Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/10–450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

[Washington,] October 4, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Threat of Intervention in Korea

Reference: CA memorandum of September 27, 1950, “Chinese Communist Intentions”

The following additional thoughts are offered respecting the Chinese Communist threat of intervention in Korea.

Note in the complete message received from the British Chargé d’Affaires at Peking, as provided by the British Embassy in Washington,¹ that: Chou En-lai summoned Panikkar at 0010 hours local time, October 3, thus indicating urgency; Chou En-lai referred to “American” armed forces crossing the 38th; and Chou while stating that Peiping was prepared to accept the Indian Government’s position re Korea as set forth by Nehru in his September 26 [30] press conference,² said further that China would accept no settlement of the Korea question to which China was not a party.

The Chou En-lai démarche cannot safely be regarded as mere bluff, although (1) made after presumed receipt by Mao Tse-tung of message from Nehru stating 38th parallel would not be crossed until after UN discussion^* and (2) designed admirably to support the Soviet resolution in UN. His démarche must be regarded as having been made with foreknowledge and support of USSR. The political and military stakes are considerable, and Moscow and Peiping may be prepared to take considerable risks.

If China and USSR are prepared now to accept the danger of clash with UN in Korea, that means that they are prepared to risk the danger of World War III, and feel ready to meet that danger, given present comparative military strengths. In such case, we cannot not avoid danger either by retreating from it or by surrendering to the Peiping threat: either move would increase, not diminish, the danger inherent in the situation for us.³

Acceptance of either the Soviet proposition, or the Chou dictum that China must be party to any agreement affecting Korea, would obviously vitiate any arrangements for settlement of the Korean affair and rob the UN allies of fruits of their effort. The danger offered by North Korea in the first instance would thus continue in being. In the light of all of the circumstances neither Peiping’s nor Moscow’s suggestion seems to merit sympathetic consideration. The problem is, however, not one which, for reasons of either UN procedure or political expediency, we should endeavor to solve alone. Especially in view of the possible dangers inherent in the situation, we should proceed only with due regard to (1) our military position in the global field and (2) the political and military positions of our friends. We should continue to advance against the enemy in the world theater, but in the theater in question we should advance only if it is in accord with our own best interests and we have the general support of our UN allies. It would seem now that the North Koreans do not intend to surrender; at the best, therefore, we can evidently expect only (1) a costly military campaign, complicated by guerrilla warfare (as suggested in publicity in both Moscow and Peiping), during a time when our military forces perhaps had better be disposed elsewhere; (2) a likewise costly process of rehabilitation of sometime enemy economy; and (3) a possible further exacerbation of relations with hypersensitive and already embittered, xenophobic Orientals.

The Indian position should be taken into consideration. Conviction is best brought home to the Indians by maneuvers of the Chinese Communists and Soviet UN representatives themselves. It is evident that India itself desires a viable solution of the problem. It seems appropriate and politically desirable, particularly, to give full consideration to the Indian point of view (which is in any event so much closer to our own than the Russian) in these respects: (1) General MacArthur’s surrender order could now be supported by a new order which, without repeating the demand to surrender, could give the Korean Communists a time limit of 10 or 15 days in which to accede to that surrender order and (2) the Indians could be asked to set forth on their own initiative concrete proposals respecting the procedure for unification of Korea and post-war rehabilitation of the country. Both of those aims have the support in principle of Sir Benegal Rau. If the Indian delegation is given more responsibility for working on the problem, they may be more respectful of our own position. Taking due note of Chou En-lai’s exception in favor of the South Korean forces, an attempt might first be made to deal with the matter through use of the South Korean forces alone north of the 38th: after all, General Walker did state that the backbone of the North Korean army had been broken (although current intelligence does not quite bear this out). It would cost little as an experiment, but of course strong hopes should not be attached to such an experiment.

Apart from the political problem of getting India’s support, procedure had best be based upon the majority position. The recommendations of Australian Foreign Minister Spender have much merit,⁴ but UN movement into North Korea should be on the basis of the consideration that the Chinese Communists might in fact intervene with armed force, and that if they did so intervene, the USSR might likewise intervene, and that the hostilities might not in such case be limited to Korea.

As practical steps it is recommended that (1) an urgent check be made through the Embassy at The Hague to get more details, if feasible, on the reason for Stikker’s estimating that a major Chinese Communist military move was in the offing, (2) our missions at strategic points in different parts of the world be informed of the Chinese Communist démarche, its possible implications, and asked to report urgently any untoward developments which have recently come to their attention which might be relevant, (3) a close check be made on current movements and activities of Soviet Embassy personnel in Washington.

In view of the pertinency in this connection of NSC 81/1,⁵ new consideration to the problem in point is perhaps merited. In any event, however, our action in the present circumstances should be moulded to the framework of the UN—and we should advance and fulfill our obligations to the UN in accordance with the majority will. It is fitting, however, that if the task is to increase in size, our UN friends bear a more proportionate share of the burden.

1. Not printed.
2. See footnote 1 to telegram 814 from Moscow received at 12:23 p. m. on October 3, p. 851.
3. The Hague Tel 490, Oct 3, 1950. [Footnote in the source text]
3. A manuscript note in the source text by Mr. Merchant indicated his agreement with this paragraph. Mr. Matthews had underlined in the first sentence the words “USSR” and “prepared to risk the danger of World War III” and placed a question mark in the margin.
4. In a statement before the First Committee on October 3, Mr. Spender, while rejecting the claim of the Republic of Korea to be the sole executive authority for all of Korea, said that U.N. forces must cross the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean aggressor and prepare the way for a unified Korea under the auspices of the proposed U.N. Commission for Korea (U.N. document A/C.1/SR. 350).
5. Dated September 9, p. 712.