795.00/10–650
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
top secret
[Washington,] October 6, 1950.
Subject: Discussion of Telegrams
| Participants: |
Sir Oliver Franks, British
Ambassador |
|
Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British
Embassy |
|
Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at
Large |
|
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary |
The British Ambassador came in to discuss four telegrams which he had been
asked to discuss urgently with the Secretary. In the latter’s absence, he
took them up with Ambassador Jessup and me.
The first telegram (a copy of which was not left with us) contained three
questions on which Mr. Bevin wanted an answer:
- 1.
- The first question was whether U.S. policy was still to localize the
Korean fighting. We replied that it continues to be U.S. policy to
localize the Korean fighting and mentioned to the Ambassador our efforts
to settle the Yalu bombing incidents, the public statements we have been
making to reassure Communist China and the Soviet Union as to our
intentions in Korea, and indirect messages we have attempted to get to
Peiping privately along the same lines.
- 2.
- The second question was whether General MacArthur had clear
instructions not to attack targets in Manchuria and Siberia and that
such attacks would not be delivered without full consultation. We told
the Ambassador that such was the case.
- 3.
- The third question related to the gap between General Assembly action
and any major move on the part of non-Korean UN forces beyond the 38th
parallel. Mr. Bevin attached considerable importance to there being a
gap in order not to bring into question the good faith of many
delegations voting in favor of the resolution in the Assembly. We
replied that we did not have precise information but that we understood
that there would be some gap if the Assembly moved promptly to pass the
resolution. The Ambassador said that General Bradley had confirmed to
Lord Tedder that there would be such a gap, but “not a large one”. It
was agreed that the U.S. and U.K. Delegations at Flushing should use
every effort to insure prompt passage of the Resolution on Saturday.
(This was phoned to USUN at once and
the Resolution was passed Saturday.)1
The second telegram from Mr. Bevin is shown as Tab A and is self-explanatory
as a covering telegram from Bevin to Franks.
The third telegram is shown as Tab B and was a covering telegram from Bevin
to Nehru, and is self-explanatory.
[Page 894]
The fourth telegram is shown as Tab C and is a message from Bevin to Nehru
which Nehru might pass on textually to the Chinese in Peiping, if Nehru
desired to. Ambassador Jessup and I confirmed that the line of this telegram
accurately reflected our own attitude, although we suggested that the
wording in the penultimate paragraph “to construct no new permanent military
bases or airfields” might be modified to read “retain no bases or
installations” in order not to bar any construction which the military
command might have to do in connection with current operations.
Sir Oliver then said that if Ambassador Jessup and I thought that we were
fully representing the Secretary’s views he would not ask that we get in
touch with the Secretary and he was confident that Mr. Bevin would accept
our judgment on this. We stated that we were confident that we reflected Mr.
Acheson’s views and that we saw no reason to attempt to get in touch with
the Secretary in New Haven.
[Annex 1]
Tab A
Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks—6th October 1950
I have been considering sending a message to Pandit Nehru with a view to
influencing Peking and I would like you to consult Mr. Acheson urgently
on the general merits of these tactics and also to ask his views on the
preliminary draft texts which are given in my two immediately following
telegrams. Please make it clear that I would, not send the message
unless Mr. Acheson approved the idea and moreover that I am anxious to
know whether he concurs in their terms or whether he has any suggestions
for amendment.
2. My two immediately following telegrams contain
- (a)
- Draft of a possible message from me to Nehru, and
- (b)
- Draft of a further message to Nehru from me in a form suitable for
transmission at his discretion to the Central Peoples
Government.
3. My purpose is to convey a message to the Chinese which may cause them
to hesitate before taking precipitate action. If they have not already
committed themselves to open support of the North Koreans, it may
influence the Chinese if they can be assured that they will get a
hearing from the United Nations Commission. If the message could also
include some reassurance to the Chinese about the intentions of the
unified command it would carry additional weight.
4. The action which I am suggesting may at the same time help to steady
the Indians and perhaps to persuade them to join the Commission if that
issue is still open when the messages arrive in New Delhi.
[Page 895]
5. If the Resolution is strengthened to allow for consultation with the
Chinese, i.e. amended to allow for a Chinese hearing or even for Chinese
association with the work of the Commission, or if supporting speeches
make it clear that it is the wish of members of the Assembly that Peking
should be given a hearing by the Commission then paragraph 3 of the
second draft message to Nehru could be strengthened accordingly.
[Annex 2]
Tab B
Following is draft of first message from Bevin to Pandit Nehru:
I have been giving much thought to the recent reports which you have been
good enough to send me from your Ambassador in Peking about China’s
misgivings about developments in Korea and the movement of United
Nations Forces northwards. I know that both you and we are in complete
agreement regarding ultimate objectives and I particularly regret that
you have not felt it possible up to now to associate India with the
Resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and other powers now before
the General Assembly. I fully share the concern you have shown regarding
any extension of the conflict. Armed intervention by China would indeed
[lead] to a great catastrophe, more
particularly if this were to come about as a result of her
misapprehension of United Nations intentions.
2. In view of the disastrous consequences which would follow from any
precipitate action by China I feel that every endeavor must be made to
remove any misunderstanding. I wonder, therefore, if you would consent
to instruct your Ambassador in Peking to tell the Central Peoples
Government what our intentions really are. These are set out in my
immediately following telegram. I have no objection if you so desire to
the text of the telegram being shown to the Chinese but naturally I
leave this entirely to you.
3. As I am sure you will have realised I still hope that you may be able
to see your way to associating India with our 8 Power Resolution and I
hope in any event that you will be able to agree that India will be
represented on the Commission constituted under the Resolution and thus
exercise her great influence in a settlement which is of such vital
importance to Asia. If you could see your way to joining the Commission,
any message to the Chinese of which your Ambassador in Peking was a
bearer would have greatly added force. This indeed might prove to be a
decisive factor in persuading the Chinese of the integrity of our
intentions.
[Page 896]
[Annex 3]
Tab C
Following is draft of second message from Bevin to Pandit Nehru:
We have been considering most carefully the statements of the Central
Peoples Government re recent developments in the Korean situation. These
show their concern about the future movements of United Nations forces
in Korea and their fear that these forces may become a potential threat
to China’s security. We have also noted their wish to be a party to the
final settlement of the Korean problem. In the light of this I feel it
would be useful for me to take this opportunity to tell you how I—and I
venture to believe many member States of the United Nations—view the
present situation.
2. Our primary objective with which I know you are in agreement is to
achieve as soon as possible a unified independent and democratic
Government of the whole of Korea. We can make no real progress towards
this until the fighting comes to end. This could be brought about at
once if the North Koreans laid down their arms. If they will not do so
then the United Nations Command has no alternative but to prosecute the
campaign in order to prevent any recurrence of the threat to the peace
of Korea. You will recall that the Security Council Resolution of June
27 imposed upon the Commander of the United Nations Forces the task of
re-establishing international peace and security in the area. Whilst
there can be no doubt that these necessary military objectives must be
achieved there is no intention on the part of the Unified Command to
take any action which could be construed as a threat to China’s
security. In fact it is the intention to withdraw all operational forces
as soon as possible, to construct no new permanent military bases or
airfields and to keep United Nations forces in Korea no longer than is
necessary for the purposes of holding elections and setting up a new
democratic Government for the whole of Korea. I also believe it to be
the intention of the Unified Command that no troops other than Korean
will be disposed near the China frontier.
3. I fully appreciate China’s desire to be associated with all steps that
are taken to secure a peaceful and final settlement of this problem. Her
close historical association with Korea and her common frontier make
this to my mind essential. I am sure that the United Nations Commission
which is to be constituted under the 8 Power Resolution will accord the
most careful consideration to the views of the Central Peoples
Government.
[Annex 4]
[Here followed a telegram from the U.K. High Commissioner in New Delhi
dated October 7, 1950, conveying Mr. Nehru’s appeal to
[Page 897]
Chou En-lai to “hold his hand for the
present.” The Chinese Government stated that it had no intention of
taking any action if American forces did not cross the 38th parallel but
was determined to do so if American troops moved into North Korea.]
