357.AD/10–550
Memorandum by Mr. John G. Boss of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
I read to Engen at Lake Success this afternoon the memorandum I sent you earlier today1 (with the exception of the last two paragraphs) on his conversation with Kassaniev at lunch yesterday. Engen confirmed the accuracy of this report, adding the following comments:
Referring to the last sentence of the third paragraph of my memorandum Engen added the following comment: He said Kassaniev had used the phrase “our neighboring states”. Although Kassaniev did not say so Engen interpreted his use of this term as indicating a preoccupation with Soviet relations with neighboring states in Europe as well as Asia. He interpreted Kassaniev as having in mind that the defeat of North Korea was the first example of a Soviet-established state being overthrown.
With regard to the fifth paragraph of my memorandum Engen amplified this somewhat as follows: He said that when he stated his understanding of the situation Kassaniev was so excited by what appeared to be to him a wholly new idea that he “paled visibly”.
Engen said that the whole conversation and the fact, in particular, that Kassaniev asked him to repeat three times what he had said revealed [Page 880] a conviction strongly held by the Russians that the United States wanted to occupy Korea permanently. The understanding which Engen stated seemed to be completely at variance with Kassaniev’s psychological attitude.
Engen amplified paragraph nine of my memorandum as follows: Kassaniev apparently gave some indication that the United Nations commission would not only go into North Korea to hold elections but also to see to it that the North Koreans kept the surrender terms. Engen restated the point in this way: that Kassaniev indicated the North Koreans might accept the MacArthur terms if American troops stopped at the 38th parallel.
I asked Engen if Kassaniev made any distinction between “American troops” and United Nations forces. Engen said Kassaniev made no such distinction but talked only about American troops.
Engen also said that Kassaniev would not say anything at all about how the Russians would feel about having Asiatic troops in North Korea.
Engen told me that Kassaniev had today invited him to lunch again tomorrow, Friday.2 Engen has accepted, and he promised to give me a report of tomorrow’s conversation at lunch, sometime tomorrow afternoon.
I emphasized to Engen that the information he had given me was being restricted to very few people in our Government. I asked him if he had communicated this information to anyone else. Engen said that he had told only Sunde and Stabell of his own Delegation and that he would, of course, tell Foreign Minister Lange when the latter returns from Chicago.
I told Engen I felt it would be very wise if he did not reveal to Kassaniev that he had passed on to us this information. Engen said that he would not do so.
I asked Engen if he knew anything about Kassaniev. Engen said he really hardly knew Kassaniev at all. He had met Kassaniev about a year ago at some reception or dinner and off and on he had had a drink with him in the Delegates’ Lounge. Engen has a very vague recollection in the back of his mind of having heard that Kassaniev was at one time Russian Consul or Consul General in New York.