795.00/8–3150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

[Extract]
top secret

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
The Secretary
H. Freeman Matthews (G)

2. Formosa. The Secretary said that frankly he had been so busy in preparation for his hearings that, although he had read the paper [Page 474] left with Matthews1 and had a very brief discussion with those in the Department concerned with the matter, he had not given adequate thought to this important and complicated subject nor had he discussed it with the President. He said, however, that a paper had been prepared which he would let Sir Oliver read, but did not feel he could let him have.2 The paper, he said, had been written with paragraph 15 of the British memorandum in mind.3 It was not designed to be a statement of American views. We felt that paragraph 15 of the British paper did not represent a position with which it would be easy for us to go along. The paper which he had let Sir Oliver read was designed to indicate the sort of approach which, if the British made to us, we would feel deserved our careful consideration. If that sort of an approach were made to us, we would see what we could do to meet it and would endeavor to work out an American Government position with respect thereto. The Secretary then covered the principal points in the attached paper and the thinking that went into them.

Sir Oliver said that he thought the suggested approach was a constructive one and that, while London would be disappointed that we have not gone the whole way of their paragraph 15, he thought they would find the approach helpful. He then asked how he could put the question up to London and emphasized that one of the factors which in past correspondence seemed to be troubling Mr. Bevin personally was the belief that the Americans might be trying to build up Chiang for possible return to the Mainland. He said that he himself was convinced that this was not the case, but anything which would reassure Mr. Bevin on this point, in view of all the confusion abroad about American policy concerning Formosa and attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government, would be advantageous. In reply the Secretary indicated he thought Sir Oliver could say that the paper represented thinking in the Department (not the views of the Secretary of State), and that he could honestly and emphatically assure London that there is a growing soberness on the Hill with respect to Formosa and a realization of the complexity of the problem. The Secretary said he had pointed out a number of pertinent factors regarding China and the dangers of the war spreading in that area and that during his discussion there had been no interruptions or adverse comments. While a few of the more extreme Republicans may still hold their views, he thought they could not carry with them the more serious-minded members of their Party, and that he was much impressed with the developing sober attitude and understanding of the [Page 475] dangers involved. He said he felt that if Sir Oliver could report a similar impression (with which Sir Oliver agreed) it should be reassuring to Mr. Bevin. Sir Oliver said lots of people had hoped that the Formosa problem could be “kept on ice” but this seemed impossible under the circumstances and that therefore the British Government was trying to find the best way to handle the problem with a view to its long-term solution. Matthews said he thought the approach in our paper went a long way toward taking the problem “off the ice” and in the proper direction. Sir Oliver agreed.

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[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

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The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that every effort must be made to prevent the spread of existing hostilities beyond Korea. To this end they desire to secure agreement between themselves on a course of action with respect to Formosa which will minimize the risk of an eruption of hostilities between the Island and the Mainland and which will serve as a basis for a common program with other friendly states and command the support of a firm majority in the United Nations.

With these ends in view the following is submitted as a basis for discussion:

1.
A concerted effort should be made in the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations to secure the adoption of a Resolution which would in substance
(a)
refer to the historic Chinese claim to Formosa and state that no nation other than China asserts a claim to sovereignty over Formosa, that both the Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese People’s Government publicly maintain China’s claim to Formosa;
(b)
confirm that, until a settlement of the case of aggression against the Republic of Korea on a basis satisfactory to the United Nations has been achieved and the peace of the general area has been restored, no party shall attempt to resort to force to alter the present status of Formosa nor shall the Island be used as a base for attack against the Mainland;
(c)
establish a Commission of the United Nations charged with the responsibility of recommending to the General Assembly of the United Nations an appropriate peaceful settlement of the Formosa question. The Commission in arriving at its conclusions shall take into account the considerations set forth in (a) and (b) above as well as the following two points,
(i)
The status of Formosa under international law in the presence or absence at that time of a Peace Treaty with Japan;
(ii)
the wishes, as they may be expressed under any arrangements which the Commission may provide, of the inhabitants of the Island with respect to the future status of Formosa.
2.
If agreement is reached by the United States and the United Kingdom on 1. above, consultation with other friendly nations should be instituted promptly with a view to securing widest possible support for the proposal in the United Nations.

  1. Reference is to the British memorandum entitled “Formosa”; see footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Merchant, August 28, p. 464.
  2. The paper under reference is printed as an annex to this document.
  3. See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Merchant, August 29, p. 467.