795.00/10–550
Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Here is the version of the story Hans Engen of the Permanent Norwegian Delegation here told me and I understand repeated later to the Secretary at Sunde’s request.
Engen has apparently had a casual acquaintance with Vassili Kasaniev, a Soviet employee of the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat. Yesterday Kasaniev invited Engen to lunch. Kasaniev initiated the conversation by asking Engen what the Norwegian Delegation thought about the U.S.S.R. resolution on Korea.1 Engen replied to the effect that the clause in the Soviet resolution concerning the withdrawal of troops demonstrated the obvious lack of [Page 878] sincerity of the whole resolution. Engen then countered by asking Kasaniev what the Russians thought of the 8-power resolution.2
Kasaniev replied that the 8-power resolution would permit United States troops to occupy North Korea. The Russians, Engen reported Kasaniev as saying, could not stand this. It was not only a question of their security but also a question of their prestige and standing in the area.
Engen then indicated to Kasaniev that it was not his understanding that U.S. troops wanted to stay in Korea but rather wanted to get out as soon as possible after the defeat of the North Koreans had been accomplished. Engen added, he told me, it was his understanding that possibly Asiatic troops (from Pakistan or India, for example) might be used for occupation duties in North Korea.
Engen’s remarks apparently made a very strong impression on Kasaniev. The term does not make much sense in the context but Engen said that Kasaniev “paled visibly”. Kasaniev asked Engen to repeat what he had said. Engen did so. Kasaniev then asked Engen whether he might repeat what Engen had said to Vishinsky.
Engen said that they were talking together as person to person and that he had no objection to Kasaniev repeating to Vishinsky what he had expressed as his personal understanding of the situation.
Kasaniev then asked Engen to repeat again what he had said which Engen did.
Engen then asked Kasaniev what the Russians had in mind. Kasaniev apparently replied along the following lines:
MacArthur should agree to stop at the 38th Parallel. The North Koreans would then lay down their arms and, third, a United Nations Commission would be allowed to go into North Korea to hold elections, et cetera.
Engen then said he asked Kasaniev how the Russians would feel about Asiatic occupation troops in North Korea. Kasaniev, to whom this was apparently a new idea, inquired about the possible composition of such troops. Engen replied by mentioning again by way of example Pakistan and Indian troops. Kasaniev then inquired whether the Philippine troops would be included. Engen said he replied to the effect that he would suppose so since the Philippines were, of course, Asiatics.
This was apparently the sum of the conversation. Engen said that immediately after they returned from lunch and before the Committee One meeting opened3 he saw Kasaniev talking with Vishinsky in the corridor.
[Page 879]Engen emphasized that the information he transmitted was a personal communication from him and not an official communication from the Norwegian Delegation, although he had reported the matter to Sunde who authorized Engen to transmit the information to us.
I gather that at Sunde’s request Engen repeated this story to the Secretary late in the afternoon. Subsequently Engen came to me privately and very personally and said he was afraid that Sunde had given the Secretary an incorrect impression, namely, that the Norwegian Delegation had voted in favor of the Indian resolution to set up a subcommittee4 because of the conversation Engen had had with Kasaniev at lunch. Engen said this was wholly incorrect and that the decision to vote for the Indian suggestion had been taken by the Norwegian Delegation the day before. This tends to be borne out by the reports from our Area Officers which based Norwegian support for the Indian proposal on the statement made by the Norwegian Prime Minister a day or two earlier.
I am sending this to you in single copy and as indicated on the phone I would appreciate it if you would inform Hickerson. The only people I am informing here are Ambassadors Austin and Gross.
- U.N. document A/C.1/567; see telegram Delga 63 from New York, received at 7:24 p. m. on October 2, p. 838.↩
- U.N. document A/C.1/558; see telegram Delga 57 from New York, received at 11:18 p. m. on September 29, p. 826.↩
- See the editorial note on the 353d meeting of the First Committee at 3 p. m. on October 4, p. 873.↩
- See the editorial note, p. 873.↩