Western troops would have penetrated into an area within the Soviet sphere of influence and overthrown a puppet government.

Engen said he thought the Russians were probably very concerned regarding the psychological effect of this development in other areas within their sphere of influence, in particular in Eastern Europe, not to mention Germany. As a third point Engen said he felt that the development, they fear, in Korea greatly touched their prestige in Asia and weakened the strength of Communist dominated authorities elsewhere in Asia, for example in Indochina.

From the foregoing Engen reasoned that the Russians might be willing to go very far towards an arrangement which to the fullest possible extent would continue the North Korean authorities.

On the other hand Engen expressed the view that it was conceivable that the Russians might be prepared to take a very great risk to resist elimination of the North Korean state. The worst risk they might take, he said, would be direct intervention; the next worst risk would be actively supporting the North Koreans with arms, et cetera.

Turning to another subject I asked Engen whether the question of Asiatic occupation forces in North Korea had come up in his conversation today. Engen said that this question had not come up and he had not thought it appropriate to raise it. He said that he could envisage a difficult problem in this regard from a military point of view, that is to say, where would these troops come from, how would they be organized, staffed, et cetera.

I recognized the existence of the problem he mentioned. Putting this problem aside for the moment, however, and supposing hypothetically that the problem could be overcome so that occupation forces in Korea would be predominantly Asiatic, if not exclusively so, I wondered what Engen thought would be the Soviet reaction. Engen replied that the answer would depend on what Asiatic troops would be involved. If, for example, Asiatic troops involved were Indian he said he thought very definitely that because of the prestige of India in Asia the Russians would look upon the occupation of North Korea by Indian forces as a lesser evil than occupation by United States forces. He said he thought it would be very much more difficult for the Russians to accuse the Indians of coming to North Korea for the purposes they now have fixed in their minds and accuse the Americans of seeking. He said he thought the Russians would not under these circumstances be afraid of elections in North Korea as an excuse for setting up an American puppet regime. Engen said he thought the main purpose of considering such an arrangement (Asiatic occupation forces) from our (Western) point of view would be to remove from the Russians the opportunity of capitalizing on the propaganda theme of American imperialism in Asia.

I asked Engen if he thought there was anything that should be done over the weekend. He said he thought not, that he had left matters rather loosely with Kassaniev that they would get together again next week.

I said I assumed the conversations having reached the present stage that Engen would wish to report fully to his Foreign Minister who returns from Chicago tonight and would wish to proceed, if at all, in accordance with his Foreign Minister’s views. Engen said this was the case, again saying that he planned to drive Lange out into the country for dinner tomorrow when he hoped to have an opportunity to talk the whole matter over fully with Lange. I told Engen that he knew the high regard in which we held Foreign Minister Lange and that if Mr. Lange had any views on the matter which he wished to communicate to us I would be very glad to receive and transmit them. We left it that we would get in touch with each other Monday morning.³

1. See U.N. document A/PV.292.
2. See U.N. document A/PV.293.
3. October 9. See the memorandum by Mr. Ross dated October 10, p. 922.