357.AD/10–450: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
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[Received October 4—3:40 p. m.]
831. 1. Despite information given me last evening by Nye (Embtel 828, October 3) I was not in position approach Bajpai Secretary General MEA on latest Chinese Communist démarche until receipt this morning Deptel 492, October 3. Nye and I have agreement never to take up matters with Government of India on basis exchange information between us.
2. I called on Bajpai this morning and told him of information which we had received through London and pointed out that if this information correct US Government was of opinion that démarche lacked legal or moral justification and threatened over defiance of expressed will UN.
3. Bajpai said he had been intending call me in to discuss latest telegrams from Peiping and would have done so if I had not requested appointment. He had given contents telegrams yesterday evening to Nye and he assumed their substance was being made available to US through British channels. He had acted through British channels since previous conversations re crossing 38th parallel had been carried on through those channels. He then read to me excerpts from two telegrams received from Panikkar yesterday and another received this morning. He said he was not making full text available to US Government because he feared that remarks of Chinese leaders derogatory to US would widen breach between US and Communist China which Government of India was attempting to narrow. Eventually, [Page 870] however, he gave me full text these three telegrams to read and also read aloud text Nehru’s message of several days ago to Chou En-Lai appealing to Peiping not to intervene in Korea.
4. In reading Nehru’s message Bajpai obviously omitted several passages. Nevertheless, I believe he gave me fair idea of contents. Nehru stressed Government of India’s efforts on behalf Peiping in and out of UN. He expressed conviction that if Peiping would show restraint in spite of position in which it had been placed by failure to obtain admittance into UN and by developments in Formosa it would eventually be admitted into UN. Sentiment was even growing in influential sections in US to admit Peiping into UN, et cetera. Devastating consequences of war which might result from Chinese intervention in Korea were stressed. Nehru described how Government of India was endeavoring to prevail upon UN not to send UN forces into North Korea and referred to three power agreement that such forces would not enter without approval UN. In general appeal followed lines of endeavoring to show that Government of India had interests of Peiping at heart; that it felt that Peiping was being treated unjustly; that justice would eventually be done if Peiping would refrain from engaging in rash adventures; and that rash actions might lead to world conflict from which all people including Chinese would suffer.
5. Telegrams received yesterday from Panikkar contained statements from Chou En-lai that Peiping had decided that if UN forces should enter North Korea Peiping must consider such entry as aggression against friendly neighboring state and would meet this aggression with armed force. There was argumentation to effect that crossing of 38th parallel from south would constitute aggression unless Korean conflict from beginning should be considered as civil war. It was hypocrisy for US to claim that entry of North Koreans into South Korea was aggression whereas entry of UN forces into North Korea was not aggression. Messages also contained praise of Nehru’s press statement of October 2 re Korea with which Peiping fully agreed.1
6. In telegram just received this morning Panikkar said that Peiping officials had made clear that entry of South Korean armed forces into North Korea would not be considered as aggression and that therefore crossing 38th parallel by South Koreans would not necessitate Chinese intervention. Entry of forces other than South Korean into North Korea would be met, however, by Chinese intervention. There was nothing in this telegram, and Bajpai told me he had thus far [Page 871] received nothing whatsoever from Peiping, which would indicate that Peiping considered that US forces had already crossed 38th parallel (see Moscow telegram to Department 814, October 3).
7. In one of Panikkar’s messages there was statement to effect that Peiping would not recognize any decision re future Korea taken by UN unless it was member of the UN Commission on Korea. I asked if Government of India was in favor of Peiping serving as member of contemplated new Commission on Korea. Bajpai said that if I was referring to commission proposed in UK resolution before first Committee General Assembly he could tell me that Government of India was maintaining negative attitude re that resolution and various parts of it. Under Nehru’s instructions, for instance, he had yesterday instructed Rau that India would not be member this Commission. I expressed some disappointment at this news. I said that if India should refuse to serve on this commission other Asian powers might follow its example and authority commission could be greatly weakened. Bajpai replied that unless it was made clear that 38th parallel would not be crossed by UN forces India would be compelled to maintain negative attitude with regard to resolution. He was of opinion that India could be more useful in maintaining peace if it did not participate in any plan connected with or flowing from crossing of 38th parallel by UN forces.
8. Bajpai asked if I had any comments or suggestions to make at this juncture in world affairs. I replied that it seemed to me that although UN forces at great sacrifices had won military victory over aggressor, international Communism by cleverly playing upon divergent aims and ambitions of free nations appeared to be putting the free world in a position of choosing between losing all advantage of this victory and allowing aggression to take its course or to face danger of new world war in extremely unfavorable circumstances.
It seemed to me there was [no?] likelihood that any appeal to North Koreans to cooperate with UN in establishing united Korea would have any effect other than to give North Koreans opportunity to strengthen themselves, and Soviet Union and Peiping time, if they chose, openly to declare that any invasion of North Korea would be considered an aggression to be met by force. Subsequent entry UN forces into North Korea could thereby be widely acclaimed as a new war, not continuation of war brought about by North Korean aggression. In fact, brief pause which had taken place has almost placed UN forces already in this kind of position.
On other hand if UN forces should decide not to enter North Korea they might be compelled either to remain there indefinitely in order to defend South Korea from sporadic attacks made by North Koreans, strengthened by arms, other supplies, and leadership from Communist [Page 872] China and Russia, or to withdraw sooner or later and permit North Korea, backed by strength and prestige of its great Communist neighbors, to complete the work of conquest which UN had interrupted.
There was undoubtedly danger of expansion of hostilities if, regardless of Peiping’s warnings, UN forces should proceed at once into North Korea. World war might commence with powers of West, at least in initial stages, differing among themselves re advisability taking steps in Korea which might involve Communist China, greatest Communist power of Asia, against free world; and with free countries of Asia led by India assuming position frankly unsympathetic with that of rest of free world. If Russia considered world war inevitable, it seemed to be managing well by playing on Asian feelings of nationalism, racial jealousies, on ambitions for Asian unity, and on outmoded suspicions of Asia of West, to introduce it with maximum disruption of free world.
I thought it great tragedy that leaders of Asian free world, instead of concentrating attention of free peoples of Asia upon merits of situation, were showing tendencies to criticise methods by which UN forces had been victorious in Korea and upon inadvisability of UN forces utilizing that victory in way which would most effectively discourage aggressors and potential aggressors. Little was being said by spokesmen for free Asia re dangers of permitting great Communist powers to prevent by threats peoples of small countries in their neighborhood from choosing for themselves the form of government which they were to have. If China would be permitted by mak[ing] threats to prevent collective action to be taken for preserving independence of united Korea there was grave danger that by similar threats, China or Russia could prevent collective action from being taken for security other nations lying in their shadow. If world was again relapsing into state where collective efforts to promote security of small nations would collapse in face of threats by great powers, then it might as well be frankly admitted that all efforts to preserve peace by means of collective security had been in vain and that international relations were to be governed by force—not by any code of international morality.
8. [sic] I told Bajpai that in talking to him in this frank manner I was not acting on instructions from my government, but I was sure that what I said must be views of many American officials who were faced with making in these trying days extremely difficult decisions. I said that the US deeply prized India’s understanding and friendship. It did not like to launch on any course of international action which did not meet with India’s approval. India’s policy in opposing crossing of UN forces into North Korea was in my opinion placing US in most difficult position.
[Page 873]I hoped Government of India would understand that if US should decide that it must advocate entry of UN forces into North Korea this decision would have been made only after full consideration had been given to India’s recommendations and it would probably be based on US conviction that for UN forces to halt just now at 38th parallel would represent capitulation to threats of aggression—capitulation which might more than offset such strengthening of cause of collective security as had been achieved thus far in Korea.
9. Bajpai was courteous in receiving my remarks. He indicated that Nehru was returning this evening to Delhi.
- Reference is to a statement made by Mr. Nehru on October 2 commemorating Gandhi’s birthday wherein he expressed fears about the extension of fighting into a world war and condemned the destruction caused by U.N. air attacks. He said that though responsibility rested on those who attacked first, the heaviest destruction had been wrought by the “saviors” of Korea. (Telegram 824, October 3, from New Delhi; 791.00/10–350)↩