795.00/10–450: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India
504. Re Deptel 492, Oct 3, 1 pm.
(1) As possible additional assistance in discussing this matter with Bajpai and Nehru, the fol is for your background info in addition to that given in Deptel 468.1 Since beginning of Kor affair, Chi Commies have in defiance of UN given polit logistic and mil assistance to North Kor forces. It has been apparent from US intelligence and reconnaissance reports that Manchuria is very important line of communication and source of supply for North Kors. In addition interrogation of prisoners has definitely established that major portion of North Kor spearhead was composed of Chi Commie troops of Kor racial origins who had been transferred since the summer of 1949 as organized units, numbering 20–30,000 troops. A Peiping broadcast of Sep 22 quoted a spokesman of Ministry of For Affairs to the effect that Kors residing in Chi have returned to their “Motherland” to defend it and seeks to justify this on specious plea that these Kors have a right to return to their “Motherland” though many have resided many years or all their life in Chi.
Therefore, it is not quest whether Chi Commie intend to intervene in Kor conflict, but only of degree of their intervention. Indirect, obscure Chi Commie statements at this time cld, therefore, hardly be interpreted except as an attempt to dissuade the GOI and perhaps indirectly other members from support of firm UN action at this critical stage. As Chi Commies have heretofore not shown any hesitation in communicating their views directly to UN, it is difficult to place any other interpretation on Chou En-lai’s statement to Panikkar.
(2) You might again stress to GOI it is obvious that any action which cld result in giving time to North Kor regime to regroup its forces north of 38° cld only result in increased defiance of UN as in the past and make more difficult the bringing about of GOI’s achieving its consistent objective in obtaining a unified Kor.
You may give GOI strongest assurances that UN operations in Korea will constitute no threat to Korea’s neighbors, that we have no [Page 875] desire to extend the conflict, that we have no desire to establish U.S. bases there or to prolong UN occupation any longer than necessary for minimum security needs, and that we do not seek any special position whatever in Korea.
On other hand, GOI must appreciate that there is a hostile Army in the field which is continuing operations against UN forces, that it has given no signs of giving up the struggle, that it continues to fight wherever it can south of the 38? parallel, that it has been assured that it will be reorganized and re-equipped north of the 38? parallel, that it refuses to hand over UN prisoners of war and civilian hostages who are being brutally murdered in large numbers, and that the North Korean aggressor continues to receive political and military assistance from its northern neighbors.