501.BC Indonesia/1–2049: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret   us urgent

57. At social occasion last night, Lovink,1 in course conversation with Embassy officer, said that SC resolution in form Netherlands had [Page 180] learned from press was entirely unacceptable and added that their objections were to what he called “body” of resolution. Continuing Lovink asked if officer wanted know what Dutch would accept. Officer said “yes, if you want us to know.”

Subsequently at Stikker’s home with Lovink present, Stikker handed us following typed text (in form SC resolution) dated January 18, which he decribed as text he had prepared in effort to find solution for Indonesian dilemma. Paper had been discussed and approved by certain cabinet colleagues, but not cabinet as whole nor with Batavia, and must therefore be understood as completely unbinding on Netherlands Government. However, he believed cabinet would be prepared to comply fully with resolution couched in terms to effect indicated. Text follows:

“The SC,

“Considering its resolution of August 1, 1947, August 25, 1947 and November 1, 1947 with respect to the Indonesian question;

“Taking note of the reports submitted by the Commission of Good Offices;

“Of the opinion that the resolution of December 24, 1948 and December 28, 1948 have not been fully complied with;

“Considering that all parties involved in the dispute desire that Indonesia will become a sovereign and independent federal state linked with the Netherlands in a union on a basis of equality in accordance with the principles of Linggadjati and the Renville;

“That for these ends the parties deem it necessary that free and democratic elections be held in the whole of Indonesia in order to create a constituent assembly which is to draw up a constitution for the USI and to determine with the Netherlands the conditions on which the Netherlands–Indonesian union will be established;

“That the Netherlands Government has declared its willingness to do everything in its power to organise these elections in the third quarter of 1949;

“That the Netherlands Government wishes to transfer the sovereignty, as soon as the above-mentioned measures have been carried out and, inasmuch as it depends on this government, no later than 1950;

“That the Netherlands forces will have to be withdrawn gradually from Indonesia, as the USI will have organised its own federal troops which are necessary to ensure the maintenance of law and order, taking into account the provisions in the agreement concerning defense between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the USI linked together in the Netherlands–Indonesian union;

“That the establishment of a national federal government for the whole of Indonesia is essential for the transition to the free and sovereign USI and to the free and democratic constitutional organization of all Indonesian territories including those over which the Republic exercised de facto authority until December 18, 1948;

“That the Netherlands Government has declared its intention to establish such a government within one month;

[Page 181]

“That in order to achieve this, consultations are already taking place between Indonesian federalists and prominent persons from Republican circles;

“That the realisation of the programme outlined above will do full justice to the national aspirations of the Indonesian peoples;

“That the cooperation of the SC in this respect contributes to safeguarding the rights and claims of all parties involved in the dispute and could promote a speedy solution of the existing difficulties;

“Appeals to the parties;

  • “1. To harmonise their efforts for the realisation of this programme,
  • “2. To cease all hostilities in the meantime and to release without delay all political prisoners who are willing to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution.

“Resolves:

“To appoint a representative of the SC who is to be accredited as special plenipotentiary to the HRC in Indonesia and who will have the following tasks:

  • “1. To observe the implementation of this programme by the Netherlands Government.
  • “2. To call for the cooperation of all national forces in Indonesia in the realisation of this programme;
  • “3. To render assistance to the parties in the settlement of their dispute.

“The special plenipotentiary will submit reports to the SC regularly and whenever he deems it [necessary?] to do so.

“The special plenipotentiary will appoint observers, officers and staff as he deems desirable.

“The activities of the CGO and the consular committee are suspended.

“The SYG of the UN is requested to make available to the special plenipotentiary staff, funds and whatever may be required besides.

“Resolves:

“To request the government of blank to recommend a person to the SC whom the Council could appoint as its special plenipotentiary”.

Stikker said he had secured postponement chamber debate Indonesia past week because fear temper likely displayed would inflame public opinion and seriously harm foreign relations. Resentment was growing against increasing evidence of SC intervention, under US leadership, into internal affair of Netherlands without any pretense of consultation or negotiation with Netherlands Government, This he said could not be understood by Netherlands, of country which had always been and still seemed to consider itself as friendly. He repeated, with greatest emphasis, that Netherlands could not accept or comply with resolution, arrived at in such fashion, which aimed at restoring the former Republican regime, with all its potentialities for domination of all Indonesia.

[Page 182]

Stikker, with Lovink joining in, went on to say that Netherlands Government resented handling and above all the leakage (or release) of US draft resolution, as it had made Drees mission Indonesia futile and highly embarrassing, since it put US on record, in the eyes of all Indonesians and Asians generally, as taking sides openly with the Republic and aiming at its full restoration. This resolution, if adopted, in Asiatic eyes, meant “finis” for Holland in Indonesia, and of western prestige, influence and, largely, of western interests in that part of the world. Its consequence, inevitably, would be the long term impoverishment of Holland, and the almost certain growth of Communism here, as in France and Italy, into a force that threatened its democratic existence. If Holland was forced to take that road, the Dutch people would do so rather than submit to what they would regard as gravest injustice.

Stikker was reminded that Netherlands Government had taken its course in Indonesia after fullest and frankest friendly warning of the danger involved. It was also pointed out to him that Netherlands Government had indicated when it took military action Indonesia that it sought only to remove those forces in the Republic which were responsible for chaos and terror and which had restrained its government from coming to agreement with the Netherlands authorities, but that now it appeared that Netherlands had much more far reaching objectives and really sought to root out the Republic once and for all. His reply was that, notwithstanding opposition of some prominent individuals and certain parties, it was still the firm intention of Netherlands Government to deal with “prominent leaders” of the Republican regime, as had been agreed with the federalists and publicly announced. Their intentions, however they claim, were being completely crossed up by SC; Lovink pleaded for postponement of SC on resolution for long enough to permit working out of text Netherlands could comply with or progress to be made on negotiations currently going on in Indonesia.

Much of above has already been reported to Department and is repeated now only as showing thinking of Foreign Office has undergone little if any change by important and conciliatory revisions in original Jessup resolution which we believe should have gone long way to meet Dutch point of view. English colleague, however, who also received copy Dutch proposed resolution does not see eye to eye with us entirely.

Baruch
  1. A. H. J. Lovink, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Office.