760H.61/11–1149
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Thompson)
Mr. Hoyer-Millar showed me a series of telegrams from the British Ambassador in Belgrade2 to the Foreign Office reporting a conversation with Tito. For the most part, the conversation added little to our knowledge of Tito’s attitude on various questions. Re Albania, he said the best policy was to let the Albanians stew in their own juice and that any outside intervention would be unfortunate. The most significant development in the conversation was Peake’s initiative in referring to items in the Belgrade press implying that the Soviet Union might get itself involved in a world war over the Yugoslav question. Peake stressed several times in the conversation that he hoped Tito did not have any illusions on this score, making clear that Yugoslavia could not count on Great Britain’s becoming involved in a world war as a result of any attack on Yugoslavia.3 Tito informed the Ambassador he had no illusions on this score, but pointed out the need for encouraging his own people.
I pointed out that it seemed unnecessary and possibly unwise to have raised this issue with Tito. Hoyer-Millar agreed but observed that Tito did not appear to have been unduly disturbed by it.
I believe we should be extremely careful to prevent any leak to the press of this British démarche, which if known, would only serve to encourage Soviet aggression.
- Sir Charles Peake.↩
- In a conversation with New York Times correspondent C. L. Sulzberger on November 8, British Prime Minister Attlee indicated that there was complete agreement between Britain and the United States on policy toward Yugoslavia and that the policy might be described as one of “all aid short of war”. (Sulzberger, Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries [1934–1954] (The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 447)↩