740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–2847
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: With regard to our future program in Korea, I am told that General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent discussed the matter with you and Mr. Petersen yesterday along the lines of the discussion which took place with Secretary Marshall on March 4.
We are of the opinion that decision and action on the following matters are urgently required in connection with our program which has as its objective the more effective implementation of policy in Korea:
- (1)
- Congressional authorization by legislative act should be requested for expenditures in Korea over the period of the next three years not to exceed $540,000,000.
- (2)
- Congressional appropriation of $215,000,000 for the fiscal year 1948 should be requested. Detailed justifications are being prepared but no formal action is necessary until the authorizing legislation has been passed.
- (3)
- Our administration in Korea should be reorganized:
- (a)
- A directive should be issued terminating General MacArthur’s political—but not his military—responsibilities in Korea.
- (b)
- A political adviser of ambassadorial rank should be appointed. He should be capable of taking charge at some future time of all US civil administration operations in Korea as well as assuming responsibility for possible future negotiation with the Soviets in Korea.
- (c)
- There should be a gradual replacement of military personnel in Military Government by civilians, civilianization to be substantially completed within the next two or three months.
- (d)
- Military Government is now endeavoring to obtain passage by the Interim Legislative Assembly of a general election law. These efforts should be continued and as soon as a law is passed a new legislative assembly should be elected. As soon as this has occurred Military Government should move as rapidly as possible toward setting up a Korean provisional government with substantial autonomy in domestic affairs. It is anticipated that the Political Adviser, acting as “Civil Commissioner”, would replace the Military Governor by the time a civil administration has been set up.
- (e)
- The Political Adviser should operate within the War Department chain of command as at present. When he assumes the position of Civil Commissioner he should have over-all direction of civil affairs, CG USAFIK retaining only his strictly military responsibilities. With this change-over, the Civil Commissioner would report directly to and come under the direction of the State Department. This assumption of responsibility by the State Department is conditioned upon approval by Secretary Marshall.
- (f)
- The inauguration of the above changes will necessitate the issuance of a new “Interim Directive to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, for Military Government in Those Areas of Korea Occupied by U.S. Forces”. Processing of such a directive through SWNCC and JCS channels is now in progress.
- (4)
- A high level business and industrial group should be dispatched to Korea to take an industrial census and make recommendations on economic, financial and industrial rehabilitation. A representative of Military Government in Korea is now in Washington in regard to this matter, which is being handled by the War Department (CAD) in consultation with JK.
- (5)
- The public information and education program of Korea should be intensified. This is being handled by the War Department (CAD) in consultation with OIC.
General Marshall has indicated his intention to discuss the Korean problem with Molotov (or Stalin) sometime before the end of the present Moscow Conference. It is anticipated that the General will tell Mr. Molotov plainly and firmly of our disappointment over the Soviet Government’s attitude toward implementation of the Moscow [Page 623] agreement regarding Korea of December 1945 and will inform Molotov that, while we are not closing the door to a reasonable Soviet initiative on reconvening the Joint Commission, we plan to proceed energetically with carrying out the objectives of the Moscow Agreement in so far as it is feasible for us to do so in the absence of a unified administration for the country.
A Russian proffer to reconvene the Joint Commission and go forward with implementing the Moscow decision on terms acceptable to us would call for a reassessment of the program outlined above but not for its abandonment. Without doubt a unified administration would make possible a reduction in the amount required for rehabilitation and reconstruction in southern Korea. But a considerable sum still would be required and machinery for expenditure of these funds under American control would be necessary.
Therefore, whether the Civil Commissioner mentioned above would function independently in southern Korea or whether he would function jointly for a time with a Russian of similar status, expenditure of appropriated funds would remain under his supervision. Furthermore, should there be a joint withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Korea, the need and means for achieving our objectives with regard to the economy and political evolution of Korea would remain substantially the same, although some modification in method might be necessary.
It could be hoped, but with little confidence, that the Russians might be induced to make a proportionate expenditure of funds, but Soviet failure to make proportionate expenditures in Korea would not alter our problem or our objective, and therefore a need for expenditure of American funds under American control would continue to exist. It is our objective to bring about in as short a time as possible a united democratic Korea and in order to do so the economy of Korea requires our support. We estimate that the amount for which authorization is requested ($540,000,000) would bring into being at the end of three years a viable, self-supporting Korean economy.
Sincerely yours,