791.13/10–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received October 5—3:04 p. m.]
837. For Secretary and McGhee only. No other circulation.
1. During my conversation with Bajpai yesterday we had a little [Page 881] exchange which I considered inadvisable to incorporate in Embtel 831, October 4, but regarding which I believe you should know.
2. When Bajpai read from one of Panikkar’s telegrams statement that Chou En-lai heartily approved Nehru’s press statement of October 2 on Korea1 I said I supposed that approval included also Nehru’s remarks re Rhee.2 Bajpai who is hot tempered flushed and told me my remark was unnecessary—that it appeared to reflect on Nehru and it was his duty to defend his Prime Minister. I told him I regretted making remark—that in trying times like this sarcasm was always inexcusable but that it was difficult to remain placid in the face of series of statements made by Prime Minister during recent days which it seemed to me could partially offset certain efforts made by US and other UN powers at the cost of much blood to discourage aggression. I said that public remarks of Nehru re our actions and policies in Korea could do great damage because he was not only Prime Minister of India but also outstanding leader of Asia. I was hurt the more by his remarks because of my personal deep admiration and respect for him. Bajpai’s anger subsided and he said he regretted he had lost his temper. His own position was difficult. He was not responsible for what his Prime Minister might say spontaneously but nevertheless it was his duty to uphold his chief. He said he supposed I was referring to remarks made by Nehru on October 2 to effect; that “one’s saviors sometimes lead to one’s ruin”.
I said that this remark unfortunately was only one of many which Prime Minister had made recently. I had made no list of them and had had no intention to refer to them. Nevertheless since subject had come up I might say that it seemed to me that perhaps unconsciously the Prime Minister had for some time been more critical publicly of activities and policies of UN particularly of US in Far East than of those of aggressor. For instance, his remark regarding President Rhee who was legally head of ROK might well add to difficulties of UN in re-establishing stable government in South Korea and would certainly encourage Communist groups who were doing their best to undermine ROK. During recent press conference Nehru also had listened sympathetically to allegations of correspondents re inhuman treatment by US soldiers of North Korean prisoners and had indicated [Page 882] he did not approve such “uncivilized” actions. Journalists at press conference could not but obtain impression that Prime Minister was critical of US treatment of prisoners whereas in fact UN forces in Korea were making every effort to live up to international codes of treatment of war prisoners although North Koreans were murdering Americans and other prisoners of war.
I said that when North Koreans had upper hand Indian press openly and many Indian officials privately were intimating that victories were due to sympathies of people of population with North Korea. Similarly victory by Chinese Communist Army in China had been interpreted by Nehru as expressive of will of Chinese people. On heels victory UN forces in Korea Nehru had now given lead to Indian press by referring to “militarists” and “military minds”. In other words, impression was being given in India and Asia that UN victory in Korea was victory of militarists whereas there had been peoples victory in China. While condemning American bombing Nehru had not pointed out that all horrors of war in Korea had flowed out of acts of aggressors. He had at no time referred to atrocities of North Koreans.
3. Bajpai said Nehru was kindhearted man. He hated to see human suffering and he could not keep quiet in face of suffering brought about by US bombing in Korea. Nehru also had been upset by ceremonial entry of MacArthur into Seoul, which he considered provocative and unnecessary, and he had not been pleased at prominent role assigned to President Rhee, who in his opinion had already been discredited.
4. I said that it was unfortunate that when US or UN committed acts or pursued policies which Prime Minister did not like he did not give his views privately rather than present them in such manner as to strengthen cause of aggressors. Bajpai replied that it was Nehru’s nature to give public vent to his strong feelings on certain subjects rather than to convey them privately.
5. It had not been my intention to discuss with Bajpai Nehru’s systematic undermining of US prestige and character by public statements. It is extremely difficult, however, to remain silent while Nehru is carrying on his sometimes subtle and sometimes openly vindictive campaign against US. It might be useful for him to know that we understand what he is doing. Unfortunately, there seems to be no other chief of mission here who dares take exception to anything Nehru says or does. UK representatives are so anxious to keep in his good graces that unless important UK interests are involved and they are under instructions they are inclined to follow policy of flattery, cajolery and apology somewhat similar to that employed by Nehru [Page 883] in dealing with Chou En-lai. Canadian HICOM is even more supine and sometimes engages in anti-American statements to strengthen his position. Only diplomatic representatives accredited here who might in dealing with GOI loyally support US in these trying times are Australian HICOM and Italian Ambassador, both of whom are on home leave.
6. Nehru has not limited his campaign against US to public statements. He continuously attacks US for its various policies, particularly its Far Eastern policy, in private conversations with chiefs of missions, none of whom so far as I know, with exception Italian Ambassador, has had hardihood to disagree. That does not mean that chiefs of diplomatic missions here are in general anti-American. Most of them are people of small caliber who do not wish to risk displeasure Nehru by supporting policies and actions of US or UN to which he takes exception.
7. Since Nehru’s personal victory in party congress at Nasik, other members of cabinet, although possibly not approving all that he does, no longer endeavor to restrain him in matters foreign policy. Cabinet foreign policy committee has apparently sunk into oblivion and he has freehand.
- See footnote 1 to telegram 831 from New Delhi, received at 3:40 p. m. on October 4, p. 870.↩
- At his news conference on September 30 (see footnote 1 to telegram 814 from, Moscow, received at 12:23 p. m. on October 3, p. 851), Prime Minister Nehru was asked whether he agreed with President Rhee’s view that the 38th Parallel no longer existed. Mr. Nehru replied that the 38th Parallel should ultimately disappear and no longer be a dividing line barring a united Korea. He went on to say that if Rhee meant that all kinds of military steps should be taken to further his (Rhee’s) alms, the Prime Minister would have to disagree. He added that he was no great admirer of Rhee in any case. (Telegram 819, October 1 from New Delhi; 791.00/10–150)↩