320/10–550: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
priority
[Received October 5—5:45 p. m.]
Delga 78. Von Balluseck, Netherlands permanent UN representative, called at his request on Gross. On instructions and stating he had personal doubts on subject, Balluseck read draft resolution which Netherlands is considering introducing in GA plenary statement on October 6 immediately after adoption 8 power Korean resolution.
In substance proposed draft called on North Korean Government to cooperate with UN in settlement provided by 8 power Korean resolution, and to indicate its willingness to comply on or before October 31.
It directs UN command to suspend all air, sea and land operations north of 38 parallel until October 31.
It provides that if North Korea indicates defiance or no intention to comply, Unified Command can resume all military action.
Balluseck stated that this resolution stems from his government’s fear that military action north of 38 parallel may well involve Chinese Commies according to information from Hague. Hence such action [Page 884] has important political implications and North Korea should have a chance to back down. He added that due to predominantly US troops and US commander, UC emphasizes US interests in FE, and there is feeling it perhaps should reflect caution of other UN members such as his government.
After Gross strongly indicated danger and difficulty of Netherlands proposal and that same result could be accomplished by having commander UN forces widely publicize 8 power resolution, Balluseck stated this reaction confirmed his own views and he would advise his government not to introduce any such resolution. Gross took the line:
- (a)
- US has watched carefully and studied reports including those from Hague on possible Chinese Commie involvement. Commies have not committed themselves by actual forces thus far and lack of vigor and decisiveness by GA now might be an invitation for them to do so.
- (b)
- It would be a very serious interference with military decisions which could cost many American lives to attempt to make military decisions for the UN Commander, particularly to tie his hands. No one could be more sensible than we whose troops are committed to elements of risk and evaluating them.
- (c)
- Proposed resolution would be in reality a re-examination of whole Korean problem with new debate in first committee at a time when delay and indetermination are most damaging. That was why we opposed Indian subcommittee proposal.
- (d)
- Gross added he would recommend to Department that fullest use be made of Korean resolution disseminating it to North Korea and felt this would effectively carry out true purpose of Netherlands suggestion. Balluseck was inclined to agree.