795.00/10–450
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Allison of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
Subject: Chinese Communist Participation in Korean Debate
| Participants: | The Honorable Kenneth Younger, M.P., Head of United Kingdom Delegation |
| Sir Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Secretary Acheson | |
| Mr. John M. Allison, United States Delegation |
Mr. Younger requested an urgent interview this afternoon to make known the contents of a priority message just received from Mr. Bevin, on the Queen Mary, expressing his concern over possible Chinese Communist action in Korea and instructing Mr. Younger to get the personal opinion of the Secretary as to the desirability of making some statement in the course of the Korean debate for the purpose of discouraging Communist China from intervention and giving it a prospect of being heard. Mr. Younger said that his instructions were that if the United States was agreeable the United Kingdom Delegation would be prepared to propose or second a resolution giving the Peiping Government the hearing on the Korean matter. Mr. Younger pointed out that obviously when Mr. Bevin had sent the message he did not realize how far advanced the Korean debate bad progressed. The Secretary stated that in his opinion it was too late now to raise the question of bringing in the Chinese Communists and that if such an attempt was made it would only serve to confuse the issue, would delay passage of the Korean resolution and might well endanger the lives of American and British troops now in Korea. The Secretary further pointed out that while he agreed there was a risk in going ahead in view of the Chinese Communists position as conveyed to the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, nevertheless there had been risk from the beginning and at present he believed a greater risk would be incurred by showing hesitation and timidity. The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists were themselves taking no risk in as much as their private talks to the Indian Ambassador could be disavowed, that they had not made any statement directly to the United Nations or to the Unified Command and if they wanted to take part in the “poker game” they would have to put more on the table than they had up to the present. The Secretary further explained that forces were in motion and plans were being made and that the Unified Command after a period of regrouping would be advancing into North Korea and that it was too late now to stop this process. In the Secretary’s opinion the only proper course to take was a firm and courageous [Page 869] one and that we should not be unduly frightened at what was probably a Chinese Communist bluff.
The Secretary admitted that the Chinese Communists did have legitimate interests in certain aspects of the Korean problem such as questions affecting power plants along the Korean side of the Yalu River which furnished considerable electric power to Manchurian industries. However, there was no reason why the Commission which was to be set up under the draft resolution of the United Kingdom should not consult all parties who might be concerned including the Chinese Communists and the Secretary said that this point might be made clear in the general debate on the resolution in the Plenary Session. It was agreed that no attempt would be made to bring in the Chinese Communists at this time and Mr. Younger seemed satisfied that he would be able to explain this to Mr. Bevin.