357.AD/10–650
Memorandum by Mr. John C. Boss of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Engen–Kassaniev Conversations
The luncheon to which Engen was invited by Kassaniev today was not held because of confusion of place. However, Kassaniev came to Flushing this afternoon and talked with Engen along the following lines, reported to me by Engen late this afternoon at Flushing.
Kassaniev had reported to Vishinsky the first conversation with Engen. Vishinsky had expressed “very great interest”. He also, according to Kassaniev, expressed regret that he had not heard previously (at an earlier stage) about the idea that other than American troops might be used for occupation duties in North Korea.
Vishinsky had apparently also expressed the viewpoint that by adoption by the First Committee and the GA of the Resolution on the Korean Question, this question was finished as far as the UN was concerned. Engen said that Kassaniev had stressed the underlined words. Engen went on to say to me that it was his clear interpretation (his feel) that the Russians want negotiations outside the UN. That is to say, he said, they are in a “bad way” about Korea and want to reach the best settlement they can.
Resuming Engen’s report of this afternoon’s conversation with Kassaniev, the latter said that he had a question he wanted to ask of Engen. Kassaniev then went on to ask whether Engen had considered whether the setting up of the Commission, under the Eight-Power Resolution, would block the setting up of arrangements for the kind of troops Engen had mentioned in his first conversation (Asiatic troops) to occupy North Korea.
The following point is not altogether clear to me. It is my understanding, however, that in discussion of the item mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, Kassaniev talked about occupation troops in North Korea being preferably troops from Asiatic countries.
Engen said he had replied to Kassaniev’s question by saying that in his view the setting up of the Commission should not block anything but that the setting up of the Commission started a new phase.
[Page 898]Engen said that the foregoing was the gist of the conversation this afternoon. He said it went “back and forth” on these points. He said the conversation centered around the question of American troops in North Korea. Engen said he felt that the Russians were obviously convinced that the purpose of the whole undertaking in Korea was to give the U.S. a foothold in North Korea.
Engen said that although Kassaniev did not so state directly, the conclusion which Engen drew from the conversation was that in the Russian view the American troops and American Military Administration in North Korea would obviously produce an American puppet government which would involve the question of a threat to Vladivostok, etc.
Engen said that he had confirmed that Kassaniev was at one time Soviet Consul General in New York, thereafter for a time a member of the Russian Delegation here, and thereafter, in the Secretariat. He said that he thought it was quite obvious that Kassaniev must have some position of standing since he seemed to have quite free access to Vishinsky.
I asked Engen what he thought Vishinsky’s position was. Engen said he thought that Vishinsky was simply a man sent abroad by his Government to present their case in the UN. I asked Engen if he meant by this that Vishinsky was simply an “advocate”—perhaps a very good one? Engen said he thought that was just the word to describe Vishinsky. He said that he felt that Vishinsky had little to do with the formation of policy. Engen added, parenthetically, that he thought that any fundamental change in Soviet policy would be reflected in the appointment of a Politburo member as a Soviet Foreign Minister.
In the course of my conversation with Engen, he asked me whether I thought the approaches of Kassaniev had any significance. I told Engen I felt that I was really not competent to judge this point. I said that I thought his conversations with Kassaniev were “interesting”. I said that on the one hand Kassaniev might merely be a well meaning person and that the conversations might be of no importance whatever. I said, on the other hand, it was conceivable that his conversations with Kassaniev might have some importance. I repeated that I, however, was not competent to have a valid judgment.
In the course of the conversation, I took occasion to say that, expressing my own view, it seemed clear to me that the last thing the U.S. would want to do would be to become engaged in any kind of open conflict with the Chinese Communists or with the Soviet Union. I said that I thought Ambassador Austin’s speech in the Plenary Session this afternoon1 had made quite clear that we had no ulterior objectives in Korea.
[Page 899]Engen said he had noticed what Austin had said. He said he thought it was very useful for us to keep repeating our objectives. He recalled a British diplomat who had once written that given the peculiarities of the Russian mind, one could never understand what they were after; therefore, the most important thing was to make sure that they understood what you were after.
Engen said he attached very considerable significance to the fact that this approach by Kassaniev had been made to him because before he came to New York (in April 1949) to serve with the Norwegian Delegation, he had been Foreign Editor of the Verdens Gang, an Oslo daily. He said that the Russians had very frequently approached him in Oslo when they had particular messages they wanted to communicate to Foreign Minister Lange, but which they did not want to pass through usual diplomatic channels. He said the Russians were aware of the fact that he, Engen, was a close, personal friend of Lange, of some years standing.
I reiterated to Engen my feeling that it was very important that the information he had given me be held very closely. I told him that if that kind of story got spread around it would almost certainly appear in the newspapers and publicity would almost certainly destroy any validity the conversations might conceivably have. Engen said that he fully agreed and was holding this information very close within his own Delegation.
I also suggested, and Engen agreed, that if either he or I should be questioned about our conversations together, we tell the same story, namely, that we had been consulting about the resolution on our united action for peace program.
Engen told me that Kassaniev had asked if he might see him again on Saturday2 and Engen had agreed to do so. Engen asked if I thought he were wise in continuing to see Kassaniev. He added that he had made quite clear to Kassaniev that their conversations were quite informal, personal, and unofficial. I told Engen that I saw no reason why he should not continue to see Kassaniev casually as he had been doing.
I asked Engen about his plans over the weekend. He said that he was going to meet Foreign Minister Lange Saturday night on Lange’s return from Chicago. He planned to be driving Lange out into the country somewhere for a pleasant luncheon on Sunday.